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Abstract 
The concept of a phased mission has been introduced as a sequential set of objectives 
that operate over different time intervals. During each phase of the mission, the 
system may alter such that the logic model, system configuration, or system failure 
characteristics may change to accomplish a required objective. 
A new fault tree method has been proposed to enable the probability of failure in each 
phase to be determined in addition to the whole mission unreliability. Phase changes 
are assumed to be instantaneous, and component failure rates are assumed to be 
constant through the mission. For any phase, the method combines the causes of 
success of previous phases with the causes of failure for the phase being considered to 
allow both qualitative and quantitative analysis of both phase and mission failure. A 
new set of Boolean laws is introduced to combine component success and failure 
events through multiple phases so that the expression for each phase failure can be 
reduced into minimal form. 
The binary decision diagram (BDD) method offers an alternative approach to the fault 
tree method and reduces the complexity of the problem. For larger fault trees it is 
more efficient to convert to a BDD prior to analysis, and this is particularly true of the 
non-coherent phase failure fault trees. The standard BDD technique has been extended 
to develop a method for use in missions of multiple phases. 
Markov methods are considered for the analysis of phased missions where repair of 
components is possible. A full Markov model is generated by using a single model 
which works over all phases of the mission, and is constructed by the inclusion of all 
components featured in every stage. By identifying certain types of phases and 
components, it is possible to reduce this full Markov model further. 
The phases of a mission may be characterised in certain ways. If a phase requires the 
relevant system function to work at an instant in time it is defined as discrete, and no 
state transitions may occur during the phase. A continuous phase requires the 
appropriate system configuration to be reliable for the specified phase duration. 
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The concept of sequential failure relationships has been introduced to missions of 
multiple phases. Component failures can be identified as initiating or enabling events, 
and the function of a component is subject to change through the mission duration. A 
maintenance policy is considered where components can be subject to scheduled 
inspection. 
Later sections of the thesis consider appropriate importance measures for phase and 
mission reliability. 
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
1.1 Introduction to Risk and Reliability Assessment 
The catastrophic consequences due to the failure of systems in industries such as 
aeronautical, nuclear, offshore, and transport demonstrate the requirement for 
improved methods of ensuring the reliability and safety of complex systems. 
Examples of such eventualities are the fire and explosion on the Piper Alpha oil 
platform in 1988 and the Chemobyl nuclear power plant disaster in 1986, both of 
which caused multiple fatalities. System assessments applied in a systematic way at 
the design stage can reduce the possibility of undesirable incidents occurring in the 
future when the system is operational. 
Methods to assess the risk and reliability of systems have been developed over a 
number of years, with significant advances made since the Second World War. Such 
methods enable the evaluation of the probability or frequency by which a hazardous 
event could occur (accounting if necessary for the safety systems failure to respond). 
The risk, or 'expected loss' of a specific incident, R, is defined as the product of the 
consequences of the event, C, and the probability or frequency of the event 
occurrence, P, in equation (1.1). 
R=CxP (1.1) 
For safety studies, the consequence is generally measured by the number of resulting 
fatalities. The risk can therefore be reduced by reducing either the consequences of the 
incident or the associated incident probability or frequency. The risk assessment will 
compare the predicted risk with an acceptable level. 
In assessing the adequacy of engineering systems, the Health and Safety Executive 
(HSE) assume a three-zone approach to define the acceptable level of risk. The 
highest zone denotes the unacceptable risk levels, where either the consequences of 
the incident or the associated incident probability or frequency must be reduced to 
bring the risk into an acceptable level. The lowest zone represents negligible risk 
levels that are considered to be acceptable. The intermediate zone is defined as the 
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'ALARP' region (As Low As Reasonably Practicable). In this case the risks must be 
shown to be as low as possible, whilst still being economically feasible. 
To determine the zone for a specific hazard requires a quantified risk assessment. This 
is defined in four basic stages: 
1. Identification 0 f the potential safety hazards. 
2. Estimation of the consequences of each hazard. 
3. Estimation of the probability of occurrence of each hazard. 
4. Comparison of the results of the analysis against the acceptability criteria. 
The consequences of an equipment failure are generally measured in terms of cost or 
the number of fatalities. Such consequences can be extremely severe, and are very 
much dependent on the failure mode and industry involved. Reliability assessment 
techniques considering the probability or frequency of system failure occurrence are 
generic and thus are extensively implemented within many industries. Examples of 
such methods are Failure Mode and Effect Analysis (FMEA), Event Tree Analysis 
(ETA), Fault Tree Analysis (PTA), and Markov Analysis. 
1.2 System Failure Quantification 
The reliability performance of a system can be predicted in terms of the reliability 
performance of its components using suitable techniques. The performance of a 
system or component is described by the quantification of system and component 
failure probabilities, using the parameters defined below. 
Where failure is tolerated and repair is possible, an appropriate performance measure 
is the availability of a system or component. This is defined as: 
The fraction of the total time that a system (or component) is able to perform 
its required function. 
This parameter can also be defined at a specified time point t as: 
The probability that a system or component is working at time t. 
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The complement of availability is unavailability, where: 
Unavailability = 1 - Availability 
The unavailability of a system or component is the probability that the system or 
component does not work at time t, and is denoted by QSYS (t) for a system and 
q c (t) for a component c. 
The reliability of a system or component is the probability of the successful 
performance ofthe system or component over a period of time, and is defined by: 
The probability that a system or component will operate without failure for a 
stated period oftime under specified conditions. 
The probability that a component or system fails to function successfully over a 
specified time period under particular conditions is defined as its unreliability, F(t), 
where: 
Unreliability = 1 - Reliability 
This parameter is generally more relevant for systems where failure cannot be 
tolerated and so the system or component is required to function successfully for a 
specified time duration. If a component or system is non-repairable and is known to be 
working at time t, it must have worked continuously over [O,t). In this case the 
unreliability is equal to the unavailability. 
The transition to a failed state of a component or system can be characterised by the 
hazard rate or conditional failure rate, het). This is a measure of the rate at which 
failures occur given successful operation to this point in time, i.e. still functioning at 
time t with the potential to fail, and is defined as: 
The probability that a component or system fails in the interval [t, t + dt) given 
that it has not failed in [O,t). 
The reliability characteristics of a component family are usually modelled by a 
'reliability bath-tub curve', illustrated in Figure 1.1. 
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In the first phase of Figure 1.1, the hazard rate (failure rate) reduces as the weak 
components are eliminated_ In the second phase, the hazard rate remains 
approximately constant and this is classed as the useful life of the components. In the 
final phase, the hazard rate increases as the components start to wear out. Reliability 
assessment is typically performed on components that are considered to be in their 
useful-life phase. The reliability of a system, RSYS (t) , can be expressed in terms of its 
constant hazard or failure rate A by the expression in equation (1.2). 
(1.2) 
Further component and system quantification techniques are presented in [1] and [2]. 
Reliability assessment tools can be applied to evaluate the reliability parameters of a 
system in terms of the reliability performance of its constituent components. Some of 
the most common are discussed in the following sections. 
1.3 Fault Tree Analysis 
The concept of fault tree analysis was first introduced by H.A. Watson in the 1960's, 
presenting a deductive analysis method of identifying the causes of a particular system 
failure mode using a 'what can cause this' approach. A fault tree provides a visual 
symbolic representation of the combination of component failure events resulting in 
the occurrence of a particular system failure mode. Analysis of the fault tree is a 
logical, structured process that provides information on the causes of system failure 
and associated reliability parameters. 
The system failure mode of concern is termed the top event of the fault tree, with 
branches below this determining its causes. Events within the fault tree are continually 
redefined in terms of their causes until component failure events (basic events) are 
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reached. The probability of the top event occurrence can then be calculated by the 
probability of the basic events. This is an example of a 'top-down' approach, in 
comparison to 'bottom-down' approaches such as FMEA which begin with a set of 
component failure conditions and implement a 'what happens if approach to identify 
possible consequences. 
The quantitative analysis of a fault tree is defined as Kinetic Tree Theory, and was 
developed in the early 1970's by Vesely [3]. This allowed calculations of parameters 
such as the probability and frequency of top event occurrence to be made in order to 
determine the risks involved with system failure. The disadvantage involved with fault 
tree quantification is that for large fault trees the analysis can become computationally 
demanding. Approximations are often used to quantify large fault trees, however the 
results will show inaccuracies. A new method has been developed to analyse a fault 
tree, the Binary Decision Diagram technique. 
1.4 Binary Decision Diagrams 
The Binary Decision Diagram (BDD) technique does not analyse the fault tree 
directly, but constructs a BDD to provide an efficient representation of the system 
with a Boolean equation for the top event. A BDD is a directed acyclic graph, and is 
dependent on the order in which the basic events of the fault tree are considered. 
Qualitative and quantitative analysis can be performed on a BDD, and exact solutions 
can be obtained without the need for approximations of the conventional fault tree 
approach. The use of BDDs in reliability analysis was initially developed by Rauzy 
[4]. 
1.5 Markov Methods 
The kinetic tree theory requires the assumption that the basic events in a fault tree are 
statistically independent. In many cases this assumption cannot be made, such as in 
systems where standby redundancy, common cause failures, secondary failures, or 
multiple-component states are possible. 
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Markov analysis provides a means of analysing the reliability and availability of 
systems whose components exhibit strong dependencies. The Markov method is a 
state-space approach. The likelihood of any event in the chain is determined only by 
the immediately preceding state and is independent of any other past events. A 
Markov model can be discrete or continuous in both time and space. The disadvantage 
of this method is that the model can increase rapidly with the number of components. 
1.6 Phased Mission Systems 
If the success of a system is reliant upon a sequential set of objectives operating over 
different time intervals, it may be referred to as a Phased Mission. During the 
execution of the phases in a mission, the system is altered such that the logic model, 
system configuration, or system failure characteristics may change to accomplish a 
different objective. The phases in a mission may be identified by; phase number, time 
interval, system configuration, task(s) to be undertaken, performance measure(s) of 
interest, or maintenance policy. 
A multi-phased mission can be characterized as a sequence of discrete events required 
to complete a task. Many types of system operate for missions which are made up of 
several phases. For the complete mission to be a success, the system must operate 
successfully during each of the phases. Examples of such systems include an aircraft 
flight, and also many military operations for both aircraft and ships. An aircraft 
mission could.be considered as the following phases: taxiing to the runway, take-off, 
climbing to the correct altitude, cruising, descending, landing and taxiing back to the 
terminal in Figure 1.2. 
Phase 11 Phase 2 Phase 31 Phase 4 Phase si Phase 6 Phase 7 
~-------------------{ ! 
~ 
Altitude Taxi Cruise De cent! Land Taxi 
: 
! 
I 
Time 
Figure 1.2 Transport phases of an aircraft 
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Component failures can occur at any point during the mission but their condition may 
only be critical for one particular phase. As such it may be that the transition from one 
phase to another is the critical event leading to mission failure, the component failures 
resulting in the system failure may have occurred during some previous phase. 
The reliability of a mission may not be obtained by the simple multiplication of the 
individual phase reliabilities. This is due to the fact that at the phase change times, the 
system must occupy a state that allows both of the involved phases to function. The 
phases of the mission will be statistically dependent. In order to identify possible 
causes of phase and mission failure, a method is required to express how 
combinations of component failures (basic events) can occur during the phases 
throughout the mission and cause system failure. These failure events then require 
quantification to enable the likelihood and frequency of mission failure to be 
determined. Mission unreliability is defined as the probability that the system fails to 
function successfully during at least one phase of the mission. An important problem 
is to calculate, as efficiently as possible, the exact value for the mission unreliability 
parameter. 
The main techniques that have previously been implemented for the solution to 
phased mission problems are that of fault tree analysis, Markov analysis and 
simulation. Fault tree analysis is a commonly used tool to assess the probability of 
failure of industrial systems. This method may be adapted for analysis of systems 
comprising of more than one phase, where each phase depends on a different logic 
model. Hence the complexity of the modelling is significantly more difficult than for 
single phase systems. Situations may be encountered in phased mission analysis that 
prevent the assumption of independence between component failure or repair being 
made. In such circumstances, methods such as the Markov approach must be 
employed. In some cases it will be difficult to model a system by fault tree or Markov 
methods. This type of situation will occur if a system is too complex to use 
deterministic analysis, or if the failure and repair distributions of a component do not 
have a constant failure or repair rate. In such circumstances, simulation may be 
necessary. Of the many considered solutions to phased mission problems, simulation 
techniques typically offer the greatest generality in representation, but are also often 
the most expensive in computational requirements. 
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1.7 Research Objectives 
The aim of this research is to consider analytical techniques for the efficient 
representation and solution of phased mission systems. Two distinct types of system 
will be examined. The first comprises of only non-repairable components and 
explores the possible methods for the representation of both phase and mission 
unavailability. The second type of system considers the possibility of repairable 
components in some or all phases of the mission with added dependencies. Previous 
work has concentrated on the object of assessing mission success. The presented 
methods will focus on the probability of success and failure in individual phases, 
where depending on the phase that the failure occurs, the consequences can be 
significantly different. The objectives of the project are listed below: 
Non-Repairable Systems: 
• Review of existing methods for non-repairable phased mission systems. 
• Present new techniques to identify the causes of phase and mission failure, and 
calculate exact phase and mission unavailability and frequency. 
• Develop current importance measures to include the importance of 
components to both individual phase and mission failure in a mUlti-phased 
mission. 
Repairable Systems: 
• Review of existing methods for repairable phased mission systems. 
• Present new techniques for calculating exact phase and mission unreliability 
for systems where some or all phases are repairable. 
• Develop the proposed techniques to include the possibility of : 
o Initiating and enabling events. 
o Appropriate maintenance policies. 
o Discrete and continuous phases. 
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Chapter 2 Reliability Analysis Tools 
2.1 Introduction 
There are many methods that can be used to predict the reliability performance of a 
system in terms of the reliability performances of the components of which it is 
constructed. Three widely used techniques, fault tree analysis, binary decision 
diagrams, and Markov analysis are discussed in the following sections. 
2.2 Fault Tree Analysis 
A fault tree provides a visual symbolic representation of the combination of 
component failure events required for the occurrence of a particular system failure 
mode. Fault tree analysis is a logical, structured process that provides information on 
the causes of system failure and associated reliability parameters and thus is very 
important in the design stages of a system. The entire system as well as human 
interactions would be analysed by performing a fault tree analysis. 
2.2.1 Construction of a Fault Tree 
The first step in the construction of a fault tree is to identify the system failure mode 
of concern. A system may have the potential for more than one undesirable failure 
mode, and so multiple fault trees would be constructed. The top event is defined as a 
particular system failure mode, with fault tree branches below this determining its 
causes. Events within the tree are continually redefined in terms of lower resolution 
events as causes for their occurrence. This process continues until all branches of the 
fault tree terminate in component failure events, termed basic events. Fault tree 
analysis can then be executed using data on the basic event failure probabilities. 
A fault tree comprises of symbols which represent events and gates. An event can be 
classed as intermediate or basic. The causes of an intermediate event can be expressed 
by other, lower resolution events, where as a basic event is the termination of a fault 
tree branch. Event symbols are shown in Table 2.1. Events are linked using a logical 
structure of gates. The three primary gate types used in fault trees are defined as 
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'AND', 'OR', and 'NOT' gates, which combine events in the same way as the 
Boolean operations of 'intersection', 'union', and 'complementation'. Another 
frequently used gate is the kin vote gate which requires that at least k out of n inputs 
occur for the output to be true. The gates are symbolised in Table 2.2. 
Event Symbols Meaning of Symbol 
D Intermediate event further developed by a gate 
6 Basic event 
Table 2.1 Event Symbols 
Gate Symbol Gate Name Casual Relation 
(] AND gate Output event occurs if all input events occur simultaneously 
6 OR gate Output event occurs if at least one of the input events occurs 
6 kin vote gate Output event occurs if at least k out of the n input events occur 
n inputs 
* 
NOT gate 
Output event occurs if the 
input event does not occur 
Table 2.2 Gate Symbols 
A system in which failure can only be caused by component failures and is made up 
of only 'AND' and 'OR' gates is defined as a coherent system. If the failure mode can 
be expressed by both component failures and successes, the use of 'NOT' gates is 
required and it is defined as a non-coherent system. 
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The analysis of a fault tree provides two types of result: qualitative and quantitative. 
Qualitative analysis identifies the combination of basic events that cause system 
failure. Quantitative analysis predicts system failure parameters in terms of basic 
event failure probabilities. 
2.2.2 Qualitative Analysis 
Qualitative analysis allows a system failure mode to be represented logically by 
combinations of basic events. Each combination of basic events that cause system 
failure is termed a cut set, defined as: 
A cut set is a collection of basic events such that if they all occur, the top event 
also occurs. 
A cut set may contain unnecessary events for the occurrence of the system failure 
mode. For example, a cut set {A, B, C} would guarantee system failure if all events 
occur. However if A and B alone can cause system failure, the state of C becomes 
irrelevant. This defines a minimal cut set: 
A minimal cut set is the smallest combination of basic events, such that if any 
basic event is removed from the set, the top event will not occur. 
Fault trees that produce identical minimal cut sets are logically equivalent. The order 
of a minimal cut set is the number of basic events which are contained in it. In general 
it is the lower order minimal cut sets that contribute most to system failure, and effort 
should be concentrated in the system design on the elimination of these. If NOT logic 
is used or implied in a fault tree, the combinations of basic events that cause system 
failure are defined as implicants. Minimal sets of implicants are termed prime 
implicants. 
The minimal cut sets of a fault tree are determined using either a 'top-down' or 
'bottom-up' approach to develop a Boolean logic expression in terms of component 
failure. The 'top-down' approach begins with the top event and continually substitutes 
Boolean events appearing lower down in the tree until the expression comprises of 
only basic events. The 'bottom-up' approach begins at the base of the tree and works 
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towards the top event. The product, '.' is used to represent 'AND', and the sum, '+' is 
used to represent 'OR' in the logic expressions. This expansion technique results in a 
sum-of-products (s-o-p) expression from which the cut sets can be determined. To 
ensure that the cut sets obtained are minimal, the s-o-p expression must be made 
minimal by removing redundancies with laws of Boo lean algebra. 
2.2.2.1 Example - Obtaining the Minimal Cut Sets 
The top-down approach for obtaining the minimal cut sets of a system is demonstrated 
using the example in Figure 2.1. 
Figure 2.1 Example Fault Tree 
The top-down approach begins with the event Top. This is an AND gate with two 
inputs, G 1 and G2, and so can be expressed as the product of the inputs: 
Top=G1·G2 
G1 is an OR gate and can be defined in terms ofthe two input events A and B: 
G1 =A+B 
This may be substituted into Top to give: 
Top = (A + B) . G2 
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Similarly, G2 can be written as the 'sum' ofC and G3: 
G2=C+G3 
G2 can then also be substituted into Top: 
Top = (A + B) . (C + G3) 
Finally G3 can be expressed as the 'product' of A and D: 
G3 =A· D 
And the expression for the Top event becomes: 
Top = (A + B) . (C + A . D) 
Since this expression now only contains basic events, Top can be expanded to give: 
Top = A-C + A·A·D + B·C + B·A·D 
= A-C + A·D + B·C + B·A·D (since A·A=A) 
This gives the cut sets of the fault tree expressed in s-o-p form. Redundancies can be 
removed using the absorption law, and the minimal s-o-p expression for Top becomes: 
Top = A-C + A·D + B·C 
This is the minimal s-o-p or disjunctive normal form of the logic equation, and each 
term represents a minimal cut set of the system. In this example there are three 
minimal cut sets of order two (i.e. contain two basic events). These are {A,C}, {A,D}, 
and {B,C}. 
The minimal cut sets in this example are obtained easily. In some cases a complex 
system can produce thousands of minimal cut sets which becomes very 
computationally intensive to analyse. Approximations can be used where only 
minimal cut sets above a certain order or below a specified probability are removed 
during the calculation process. This reduces the accuracy of the minimal cut sets 
leading to further inaccuracies in the quantitative analysis. 
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2.2.3 Quantitative Analysis 
Quantitative analysis of a fault tree provides predictions of the systems performance. 
Widely used parameters are the top event probability and frequency, along with the 
expected number of top event occurrences. 
2.2.3.1 Top Event Probability 
The probability of occurrence of the top event, also termed the unavailability of the 
system, can be directly obtained from the minimal cut sets. This method is known as 
the inclusion-exclusion expansion. 
The probability of existence of a minimal cut set Ci is obtained by the product of the 
probabilities of existence of the events that contribute to the minimal cut set. For 
example, the probability of existence of C,={A,B} is obtained by the failure 
probability of component A multiplied by the failure probability of component B. In 
general terms, the probability of existence of cut set Cj containing N c. events, P( Ci), is , 
expressed by equation (2.1). 
Ne; 
P(C;) = TI qc(t) (2.1) 
c=l 
The top event will occur by the existence of any minimal cut set, Ci . For a system with 
Nmcs minimal cut sets, the system failure probability at time t, QSYS (t), is given by 
equation (2.2). 
(2.2) 
This may be expanded as shown in equation (2.3). 
Q (t)= ~ P(c.)-~~ P(C.nC.)+· .. +(_I)Nmes-1 p(C nC n .. ·nC ) (2.3) SYS L I L L..J I ] 1 2 Nmes 
i=l i=2 j=l 
In many cases the top event of a system is made up of a large number of minimal cut 
sets. In such cases obtaining the top event probability using the inclusion-exclusion 
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expansion is not possible due to the number of calculations required. This is overcome 
by employing approximation techniques. 
2.2.3.1.1 Upper and Lower Bounds for System Unavailability 
The terms in equation (2.3) provide less significant contributions as more minimal cut 
sets are combined. This series can be truncated to give upper and lower bounds for the 
system unavailability, shown in equation (2.4). 
(2.4) 
i=! i=2 j=! i=! 
Lower Bound Exact Upper Bound 
The upper bound is also known as the rare event approximation since it is itself 
accurate if the component failure events are rare. 
2.2.3.1.2 Minimal Cut Set Upper Bound 
The Minimal Cut Set Upper Bound, QMCSU, is a more accurate upper bound of the 
system failure probability. This is derived below and results in equation (2.5). 
Then, 
So, 
P(system failure) = peat least one minimal cut set exists) 
= 1 - P(no minimal cut sets exist) 
N mcs 
P(no minimal cut sets exist) ~ IT P (minimal cut set i does not exist) 
i=! 
(equality being when no event appears in more than one minimal cut set) 
N mcJ 
P(system failure) ::; 1- ITP(minimal cut set i does not exist) 
i=! 
N mcs 
QMCSU = 1- IT[1-P(CJ] 
i=! 
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(2.5) 
2.2.3.2 Top Event Frequency 
The system unconditional failure intensity, WSYs(t) , is defined as the probability that 
the top event occurs at t per unit time. The probability that the top event occurs in the 
time interval [t, t+dt) is given by WSys(t) dt . For the top event to occur during [t, 
t+dt), no minimal cut sets can exist at t, and one or more must occur in [t, t+dt). This 
can be expressed as, 
(2.6) 
where A is the event that no minimal cut set exists at time t 
Nmcs USi is the event that one or more minimal cut sets occur in [t, t+dt) 
i=1 
Since P(A) = 1-P(A) , the right hand side of equation (2.6) can be expressed by 
equation (2.7), 
(2.7) 
where A is the event that at least one minimal cut set exists at time t 
Therefore: (2.8) 
The first term on the right hand side of equation (2.8) represents the contribution from 
the occurrence of at least one minimal cut set. The second term represents the 
contribution of minimal cut sets occurring while other minimal cut sets already exist 
(i.e. the system has already failed). The two terms can be denoted by WSYS (I) (t) dt and 
WSYS (2) (t) dt respectively, and equation (2.8) becomes, 
d (I) d (2) WSYS (t) t = WSYS (t) t - WSYS (t) dt (2.9) 
Both of the terms on the right hand side can be obtained using the inclusion-exclusion 
expansion (equation (2.3». Since this is even more computationally intensive than the 
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equivalent top event probability calculation, an approximation for the system 
unconditional failure intensity is used. 
2.2.3.2.1 Approximation for the System Unconditional Failure Intensity 
In most situations, the event of component failure is very unlikely and so the 
occurrence of a minimal cut set will be a rare event. The second term of equation (2.9) 
requires the probability that minimal cut sets exist and then others occur. When the 
occurrence of a minimal cut set is a rare event, this term becomes negligible, and an 
upper bound for the system unconditional failure intensity, W SYSMAX (t) dt, is obtained 
by considering only the first term of the equation, W SYS (1) (t) dt, as given in equation 
(2.10), 
W
SYSAUX 
(t) dt ~ W SYS (1) (t) dt (2.10) 
W SYS (1) (t) dt may be expanded using the inclusion-exclusion technique and again 
truncated after the first term to give the rare event approximation (equation (2.11)), 
Nmcs 
WSYSAUX (t) dt ~ L we; (t)dt 
i=1 
Nmcs 
WSYSAUX (t) ~ L we; (t) (2.11) 
;=1 
where we; (t) is the unconditional failure intensity of minimal cut set S; 
The unconditional failure intensity of a minimal cut set S;, we. (t) , is the probability of 
, 
occurrence of the minimal cut set per unit time at t. Since only one component failure 
can occur in a small time element dt, the probability of occurrence of minimal cut set 
S; is the probability of any event c from the set occurring during [t,t + dt) given that 
all other basic events in the minimal cut set have already occurred. Considering each 
of the Ne. events in turn allows the unconditional failure intensity of the minimal cut 
, 
set to be expressed in equation (2.12). 
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(2.12) 
2.2.3.3 Expected Number of System Failures 
The expected number of system failures during [0, t) is denoted by WSYS (0, t) and is 
obtained by the integral of the system unconditional failure intensity in the interval 
[O,t) shown in equation (2.13), 
WSYs(O,t) = S; WSys(u) du (2.13) 
If the system is reliable, the expected number of system failures can be used as an 
upper bound for the system unreliability. 
2.2.3.4 Structure Functions 
The state of a component or system may be considered to either work or fail. This can 
be represented by a binary indicator variable. A component c is assigned a binary 
indicator variable Xc, such that, 
{
I if the component is failed 
Xc = ° if the component is working 
Similarly the top event of a system may be assigned a binary function, ~ , such that, 
{
I if the system is failed 
~(x) = 
° if the system is working 
This is known as the System Structure Function, and shows the system state in terms 
of its component states, x. The system structure function may be expressed in terms of 
its component states using equation (2.14). 
N mcs 
~(x) = 1- IT (1- p;(x)) (2.14) 
;=1 
where p; (x) is the binary indicator variable for each minimal cut set C;, i=1..Nmcs 
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Ne, 
Then, p/(X) = IT Xj 
jEC, 
{
I if cut set Cj exists 
Where p;(x) = 
o if cut set Cj does not exist 
(2.15) 
The probability of the top event occurrence can be obtained by the expected value of 
the structure function, E [ ~ (x)] , in equation (2.16), 
QsyS (t) = E[ ~(x)] (2.16) 
If the minimal cut sets are independent, E[~(x)] = ~[E(x)]. In most cases the 
minimal cut sets will not be independent and so a full expansion of the structure 
function must be performed prior to taking the expectation. 
2.2.3.5 Importance Measures 
The contribution of a component or cut set to the occurrence of a top event is defined 
as its importance. The measure of importance is a function of time, system structure 
and failure and repair characteristics. It is clear by the structural arrangement of a 
system that some components will be more critical to the success of a system than 
others; a component in a series arrangement will generally be more important than a 
component placed in a parallel arrangement. 
The analysis of importance is a sensitivity study method that allows identification of 
the weak areas of a system, thus is a very useful tool in the design and optimisation 
stages. Fault tree analysis is a suitable technique of identifying the basic causes that 
contribute to system failure. Quantification of a fault tree can be performed if 
component data is known, and the importance of each individual component may be 
calculated as a value between 0 and 1. 
There are several importance measures that have been developed to analyse the 
contribution of both individual components and minimal cut sets to the occurrence of 
the top event. These may be divided into two categories of importance measure, 
deterministic and probabilistic. Probabilistic measures can be further categorised as 
dealing with system unavailability or system unreliability assessment. 
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2.2.3.5.1 Deterministic Measures of Importance 
Deterministic measures of importance analyse the importance of a component to a 
system with no reference to its probability of occurrence. The Structural Measure of 
Importance is one such measure. 
Structural Measure of Importance 
For a component c the structural measure of importance is defined by equation (2.17). 
I ST = number of critical system states for component c 
C total number of states for the (n -1) remaining components (2.17) 
A system is in a critical state for a component c if the remaining (n-l) components are 
in a state that allows the failure of component c to cause the system to go from a 
working to a failed state. This can be demonstrated on a single system, shown in 
Figure 2.2. 
Figure 2.2 Single System 
The critical states for each ofthe components can be summarised in Table 2.3. 
States For Other Components Critical State For Component A B C 
Component A: - 0 0 Yes 
- 0 1 Yes 
- 1 0 Yes 
- 1 1 No 
Component B: 0 - 0 No 
0 - 1 Yes 
1 - 0 No 
1 - 1 No 
Component C: 0 0 - No 
0 1 
-
Yes 
1 0 - No 
1 1 No 
where 0 = Component Success, 1 = Component Failure 
Table 2.3 Critical States for Components in Single System 
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The Structural Measure of Importance for each of the components is found in equation 
(2.18). 
I ST_~ A - 4 1
ST 
=..!.. 
B 4 1
ST _..!.. 
c - 4 
(2.18) 
Since each component will have a different rate of failure, in reality this measure is 
not very useful. Probabilistic measures of importance depend on component failure 
probability and intensity and so are generally of more use than deterministic measures. 
Such measures for dealing with system unavailability and unreliability assessment are 
presented in the following sections. 
2.2.3.5.2 Probabilistic Measures of Importance 
Several probabilistic measures have been developed to compute the importance of 
both basic events and minimal cut sets to the occurrence of the top event with 
consideration of system unavailability. Many of these importance measures depend on 
the criticality function G(q(t)). This function may be formally defined as: 
Gc(q(t)) = The probability that the system is in a critical system state for component c 
Birnbaum's Measure of Importance 
Bimbaum's measure of importance [5] is also known as the criticality function. The 
criticality function is found by the sum of the probabilities of occurrence ofthe critical 
system states for component c. To demonstrate this, the example given in Figure 2.2 
may be used, and the system state probabilities are summarised in Table 2.4. 
Bimbaum's measure of importance for each of the components is found using this 
method in equations (2.19) 
(2.19) 
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States For Other Components Probability Critical State For Component A B C 
Component A - 0 0 (1-q B )(1-q c) Yes 
-
0 1 (1-q B)q c Yes 
- 1 0 qB(1-qc) Yes 
- 1 1 qBqC No 
Component B: 0 - 0 (1-qA)(1-qc) No 
0 - 1 (1-q A)q c Yes 
1 - 0 qA(1-qc) No 
1 - 1 qAqC No 
Component C. 0 0 - (1-q A )(1-q B) No 
0 1 - (1-q A)q B Yes 
1 0 
-
qA(1-qB) No 
1 1 - qAqB No 
Table 2.4 Example of Bimbaum's Measure ofhnportance 
Bimbaum's measure of importance can also be directly obtained using equations 
(2.20) and (2.22): 
where QSYS (t) = probability that the system fails 
(lc,q(t» = (qp···,qc-1'1,qc+I'···,qn) 
(Oc,q(t» = (qp···,qc-l'0,qc+l'···,qn) 
(2.20) 
component c failed 
component c working 
Equation (2.20) is the probability that the system fails with component c failed 
minus the probability that the system fails with component c working. This 
expression therefore represents the probability that the system fails only when 
component c fails. Considering the example in Figure 2.2, Bimbaum's 
importance measure for components A, B, and C is given in equations (2.21). 
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• 
(lA,q(t» =l+qBqc -qBqe =1 
(OA,q(t»=qBqe 
(lB,q(t» = qA +qe -qAqe 
(OB,q(t» = qA 
(le,q(t»=qA +qB -qAqB 
(Oe,q(t» = qA 
This is equivalent to equation (2.20) since: 
8QSYS (q(t» QsyS (lc,q(t» - QSYS (Oc ,q(t» 
~c«) 1-0 
(2.21) 
(2.22) 
Equation (2.22) is defined as the partial derivative of the probability that the 
system fails with respect to the probability of failure of component c. Applying 
this method to the example in Figure 2.2 gives the same results as in equations 
(2.21). 
Bimbaum's measure of importance is not a function of a component's own failure 
probability. Many further importance measures are defined using this parameter. 
Criticality Measure of Importance 
The criticality measure of importance is defined as the probability that the system is in 
a critical state for component c, and component c has failed (weighted by the system 
unavailability). This is represented by equation (2.23). 
I eR = Gc(q(t»qc«) 
c QSYS (q(t» (2.23) 
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Applying this to the example in Figure 2.2 gives: 
IB eR = (l-qA)qeqB 
qA + qBqe -qAqBqe 
(2.24) 
Fussell-Vesely Measure of Importance 
For system failure to take place, it is possible that one or more minimal cut sets could 
occur simultaneously. Component c will contribute to the failure of a system by the 
occurrence of a minimal cut set containing c. 
The Fussell-Vesely measure of importance [6] is defined as the probability of the 
union of the minimal cut sets Ck containing c given that the system has failed 
(equation (2.25». 
(2.25) 
Application of this measure of importance to the components in the example (Figure 
2.2) with minimal cut sets {A} and {B,C} gives: 
(2.26) 
The rankings found by the Fussell-Vesely measure of importance are seen to closely 
relate to those found by the criticality importance measure. 
Fussell-V esely Measure of Minimal Cut Set Importance 
The Fussell-Vesely measure of minimal cut set importance ranks the minimal cut sets 
in the order of their contribution to the top event. The importance of each cut set Ck 
can be defined as the probability of existence of the minimal cut set given that the 
system has failed: 
(2.27) 
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The importance of each of the minimal cut sets for the example in Figure 2.2 can be 
expressed by equations (2.28). 
(2.28) 
2.2.3.5.3 Probabilistic Measures for Initiating and Enabling Events 
The original, pioneering work, in fault tree analysis held the assumption that the 
sequence of occurrence of basic events is not important, thus a minimal cut set will 
cause system failure regardless of the order of component failures. However, in some 
cases the top event of a fault tree may only be caused by a certain sequence of basic 
event occurrences. An example of such a situation would be a safety protection 
system designed to protect against a specific hazard. If the hazardous event occurs 
while safety protection devices are functioning, the top event will not occur and a 
shutdown would be instigated. If the hazardous event occurs while safety protection 
devices are not working a more catastrophic system level failure will occur. This 
introduces a limited ordering requirement on the basic events. In this case the last 
event to occur needs to be the hazardous one. If the safety features have failed (in any 
order) prior to this then the system failure represented by the fault tree will occur. 
Such a system, with limited sequential aspects, can be modelled using component 
failure events classified as initiating or enabling events. 
t=O tEf T tEr 
I 
Initiating Events I 
Occurs 
Final Enabling Enabling Event 
Event Occurs Repaired to Restore 
Protection Capability 
Figure 2.3 Example of A Safety System 
Consider the situation illustrated in Figure 2.3. The final safety feature fails at t=tE/, 
and the protection capability is restored again at t=tEr' During the period of time from 
tE/to tEr. the system is in a critical state and vulnerable to the occurrence ofthe hazard. 
If the hazardous event occurs prior to tE!> the safety systems will respond as required 
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and the system will not fail. If the hazardous event occurs while the safety system is 
inactive, the safety system is unable to respond and so a hazardous system failure will 
occur. Thus the order in which components fail will be of importance to the system 
outcome. In this type of situation, failed safety features are known as enabling events. 
The occurrence ofthe hazardous event is known as an initiator. Initiating and enabling 
events may be formally defined as: 
Initiating Events: 
Enabling Events: 
Perturb system variables and place a demand on control 
or protective systems to respond. 
Inactive control or protective systems which permit 
initiating events to cause the top event. 
In a system, an initiator may act as either an enabler or an initiator, whereas an enabler 
can only act in this capacity. Every minimal cut set of the system requires at least one 
initiator in order to cause system failure. 
The importance measures described in the previous sections assume that the order of 
component failures in a minimal cut set is irrelevant. Probabilistic measures of 
importance are presented to deal with the interval reliability of a system where the 
order of component failures is important. All such measures are weighted according to 
the expected number of system failures, WSYS (0, t) . 
Expected Number of System Failures 
The system unconditional failure intensity, WSys(t) , is defined as the probability that 
the top event occurs per unit time at t. This is the sum of the probabilities that the 
system is in a critical state for each initiator i and the frequency that i occurs at t, and 
is given in terms of the criticality function in equation (2.29). 
N, 
WSys(t) dt = L G;(q(t»). w;(t)dt 
;:1 
i initiator 
= t(BQSys(q(t»].W;(t)dt 
;:1 Bqj(t) (2.29) 
i initiator 
where Ni is the number of initiating events 
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The expected number of system failures can be calculated by the integral of the 
system unconditional failure intensity over the interval [O,t) (equation (2.30». 
w, (0 t) = rt w (u) du = rt~( 8QSYS (q(u »). w. (u)du SYS' Jo SYS Jo L.J 8 () I 
i=1 qi U (2.30) 
j initiator 
Barlow-Proschan Measure of Initiator Importance 
The Barlow-Proschan measure of importance is the probability that initiating event i 
causes system failure over the interval [O,t). This is defined in terms of the criticality 
function and weighted according to the expected number of system failures, 
WSYS (O,t) , in equation (2.31) 
r {QSys(1pq(u» - Qsrs (0i'q(u»}wi (u)du I.BP = _0 _____________ _ 
I WSys(O,t) (2.31) 
Measures of Enabler Importance 
The sequential contributory measure of enabler importance was introduced by 
Lambert [7], and is defined as the probability that enabling event e permits an 
initiating event i to cause system failure over [O,t). The failure of the enabler e is 
considered only a factor when it is contained in the same minimal cut set as the 
initiating event i. Again, since the interval reliability is the parameter of interest, 
Lambert's measure is weighted by the expected number of system failures and is 
given in equation (2.32). 
L s; {Q(1e,l i ,q(u» - Q(1e,Oi ,q(u»}qe (U)Wi (u)du 
i 
e*i 
eand ieCk I sc = for some k 
e Wsrs(O,t) 
where i runs over each initiating event in the same minimal cut set as e 
(2.32) 
This expression is an approximation since it does not account for the separate roles of 
events e and i in causing or contributing to system failure. For enabling event e to 
allow initiating event i to cause system failure, e and i must occur in at least one 
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minimal cut set together and it must be the existence of one such minimal cut set that 
causes system failure. 
A method has been developed by Beeson and Andrews [8] to obtain the exact 
importance of an enabler e when initiating event i causes system failure, however this 
technique is very computationally intensive to perfonn. In recognition that equation 
(2.32) is not an accurate calculation, a better approximation is presented by 
Dunglinson and Lambert [9]. This is defined as the fraction of time that minimal cut 
sets containing event e have caused the top event to occur given that the top event has 
occurred, and is expressed in equation (2.33). 
t N, 
fo I P(Ukli,eek E k )Wi (u) du 
I DL = _.o....i=~l _______ _ 
e WSys(O,t) 
(2.33) 
where Ek is the event that minimal cut set k occurs with initiating event i set to true 
This Dunglinson-Lambert measure is only an approximation since the existence of 
other minimal cut sets that do not contain both events e and i has not been accounted 
for. 
2.3 Binary Decision Diagrams 
The size of a fault tree problem can become very large, especially when considering 
the possibility of multiple phased missions. An alternative method to assess the 
reliability performance of a system is by converting the fault tree to a Binary Decision 
Diagram (BDD) prior to analysis. A BDD provides an efficient representation of a 
system with a Boolean equation for the top event. BDDs are often preferred structures 
to that of fault trees due to the fact that the logic expression offers efficient 
mathematical manipulation. Qualitative and quantitative analysis can be performed on 
a BDD, and exact solutions can be obtained without the need for approximations of 
the conventional fault tree approach. The use of BDDs in reliability analysis was 
initially developed by Rauzy [4]. 
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2.3.1 Properties of the BDD 
A BDD is a directed acyclic graph, and so paths through a BDD can only travel in one 
direction without the possibility of looping. A BDD comprises of both tenninal and 
non-tenninal nodes (also called vertices) which are connected by branches. The non-
tenninal nodes of a BDD represent the basic events of the fault tree and the tenninal 
nodes represent the final state of the system. The tenninal nodes of a BDD are defined 
by: 
o 
1 
System works 
System fails 
An example of a binary decision diagram is given in Figure 2.4. 
Root Node 
Figure 2.4 Example Binary Decision Diagram 
Each non-tenninal node has two outgoing branches. Generally, the left '1' branch 
represents the occurrence of the basic event (the component fails), and the right '0' 
branch represents the non-occurrence of the basic event (the component works). The 
size of a BDD is defined by the number of non-tenninal nodes. 
Each path through a BDD begins at the root node and moves through the diagram 
until a tenninal node is reached. Paths that tenninate in a '1' node can be used to 
generate the cut sets of a system. On these paths the cut sets are produced by listing all 
basic event occurrences as these lead to system failure. Only the branches representing 
the occurrence of a basic event are included in the cut set. For example, there are two 
paths in the BDD in Figure 2.4 that end in a tenninal '1' node: 
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1. A,B 
2. A,B,C 
The cut sets obtained by only the occurrence of basic events become: 
1. A,B 
2. A,C 
There are various methods of obtaining the BDD for a system. All methods require an 
ordering of the variables (basic events of the fault tree). This ordering represents the 
sequence of the basic events in the construction of the BDD, and can be chosen to 
define an optimal BDD for analysis. Further work on the qualification and 
quantification ofBDDs is developed by Sinnamon and Andrews [10], [11]. 
2.3.2 Formation of a BDD Using Structure Functions 
The structure function of a fault tree can be used to demonstrate the formation of a 
BDD by successively substituting one and zero into the structure function equation in 
the sequence of the chosen ordering. This is demonstrated using the example fault tree 
in Figure 2.5 .. 
Figure 2.5 Example Fault Tree 
The minimal cut sets of this example are {A,C} and {B,C}, and the structure function 
is given by: 
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If the variable ordering is chosen as the events appear from left to right on the fault 
tree, A<B<C, A is considered first, followed by B and then C. The first non-terminal 
node 'A' is drawn with 2 outgoing branches denoting the failure (occurrence) and the 
success (non-occurrence) of the event. The result of the failure and success branches 
is obtained by substituting '1' and '0' respectively for X A in the structure function 
equation. The same is then done for B and C until terminal nodes are reached which 
determines the system state. The resulting BDD with Boolean equations is shown in 
Figure 2.6. 
Figure 2.6 Binary Decision Diagram with Boolean Variables 
2.3.2.1 Reduction of the BDD 
A series of operations may be applied to reduce the size of a BDD: 
1. If the two sons of a node 'a' are equivalent, then delete node 'a' and direct 
all of its incoming branches to its left son. 
2. Ifnodes 'a' and 'b' are equivalent, then delete node 'b' and direct all of its 
incoming branches to 'a'. 
where the son of a node is the node which either branch leads to. 
This reduction technique may be applied to the example BDD in Figure 2.6. The first 
operation may be applied to delete node F2 since both of its sons are equivalent. Node 
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FI passes directly to its left son, F4. Node F5 is deleted. Application of the second 
operation identifies the identical nodes F4 and F6. F6 and sons can be deleted and the 
incoming branch from node F3 passes instead to node F4. The resulting BDD is given 
in Figure 2.7. 
o 
o 
Figure 2.7 Reduced BDD from Figure 2.4. 
The reduced BDD is considerably smaller than the original BDD in Figure 2.6, with 
three non-terminal nodes rather than six. 
Although this method results in a significant reduction in the size of a BDD, it does 
not always result in the minimal BDD. A minimisation procedure to obtain the 
minimal cut sets of a BDD is presented in Section 2.3.4. The use of structure functions 
to form the BDD clearly demonstrates the relationship between the fault tree and the 
BDD, however an obvious disadvantage is that the cut sets must be determined to 
define the system structure function prior to construction ofthe BDD. 
2.3.3 Formation of a BDD using If-Then-Else Structure 
An alternative method to construct a BDD was developed by Rauzy [4] where each 
gate of a fault tree is defined using an if-then-else (ite) technique. The top event of a 
fault tree can be expressed as a Boolean function, f(x), and pivoted about any variable 
Xl. Shannon's formula can then be expressed in equation (2.34). 
f(X) = Xl· f1 + Xl· f2 (2.34) 
where f1 and f2 are functions with Xl =1 and Xl =0 respectively 
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The ite structure for this is represented as ite(X1, fl, f2), and is defined by 'if Xl fails, 
then consider fl, else consider f2'. In the BDD, fl is achieved by the '1' branch of the 
Xl node (occurrence of Xl), and f2 is achieved by the '0' branch of the Xl node 
(non-occurrence of Xl). This structure is shown in Figure 2.8. 
f1 
Figure 2.8 A Binary Decision Diagram Vertex ofite(Xl, fl, f2) 
To begin the construction of the full BDD, each basic event x is given the structure 
ite(x, 1, 0). To combine basic events within the BDD, the following rules must be 
applied: 
To combine two basic events (X and Y) using a logical operation E9, 
If J = ite(X,[ 1,[ 2) 
and H = ite(Y,gl,g2) 
If X < Y J ffi H = ite(X,jl ffi H,j2 ffi H) 
If X = Y J ffi H = ite(X,[l ffi gl,j2 ffi g2) 
This method has the advantage of automatically eliminating the repetition of nodes. 
The ite method may be applied to the fault tree in Figure 2.5, again using the ordering 
A<B<C: 
G 1 is defined as: G1 =A+B 
= ite(A, 1,0) + ite(B, 1,0) 
= ite(A, 1, ite(B, 1,0» 
Top is then found as: Top = G1 . C 
= ite(A, 1, ite(B, 1,0» . ite(C, 1,0) 
= ite(A, ite(C, 1,0), ite(B, ite(C, 1,0),0» 
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The BDD can then be constructed by considering the '1' and '0' branches of each 
variable in turn until the terminal vertices are reached. The resulting BDD is given in 
Figure 2.9. 
o 
Figure 2.9 BDD of fault tree in Figure 2.3 using ite technique 
The paths terminating in '1' give the cut sets ofthe system: {A,C} and {B,C}. 
2.3.4 BDD Minimisation 
In most cases, the BDD will not be minimal and so the cut sets that are obtained will 
also not be minimal. A minimisation process has been developed by Rauzy [4] to 
create a new BDD that encodes the minimal cut sets of the fault tree. 
A general node in the BDD is defined by equation (2.35). 
F = ite(x, G, H) (2.35) 
If 8 is a minimal solution of G, which is not a minimal solution of H, then the 
intersection of 8 and x ({ 8 } (Ix) will be a minimal solution of F. The set of all 
minimal solutions ofF, solmin(F) will also include the minimal solutions ofH, and can 
be expressed in equations (2.36) and (2.37). 
solmin(F) = { cr } (2.36) 
where cr = [{ 8 } (Ix] U [solmin(H)] (2.37) 
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Rauzy has also defined the without operator which removes all paths from Groin that 
are included in Hmin. This ensures that by removing any minimal solutions of G that 
are also minimal solutions ofH, equation (2.37) becomes minimal. 
2.4 Markov Analysis 
Markov methods provide a means of analysing the reliability and availability of 
systems whose components exhibit strong dependencies. Markov diagrams for large 
systems are generally exceedingly large and complex and are often difficult to 
construct. Markov models are more suitable for analysis of smaller systems. The 
Markov approach assumes that the system is characterised by a lack of memory, 
where the future behaviour of the system is only dependent on the immediately 
preceding state and not on the full history. Each event is determined only by the 
present system state and is independent of any other past events. A Markov process 
features a constant transition rate between the system states, and can be used for 
solution to systems that vary discretely or continuously with respect to time or space. 
A Markov Model consists of two elements: states and transitions. Only transitions 
between linked states are possible. In reliability problems it is possible that a state can 
cause terminal system failure. This is defined as an absorbing state and no transitions 
may be made from it. 
For the method described below it is assumed that the system has a fixed number of 
identifiable discrete states and that the rate of transition between states is constant 
with time. This implies that the times to failure and repair of the components are 
associated with (negative) exponential distributions. This Markov method is discrete 
in space and continuous in time. 
2.4.1 Markov Model Concepts 
To begin Markov analysis a directed graph is constructed where each node represents 
one of the discrete system states, and the edges represent the transition rates between 
the states in the direction ofthe arrow. 
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Considering a single repairable component that may exist in one of two states, 
working (O-W) or failed (l-F), and can be represented by x(t) in equation (2.38). 
{
I Component Failed 
x(t) = 
o Component Working 
(2.38) 
The state of a repairable component with failure rate A and repair rate v can be 
represented by a transition diagram in Figure 2.10. 
Failure 
'A 
Repair 
u 
where port) = Probability that component is in the working state at time t 
PJ(t) = Probability that component is in the failed state at time t 
Figure 2.10 Single Repairable Component Markov Transition Diagram 
The parameters A and u are referred to as state transition rates since they represent the 
rate of communication between the states. 
The failure and repair density functions,j(t) and g(t), of a component with failure rate 
A and repair rate u are given in equations (2.39). 
f(t) = Ae-1.t g(t) = ue-ut (2.39) 
To begin the solution of a Markov model, incremental intervals of time dt must be 
considered. Each interval must be sufficiently small so that there is an insignificant 
chance of two or more events occurring and so a maximum of one state transition may 
take place in anyone interval. 
A set of differential equations may be obtained from the state transition diagram in 
Figure 2.10. The probability of a component being in the working state at a time t+dt 
is dependent only on the state of the component at time t, and can be defined as, 
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Po(t+dt) = [Probability of component working at time t AND not failing in time dt] 
+ [Probability of component failed at time t AND repaired in time dt] 
The probability that the component is in the working state at time t+dt may be 
represented by equation (2.40). 
Po (t + dt) = Po (t)(I- Adt) + ~ (t)(udt) 
This may be expressed as a differential equation as shown in equation (2.41) 
Asdt~O 
Po (t + dt) - Po (t) "I D ( ) D ( ) 
-"-----"--- = -JI.f 0 t + Url t 
dt 
Po (t + dt) - Po (t) 
dt 
_ dPo(t) _ pt' ( ) 
- - 0 t 
dHO dt 
Thus equation (2.40) can be expressed by equation (2.42). 
Po (t) = -APo (t) + u~ (t) 
(2.40) 
(2.41) 
(2.42) 
Similarly the probability that the component is in the failed state at time t+dt may be 
derived to form equation (2.43). 
A (t) = APo (t) - U~ (t) (2.43) 
A more simple way to represent such systems of differential equations is by the use of 
matrices. In matrix form these equations are represented in equation (2.44). 
Or, 
[P] = [P][A] (2.44) 
where Po (0) and ~ (0) are the known initial system state probabilities at t=0 
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This square matrix A can easily be found from the transition diagram where, 
• There are the same number of rows and columns of the matrix as there are 
states in the diagram. 
• Each row has a sum of zero. 
• All non-diagonal elements in row i and columnj represent the transition from 
state i to state j. 
• All diagonal elements ii represent the transition rate out of state i. 
N 
The sum of the system state probabilities at any time t must be equal to 1, ! Pj (t) = 1. 
j~1 
In reliability problems, a system failure mode may be catastrophic. In this case a state 
is entered that cannot be left, and is known as an absorbing state. For a single 
component, this would be represented by the state transition diagram in Figure 2.11. 
Figure 2.11 Single Non-Repairable Component Markov Transition Diagram 
Again using matrices, this system can be represented by equation (2.45). 
(2.45) 
2.4.2 Laplace Solution of Markov Differential Equations 
Since the state equations are linear differential equations with constant coefficients, 
one method for solution is using Laplace transforms. This technique may be applied to 
both the non-repairable and repairable single component systems in the following 
sections. 
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2.4.2.1 Non-Repairable Single Component 
Since Po (t) + l't (t) = 1, transition to the failed state 1 is obtained by the matrix set of 
differential equations (2.45) and can be represented as given in equation (2.46). 
dl't (t) = A[1-l't (t)] 
dt 
Applying Laplace transforms to this differential equation gives equation (2.47). 
A 
sl't (s) -l't (0) = - - Af't (s) 
s 
(2.46) 
(2.47) 
If the component is known to be working at t=O, the initial condition l't (0) = 0 holds 
and equation (2.47) may be written as shown in equation (2.48). 
A 
sl't(s) =--Al't(S) 
s 
A (s + A)l't (s) =-
s 
A l't(s)=---
s(s + A) 
1 1 
l't(s)=----
S S+A 
(2.48) 
Inverting equation (2.48) gives the unavailability (unreliability) of the non-repairable 
component with time in equation (2.49). 
l't (t) = 1- e-i..1 (2.49) 
The availability (reliability) of the component with time is given in equation (2.50). 
(2.50) 
2.4.2.2 Repairable Single Component 
The Laplace transform of the repairable single component failure state in equation 
(2.43) is given in equation (2.51). 
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s~ (s) - ~ (0) = "A.Po (s) - u~ (s) (2.51) 
Equation (2.51) may be rearranged to give equation (2.52). 
"A. 1 ~(s)=-Po(s)+-~(O) 
s+u s+u 
(2.52) 
Similarly the Laplace transform of the working state in equation (2.42) can be 
rearranged to form equation (2.53). 
u 1 Po(s)=-~(s)+--Po(O) 
s+A. s+"A. 
(2.53) 
Equations (2.52) and (2.53) may be solved simultaneously to give equations (2.54). 
Po(s) = _U_[Po(O) + ~ (0)] +_1_. 1 ["A.Po(O) -u~ (0)] 
"A.+u s "A.+u s+"A.+u 
(2.54) 
~ (s) = _A._[Po(O) + ~(0)]+_1_. 1 [u~ (0) -"A.Po(O)] 
"A.+u s "A.+u s+"A.+u 
Inverting the Laplace transforms back to the real time domain gives equations (2.55). 
u e-(A,+u)t 
Po(t) = -[po (0) + PI (0)]+ ["A.Po(O) -u~ (0)] 
. "A.+u "A.+u 
(2.55) 
A. e -(A,+u)t ~ (t) = -[po (0) + ~ (0)]+ [u~ (0) - "A.Po(O)] 
"A.+u "A.+u 
The component will begin life in the working state and so the initial conditions are 
Po (0) = 1 and ~ (0) = O. This reduces equations (2.55) to give equations (2.56). 
~(t) =_v_+ k-(Mu), =l __ A_[l_e-(l+U),] 
A+V A+V A+V 
A A -(l+u)1 A 
P'(t)=--- e = __ [l_e-(l+U)t] 
A+V A+V A+V 
(2.56) 
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2.4.3 Numerical Solution of Markov Differential Equations 
For complex problems it is more suitable to solve the set of Ns differential equations 
using numerical methods. Equation (2.44) may be written in expanded form by 
equation (2.57). 
[P]=[P][A] 
[A,~, "', PN.l= [~, P2 , "', PN, HA] (2.57) 
Since, Pet) = f1;(t + dt) - f1;(t) 
I dt 
(2.58) 
Equation (2.57) may be represented by equation (2.59). 
l~ (t + dt), P2 (t +dt),"', PN, (t +dt)J= l~ (t), Pz(t),' ", PNs (t)j[1 + [A]dt] (2.59) 
The general numerical solution to the set of differential equations is therefore given by 
equation (2.60). 
[pet + dt)] = [P(t)] [K] where [K] = [I + [A]dt] (2.60) 
This leads to a recursive solution to the differential equations over a duration of time. 
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Chapter 3 Review of Existing Methods for Phased Mission Systems 
3.1 Introduction 
The topic of phased mission analysis has been the focus of several researchers in the 
broader field of risk and reliability assessment. Methods have been investigated to 
identify possible causes of phase and mission failure by the combination of basic 
event occurrences throughout the mission. The quantification, using the failure event 
probabilities, enables the likelihood and frequency of mission failure to be 
determined. 
The methods that have been developed for solution to phased mission problems can be 
categorised as those appropriate for non-repairable or repairable systems. In the case 
of non-repairable systems, a component failure will be permanent and the component 
will remain failed for the duration of the mission. In the case of repairable systems, it 
is possible for a component to be restored to new condition after failure. The 
techniques that have been found appropriate for solution to these cases are discussed 
in the following sections. 
3.2 Non-Repairable Systems 
The earliest consideration of the analysis of phased missions was made by Esary and 
Ziehms [12] using fault tree analysis. A mission is split into consecutive phases, and 
each phase performs a specified task. The system at any time may be represented by 
one of two states - working or failed. The success of the mission depends on the non-
repairable components used during each phase, and the probability of the successful 
completion of all phases is referred to as the Mission Reliability, RM1SS• 
The reliability of a phased mission cannot simply be obtained by the multiplication of 
the reliabilities of each of the individual phases. This involves the false assumptions 
that all components are in the working state at the beginning of each phase and that 
components are not shared between the phases, and results in an appreciable over-
prediction of system reliability. This point is illustrated using the example in Figure 
3.1. 
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Phase 1 Phase 2 
Figure 3.1 Example Mission with Two Phases 
Let P Cl be the probability that component c functions through phase I, and P C2 be the 
conditional probability that component c functions through phase 2 given that it has 
functioned through phase 1. The system reliability for phases 1 and 2 would be found 
by: 
Phase 1 
Phase 2 
RI = PAl + P BI - PAl P B, 
R2 = PA2 PB2 
The multiplication of the separate phase reliabilities would give the incorrect value of 
mission reliability, RM1SS • , shown in equation (3.1) 
(3.1) 
For the mission to be achieved successfully, both components must function through 
both phases. The correct mission reliability defined by Esary and Ziehms is obtained 
by the probability that the components both function through phases 1 and 2, and is 
given in equation (3.2). This is less than the inaccurate mission reliability calculated 
by the multiplication of individual phases in equation (3.1). 
(3.2) 
It can easily be seen that the mission reliability defined in equation (3.2) is also 
incorrect. The multiplication of the component reliability in individual phases assumes 
that the probability of success in each phase is independent. Since the success of each 
component in phase 2 implies that the component must have worked successfully 
through phase 1, the reliabilities should be combined to a single term. 
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Since a component cannot be repaired or replaced, it will function continuously until 
failure occurs and will subsequently remain in the failed state. A method is presented 
by Esary and Ziehms to transform and reduce a multi-phase mission into an equivalent 
single-phase mission, allowing existing techniques to be applied to calculate the 
mission reliability. This is discussed in the following section. 
3.2.1 Transformation of a Multi-Phased Mission to an Equivalent Single-
Phase Mission 
In a multi-phased mission, the performance of a component in a phase depends on its 
behaviour through previous phases. It will only be in the working state in a phase if it 
has performed successfully through all preceding phases. 
A single component c in phase j may be replaced by a series system of components 
which represent the performance of component c in all phases up to and including 
phase j, cl' c2 , ••• , C j' demonstrated in Figure 3.2. 
Single phase 
Multiple phases 
Figure 3.2 Single and Multiple Phase Component Block Diagrams 
Similarly using fault tree analysis, the single event input of the failure of component c 
is replaced by an OR combination of the failure of component c in any phase up to 
and including phasej, shown in Figure 3.3. 
Figure 3.3 Component Failure in Fault Tree of a Multi-Phased Mission 
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The individual phase configurations can then be joined in series to form a single 
system. As a demonstration this will be applied to a simple mission network 
comprising of three phases and three components, A, B, and C given in Figure 3.4. 
Phase 1 Phase 2 Phase 3 
Figure 3.4 Reliability Network of a Simple Phased Mission System 
This multi-phased mission can be transformed to a single-phase mission as 
demonstrated in Figure 3.5. 
Transformed Phase 1 Transformed Phase 2 Transformed Phase 3 
Figure 3.5 Equivalent Single Phase Mission 
The three original sequential phase configurations have been transformed to a single 
network comprising of three sub-systems in a series arrangement. Since the 
subsystems will generally have components in common, they will not function 
independently. In this case the product of the subsystem reliabilities will not be equal 
to the mission reliability. 
The subsystem reliabilities become, 
Phase 1 
Phase 2 
Phase 3 
(3.3) 
where Pc is the conditional reliability of component c in phase j: 
j 
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The product of the subsystem reliabilities would be less than the true system 
reliability, RM1SS = PA.PA2PA3PB.PB2PB3PC.PC2PC3 which is found by the simplest form of 
Figure 3.5, shown in Figure 3.6. 
Figure 3.6 Simplest Form of Figure 3.5 
3.2.1.1 Cut Set Cancellation 
Further simplification of the phase configurations may be made pnor to the 
transformation of the multi-phased mission to an equivalent single phase mission. 
This is achieved by the technique of cut set cancellation. 
If minimal cut sets of an earlier phase contain any minimal cut sets from a later phase, 
they may be removed from the earlier phase. Since mission success is the only 
consideration, there is no need to repeat such events as later phases take into account 
the failure of components in all phases up to the inspected phase. 
Phase fault trees for the example given in Figure 3.4 can be constructed and are shown 
in Figure 3.7. 
Figure 3.7 Phase Fault Tree Representation of Figure 3.4 
The minimal cut sets for each phase are: 
Phase 1 
{A,B,C} 
Phase 2 
{A} 
{B,C} 
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Phase 3 
{A} 
{B} 
{Cl 
Minimal cut set {A,B,C} can be removed from phase 1 as A failing in phase 1 means 
it will still be failed in phase 2 which will fail the mission and make the states of 
components Band C irrelevant. In the same way, the phase 2 minimal cut sets may be 
removed since they contain the single order phase 3 minimal cut sets. The phase 
minimal cut sets become, 
Phase 1 Phase 2 Phase 3 
{A} 
{B} 
{Cl 
Both systems are equivalent and result in the same mission reliability, however the cut 
cancellation technique presents a more simple transformation to a single-phase 
mission. 
In summary, Esary and Ziehms present a suitable method of transforming a multi-
phased mission into an equivalent single phased mission to allow the use of existing 
reliability techniques. The cut set cancellation technique presents a more simple 
transformation process. However if minimal cut sets are removed from a phase, it is 
not possible to determine individual phase unreliability or reliability, and calculations 
can only be made for the entire mission. 
3.2.2 Obtaining Bounds for Mission Unreliability 
Mission unreliability is defined as the probability that the system fails to function 
successfully during at least one phase of the mission. An important problem is to 
calculate as efficiently as possible either the exact value or bounds for this parameter. 
The developments by Esary and Ziehms in this area are reviewed by Burdick et al [13] 
with presentation of mission reliability approximation methods. These methods use 
only statistically independent, non-repairable components to find approximation 
techniques that can be applied to systems containing a large number of components. 
The method presented by Esary and Ziehms can be applied to an original fault tree of 
a multi-phased mission assuming zero-duration phase boundaries. However, the 
transformation of each basic event c in phase j into a series of events, Cj •• Cj leads to a 
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large increase in the number of cut sets of the mission. The exact unreliability 
becomes difficult to calculate and may become costly. Methods have been developed 
to estimate the system unreliability without the use of basic event transformation. Four 
of the most accurate and conservative were found to be: 
• Inclusion-Exclusion Expansion of Phase Unreliabilities 
The minimal cut sets are obtained for each phase of the original model. The 
unreliability of phase}, Qj' is calculated using the inclusion-exclusion 
expansion of the phase} minimal cut sets (equation (2.3)) using unconditional 
basic event unreliabilities. The conditional basic event c reliability Pc. was 
J 
obtained in equation (3.3), and the unconditional basic event c reliability Pc 
) 
is derived from this in equation (3.4). 
j 
Pc} = P[xc(tj ) = 0] = TIpc; for }=l, .. ,m 
i:\ 
(3.4) 
An approximation for mission reliability, QIN-EX' can be expressed by the 
product of the individual phase reliabilities in equation (3.5). 
m 
QIN-EX = TI Rj 
j:\ 
(3.5) 
This is usually expressed as an approximation of mission unreliability, QIN-EX' 
and is obtained by the sum of the individual phase unreliabilities in equation 
(3.6). 
m 
QIN-EX ~LQj (3.6) 
j:\ 
This approximation technique may also be applied after the cut set cancellation 
method has been implemented to give another approximation of the mission 
unreliability, QIN-EX(CC)' The result will generally be less than with no cut set 
cancellations due to the fact that there are fewer cut sets in each phase. 
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• Minimal Cut Set Bound 
The minimal cut sets are obtained from the original logic model. The 
probability of failure of cut set Cj in phase}, qc' is calculated using equation 
IJ 
(3.7). 
NC;J 
qC
iJ 
= IT p{c} 
c;l 
(3.7) 
where c occurrence of basic event c in cut set Cj of phase} 
Nc number of basic events in minimal cut set Cj of phase} 
IJ 
The reliability of phase} can then be estimated using the minimal cut bound in 
equation (3.8). 
Nmc'J 
R. = TIpc J IJ 
j;1 
(3.8) 
where Nmcs . number of minimal cut sets in phase} J 
Pc is the probability of success of cut set Cj in phase} 
IJ 
The approximation for the reliability of the mission using the minimal cut set 
bound, QMCB' can then be obtained in the same way as for equation (3.5). This 
method may again be used after applying the cut set cancellation technique to 
give another approximation ofthe mission unreliability, QMCB(CC)' 
The four mission unre1iability approximation methods are ordered in terms of their 
accuracy in equation (3.9). 
(3.9) 
Since the outcome of previous phases in each calculation is not accounted for, the 
bounds are only estimates. However such approximation techniques can be useful in 
finding estimations for systems containing a large number of components where an 
exact solution would be costly or difficult to calculate. 
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A further technique is presented by Veatch [14] to approximate the unreliability of a 
phased mission by constructing a lower bound structure function with application to 
periodic systems. 
3.2.3 Redundancy 
The reliability of a system can be improved by adding redundant elements that are not 
required for the successful operation of the system. The number of redundant elements 
for a system whose parameters do not vary with time are determined at the start of the 
mission time. In the case of phased missions, failure rates and number of redundancies 
can vary with time and it becomes more difficult to calculate the exact mission 
reliability. This problem is identified and an optimisation solution is presented by 
Vujosevic and Meade [15]. 
The redundancy issue is also considered by Lee and Hong [16] with derivation of an 
expression for system reliability. A system is presented whereby the failure rate of a 
component and added redundancy levels are subject to change during the period of the 
mission. However this method concentrates on only a simple series and parallel 
arrangement and performs calculations based on the difference in the number of 
working components at the start and end of each phase. This technique does not 
demonstrate the general case of the combination of series and parallel systems as 
represented by fault trees. 
3.2.4 Expected Number of Failures 
The expected number of system failures in a single phase mission can be obtained 
using the method presented in Sections 2.2.3.2 and 2.2.3.3. When considering a multi-
phased mission, this parameter becomes more difficult to calculate. The boundary 
between two phases involves a change in failure logic model. This phase transition 
may cause the system to fail without the occurrence of a component failure. Montague 
and Fussell [17] present a method to determine the expected number of system 
failures for a phased-mission system. 
The standard method for obtaining the top event frequency of a system is given in 
equation (2.8). This is the contribution from the occurrence of at least one minimal cut 
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set minus the contribution of the occurrence of minimal cut sets when the system has 
already failed. The expected number of system failures is then obtained by the integral 
ofthis parameter over a specified time interval in equation (2.13). 
This principle is adapted for use in phased-mission systems by Montague and Fussell. 
The expected number of failures for a phased-mission system with m phases may be 
expressed in equation (3.10). 
m m-I 
WMISS(to,tm) = L r Wj(t)dt + Lboundary condition W/t) 
j=1 tj _1 j=1 
(3.10) 
The first term of equation (3.10) represents the number of failures during each phase j 
of the mission, using a separate integral term to define a new function in each phase j. 
Montague and Fussell state that this function may be estimated by application of the 
inclusion-exclusion expansion to the occurrence of phase j cut sets to approximate the 
rate ofphasej failure, wj(t). 
The second term accounts for the occurrence of the top event when a boundary is 
crossed. This allows for the possibility of failure when entering a new phase due to the 
basic events that exist from the previous phase. The boundary condition may be 
expressed as the expected number of system failures in an arbitrary small time 
interval, Ilt, in equation (3.11). 
~(tj) = (0 failures in M).P[S(tj - ~)r.S(tj + ~)]+(1 failure in M).P[S(tj - ~)r.S(tj + ~)]+ .... 
(3.11) 
where S(t j ) top event does not exist at time Ij 
S (t j ) top event exists at time Ij 
Taking the limit of equation (3.11) as M ~ 0, the expected number of failures across 
the phase j boundary becomes as given in equation (3.12). 
(3.12) 
where S(tjJ top event does not exist at the instant before the transition 
S(tjJ top event exists at the instant after the transition 
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This boundary expression is the probability that the system is in the working state 
before the transition and is in the failed state after the transition. Since the transition is 
assumed to be instantaneous, it does not include the possibility that a basic event has 
changed state during the transition. Equation (3.12) may be expanded to represent 
every possible combination of a minimal path set existing before the phase boundary 
and a minimal cut set occurring due to the phase transition, and is summarised in 
equation (3.13). 
-
Top event does not exist at tj _ S(tj_) = Dlj_1 (tjJuD2j_1 (tjJu ... UDNmp'j_l (tjJ 
Top event exists at tj+ S(tj.J = Cl (tj.J U C2 . (tj.J u ... U CN (tj.J j j mcsj 
Path set I ofphasej-l exists at t = t.i-
Cut set k of phase j exists at t = t.i+ 
N 
mpSj_l Number of minimal path sets in phasej-l 
Then, 
S(tjJnS(tjJ=[~j_l (tjJuD2j_1 (tjJu ... UDNmp'j_l (tjJ]n[Gj (tjJuG;j (tjJU ... UCNmcsj (tj+)] 
= [Dlj_1 (tjJnGj (tj+)]u[Dlj_1 (tjJnC2j (tjJ] ... u[DIJ_1 (tjJnCNmc./tjJ] 
... [DNmpsj_t (tjJnG/tj+)]u ... [DNmp'J_t (tjJnCNmc'J (tjJ] 
(3.13) 
Each path set and cut set pair can be further expanded in terms of basic events. If a 
basic event is common and complementary between the pair, the intersection becomes 
zero since it'is not possible for an event to change state during the phase transition. 
The probability of each combination is then calculated by the product of the collective 
component availabilities or unavailabilities at the time of transition. Since this can be 
computationally intensive, approximation methods are presented to estimate the 
expected number of failures across each phase boundary. 
The method presented by Montague and Fussell to obtain the expected number of 
failures in equation (3.10) successfully identifies the problems faced across a phase 
boundary. The first term in this equation represents the expected number of failures 
during each phase of the mission, however this cannot be derived using a simple 
inclusion-exclusion expansion of the occurrence of the phase cut sets since the 
52 
outcome of previous phases is not accounted for. The second term of equation (3.10) 
represents the expected number of failures across each phase boundary, and is 
obtained using equation (3.13). However, the combination of all path and cut sets at 
each phase transition will be computationally time consuming, and approximation 
techniques would not generate an accurate result. In general, this method does not 
produce an accurate calculation of the expected number of mission failures since for 
each phase calculation the outcome of earlier phases is not included. 
3.2.5 Laws of Boolean Phase Algebra 
Previous methods have considered the performance of a component c as a separate 
event in different phases, with the system reliability parameters obtained as a product 
of the event probabilities. A set of Boolean algebraic laws have been developed by 
Dazhi and Xiaozhong [18] to represent combinations of component behaviour. A 
basic event A may be represented in the following way: 
Aj Basic event A occurs in phase}, i.e. failure occurs in one phase. 
A(j) Basic event A exists in phase}, i.e. failure could have occurred 
in phases l.J. 
If phases} and k are taken in the order of};::: k;::: 1, the intersection and union concept 
rules given in equations (3.14), (3.15), and (3.16) can be applied to phased mission 
systems: 
j 
= ~k) UA; (3.14) 
i=k+l 
=~k) (3.15) 
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= ~j) (3.16) 
For the system to be failed in phase j, X(j)' phase failure could have occurred in any 
phase up to and including phasej. This can be expressed in equation (3.17). 
where Xi is the event that the system fails first in phase i 
NmsCj 
. Xi = U C(i)j , and C(i)j is the existence of cut set Ci in phase j 
i;\ 
The mission unreliability can then be expressed in equation (3.18). 
(3.17) 
(3.18) 
Equation (3.18) automatically implements the cut set cancellation technique presented 
in Section 3.2.1.1. The Boolean laws described above are applied to the solution of 
accident sequences by Dazhi and Xiaozhong. Further Boolean laws are presented by 
Kohda et al [19] using the minimal cut sets and path sets of each phase to eliminate 
the requirement of converting the mission into a single phase system. 
The introduction of Boolean laws to the solution of phased missions overcomes the 
false assumption made in Esary and Ziehms method that the performance of a 
component through different phases is separate. The algebraic combination of the 
separate phase events implements the cut set cancellation method and presents a 
correct representation of the events that cause phase or mission failure. 
Somani and Trivedi [20] present further methods for phased mission system reliability 
analysis based on Boolean algebraic methods of fault trees. Rather than manipulating 
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a multi-phased mission into an equivalent single phase mission where combination 
techniques encounter the problem of multiple repeated events, the phase fault trees are 
solved individually. However, this requires that information must be carried from 
phase to phase since phases are not independent. 
This proposed method is based on the concept of cumulative distribution functions 
with a mass at the origin. A random variable X has a cumulative distribution function 
with time t given by equation (3.19). 
(3.19) 
where TJ is the time at the start ofthe phase 
This function has a mass at the origin given by P(X = 0) = (1- e-'u;) which is the 
probability that the component exists in the failed state at the start of the phase, and 
e -AT. (1- e -At) represents the continuous part of the function which is the failure 
probability distribution of the component in the current phase. Failure probabilities of 
individual components may be represented using such distribution functions. 
Somani and Trivedi consider the simple situation where each phase has the same 
system configuration and failure criteria. The only difference between phases is the 
component failure rates. Three situations are considered - phase-dependent failure 
rates, age-dependent failure rates, and random phase durations. Further considerations 
are made for situations where the system configuration varies between the phases. 
Reasons for this may include the change of operational level requirements of 
components, or addition or removal of redundant modules during operation. It is 
possible that a combination of component failures in a phase will not cause the phase 
to fail, but on transition to a later phase may cause an instant failure to occur. Four 
possible scenarios across a phase boundary are considered, 
1. A combination of component failures does not lead to system failure in either 
phase} or}+ 1. 
2. A combination of component failures leads to system failure in both phase} 
andj+1. 
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3. A combination of component failures does not lead to system failure in phasej 
but leads to system failure in phase j+ 1. 
4. A combination of component failures leads to system failure in phase j but not 
in phasej+ 1. 
The failure criteria do not change with respect to the failure combination under 
consideration between phases for the first two situations. The failure combinations in 
the third situation can also be treated as failure in both phases (as failure will occur at 
the transition point). The mission reliability for all three cases are treated in the same 
way as for a mission where all phase configurations are identical by solution of the 
fault tree for the final phase. 
A method is presented to solve the fourth situation to account for the probability of 
occurrence of failure combinations in phase j. The unreliability of a system can be 
divided into two parts - common failure combinations, and phase failure 
combinations. 
Common Failure Combinations 
This involves the probability of the component failure combinations that are 
common to all phases. If a combination leads to failure in phase j+ 1 it is also 
considered to be a failure combination of phase j. The unreliability due to such 
common failure combinations is solved using the same method as for a 
mission with phase independent failure criteria, the failure distribution for each 
component is evaluated and the fault tree for the last phase is solved. 
Phase Failure combinations 
This involves the probability of failures specific to individual phases - the 
probability of occurrence of component combinations that cause failure in 
phase j but in no subsequent phases. Phase failure combinations for phase j 
(PFCj), that are treated as success combinations for all the subsequent phases 
are given by equation (3.20). 
(3.20) 
where Ej represents Boolean expression for the failure combinations of phase j 
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This can be simplified in equation (3.21). 
(3.21) 
The phase failure combinations for phase j require the same notation as for the Esary 
and Ziehms' method where a separate symbol (a) is assigned to denote the 
occurrence of an event in each phase j. A new notation is defined, where A j 
represents the failure of component A in any phase up to and including phase j, 
and A j represents the success of component A from the start of the mission to the end 
ofphasej, 
Since the phase failure combinations expression represents both component failure 
and success events, simplification will merge combinations of both terms. Algebraic 
rules are required to simplify such success and failure combinations. If i andj are two 
phases in a mission where i<j, the Boolean laws can be summarised in equations 
(3.22). 
1. Ai·Aj ~Aj 
2. Ai·Aj ~Ai 
3. Ai .Aj ~O 
- -4. Ai+Aj ~Ai (3.22) 
5. 4 +Aj ~Aj 
6. Ai+Aj ~1 
7. 4 + A j ~ no physical meaning 
The phased mission Boolean laws presented in equation (3.22) show a deficiency. The 
sixth law represents the event that component A succeeds up to and including phase i 
OR component A fails in any phase up to and including phase j. By the Boolean law 
of complementation, an event or its complement is equal to 1, implying the expression 
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Aj + Aj ~ 1. Although this sixth law for phased mission algebra is correct, the 
combination technique could be misleading. 
This method also becomes complex when combining terms that cannot be simplified, 
for example Aj . Aj . Somani and Trivedi express this as the event that component A is 
operational until the end of phase i, and then fails sometime between the end of phase 
i and the end ofphasej. This is not consistent with the original definition of Aj as the 
event that component A fails in any phase up to and including phase j. The probability 
ofthis combination of events is obtained in equation (3.23). 
P(Aj · Aj = 1) = E[Aj · Aj] = E[Aj · (1- A)] 
=E[AJ-E[(Aj . A)] = P(Aj =l)-P(Aj =1) (3.23) 
It can be seen from equation (3.23) that the probability of event Aj . Aj is the same as 
the probability that component A fails between the end of phase i and the end of phase 
j. It would be useful if this term could be directly obtained without the inclusion of the 
component success probabilities. 
The system unreliability is obtained by computing the phase failure combinations for 
all phases and is given in equation (3.24). 
m-I 
QMISS=P(Em)+ LP(PFC) (3.24) 
j=1 
The unreliability at the end of each phasej can be expressed in equation (3.25). 
j 
Qj = "LP(PFC;) (3.25) 
;=1 
where PFC;,j is the PFC of phase i (i<j), assumingj is the last phase 
PFC1 · = PFC.. 1 nE. J IJ- J 
At a phase transition, a jump in unreliability may be seen. This may be due to more 
stringent failure criteria in a later phase, and is described as a latent failure. 
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The method presented by Somani and Trivedi successfully identifies the possible 
situations that can occur across a phase boundary. The Boolean laws defined in 
equations (3.22) allow further possible combinations of component failure and success 
events in a phased mission system, however it can be seen that there are representation 
problems in the rules. In all previous methods, the event of phase failure would cause 
failure of the entire mission. This assumption means that it is not possible for the 
mission to continue after the failure of a phase, and so a phase j failure combination 
could not become a successful combination in phase j+ 1. Somani and Trivedi's 
method allows the phases of a mission to occur in any order, and so this situation 
becomes possible. The calculation of the system performance parameters involves the 
combination of the current phase failure combinations with the success combinations 
for all subsequent phases. This leads to lengthy calculations for situations where there 
are numerous phases or cut sets in each phase. 
This work is extended by Ma and Trivedi [21] who obtain the mission unreliability in 
the form of the sum of disjoint products using a computational algorithm and 
implement the algorithm using the SHARPE software package. 
3.2.6 Binary Decision Diagrams 
A single phase system can easily be represented in BDD form using the method 
demonstrated in Section 2.3. When considering the possibility of multiple phases, the 
state of a component in a phase is dependent on the performance of the component 
through all previous phases, and the BDD technique becomes more complex. 
Trivedi et al [22] present a method whereby this binary decision diagram technique 
can be applied to missions of multiple phases. The behaviour of a component in a 
phase is represented by the performance of the component up to and including the 
phase in question using a series of sub-components as described in Section 3.2.1. 
The failure function for component c in phase j, q c/t), is the probability that 
component c is failed in phasej, and is expressed in equation (3.26). 
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Since all cp i = 1,2, .. . ,j are in series, 
(3.26) 
where t is measured from the start ofphasej, 0 ~ t ~ ~ 
The first term of equation (3.26) represents the probability that the component has 
already failed during the previous 1..)-1 phases. The second term represents the 
failure probability distribution of the component in phasej. 
In the same way as for a single phase mission, an ordering sequence is required to 
enable the construction of the BDD. Trivedi et al present two possible ordering 
schemes, where each component C is expanded into its series of sub-components in 
the following ways: 
• Forwards Phase-Dependent Operation (PDO): The variables are ordered in the 
same pattern as the phase order, Cl, C2, •.• , Cm. 
• Backwards Phase-Dependent Operation (PDO): The variables are ordered in 
the reverse pattern ofthe phase order, Cm, Cm-I. •.. , Cl· 
The ite structure of the performance of component C in two phases i and j can be 
represented by E j and Ej respectively, 
Ej = ite(cj, G], G2 ) 
Ej = ite( Cj, HI. H2 ) 
The logic operation between Ej and Ej can be represented by BDD manipulations as: 
Forwards PDO : ite(cj, G], G2)ffi ite(Cj, HI, H2) = ite(cj, GI E9 HI, G2 E9 Ej ) 
Backwards PDO : ite(cj, GI, G2 ) E9 ite(Cj, HI, H2 ) = ite(Cj, Ej E9 HI, G2 ffi H 2) 
The ordering of variables is very important to the size of a BDD. Methods such as 
heuristics may be implemented to select the most appropriate or efficient ordering 
sequence of variables in the BDD. Once the components are ordered, each component 
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is replaced by a series of sub-components in either a forwards or backwards phase 
ordering pattern. If backwards PDO is used, generally a smaller BDD is produced 
using Trivedi's approach and common component cancellation is achieved without 
requiring additional operations. 
An algorithm is presented to construct a BDD for a phased mission system: 
1. Obtain the failure function for each variable using equation (3.26). 
2. Order the mission components using a heuristic method. 
3. Generate the BDD for each phase using logic equations. 
4. Use phase algebra and the backwards PDO to combine each phase 
. BDD using OR logic to obtain a mission BDD. 
5. Calculate the unreliability of the PMS from the mission BDD. 
In a backwards PDO BDD, the '0' branches (non-occurrence of the basic events) 
always links two variables that belong to different components. However, the '1' 
branches (occurrence ofthe basic events) can connect nodes in two ways: 
1. The' 1 ' branch links variables of different components. 
2. The' 1 ' branch links variables of the same component. 
Considering a BDD for function G, 
Since the '0' branch always links events of different components, G2 will not 
represent any event of component c. This implies that Cj and G2 are always statistically 
independent events and so, 
P( c j • G2 = 1) = P( C j = 1) . P( G2 = 1) 
In the case where the '1' branch links nodes from different components, G 1 also does 
not represent any variable of c, and the same method can be applied as for a single 
phase system shown in equation (3.27). 
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P(G= l)=E[G] =E[cj ·GI +Cj ·G2 ] 
= E[cj ] • E[GI] + E[cj l' E[G2] 
= E[GI] + (1 - E[ cj ]) • (E[G2] - E[GI]) 
= P(GI = 1) + (1 - P( Cj = 1)) . (P(G2 = 1) - P(GI = 1)) (3.27) 
For a '1' branch that links two nodes belonging to the same component, GI will also 
be dependent on a variable of c. Since the two events are not independent, the 
following structures apply: 
Also, P(G = 1) = E[G] = E[ c j • GI + c j • G2 ] 
= E[ C j • ( cj • HI + c j • H2) + E[ C j ] . E[ G2] 
=E[c j ' Cj'HI+ cj ' cj 'H2)+E[cj ] 'E[G2] 
Using the rules of phase algebra in equations (3.22), a branch linking two nodes 
belonging to the same component is given in equation (3.28). 
P(G = 1) = E[cj ·HI +c j ·H2 ] - E[cj ]' E[H2] + E[c j ] • E[G2] 
= E[GI] + E[c j ] • (E[G2] - E[H2]) 
= P(GI = 1) + (1- P( cj = 1)) . (P(G2 = 1) - P(H2 = 1)) (3.28) 
Depending on whether the' 1 ' branch links events of different components or the same 
component, equations (3.27) or (3.28) respectively would be applied. 
Trivedi et al also identify the possibility of latent failures across phase boundaries. 
The phase BDDs can be used to obtain the system unre1iability at the instant before 
and after the phase boundary to calculate the unreliability jump across the phase 
transition. 
The limitations of Trivedi et aI's approach are identified by Xing and Dugan [23]. The 
developed phase dependent operation will only generate the correct phased mission 
system binary decision diagram ifthe following rules are adhered to: 
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1. Orderings implemented in the generation of each phase BDD must be consistent 
or the same for all phases. 
2. Variables belonging to the same component in different phases must stay together 
in the ordering scheme. This is achieved by expanding each component into sub-
component form after the ordering of components has been defined using 
heuristics. 
If an arbitrary ordering scheme is implemented, the phase dependent operation is not 
complete enough to combine the single phase BDDs into an equivalent mission BDD. 
The problem with the method is that a BDD with backwards PDO may represent an 
impossible situation, for example the success of an event in a later phase ordered 
before the failure of the same event in an earlier phase. An example mission to 
demonstrate this is shown in Figure 3.8. 
Figure 3.8 BDD Ordering Pattern 
If A is successful in phase 2, it is not possible for it to have failed in phase 1. Node 
combinations that represent such impossibilities can be removed from the BDD. The 
incoming branch to each impossible node is then passed to the node on its right '0' 
son, since this implies for the component to work in a later phase, it must have worked 
through earlier phases. Any nodes below the left son are also removed, along with any 
redundant nodes. The example in Figure 3.8 becomes as shown in Figure 3.9. 
Figure 3.9 BDD of Figure 3.8 with Impossible Nodes Removed 
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A similar method must be applied to remove impossible nodes using the forwards 
ordering scheme. 
If all impossible node combinations are removed from the BDD, any arbitrary 
ordering scheme may be used to obtain the final phased mission BDD. 
The BDD method presented by Trivedi et al demonstrates an efficient representation 
of the failure logic of a phased mission. Xing and Dugan identify some limitations in 
this method by the way in which the variables are ordered. A further deficiency is that 
each phase j BDD is constructed from only the phase j failure conditions. Although 
each phase j basic event is expanded into its series of sub-events, the outcome of 
previous phases is not accounted for and so the phase BDDs will be incorrect. 
3.2.7 Imperfect Coverage 
Xing and Dugan [24], [25] consider the possibility of imperfect coverage in phased 
mission analysis. This means that a single point failure could cause system failure 
despite the fault-tolerant mechanisms in place. A system can exhibit one of two failure 
modes: covered failure which is local to the affected component and does not lead to 
system failure, and uncovered failure which causes immediate system failure. A 
generalized phased-mission technique is proposed to take these factors into account. 
3.2.8 Markov Methods 
An alternative to combinatorial techniques is by application of Markov methods. 
There are two general approaches to the solution of multi-phased missions using 
Markov methods; treating each phase individually, or analysing the entire mission 
with a single model. If the phases of the mission are treated separately, each 
individual Markov model must be solved separately and linked by a state probability 
vector. The alternative is to solve a single large model with state space at least equal 
to the size of the sum of the components in each individual phase model. This 
problem is considered by Dugan [26] who presents a method to construct a single 
continuous-time discrete-space Markov model for phased mission systems where the 
state space is the size of the union of the components in each phase model. The 
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Markov model is constructed from the set of phase fault trees, and can be used to 
calculate many reliability measures. 
The example in Figure 3.4 may be examined with the following assumptions: 
• Failure rates for the components are constant for the duration of the phase, 
but can be different for each phase. 
• The system fails due to failure in any phase of the mission. 
• Phase change times are deterministic. 
Problems are encountered using this Markov model when a set of components is not 
consistent between phases, or when components are not subject to failure in a phase, 
since the system states do not match. The phase fault trees of a mission represent the 
failure conditions of the system and can be converted to Markov chains for further 
analysis. The phase fault trees in Figure 3.7 can be converted to separate Markov 
models with system states representing the states of components A, B, and C in the 
form {A,B,C} with 0 as working and 1 as failed in Figure 3.10. 
Phase 1 Phase 2 Phase 3 
Figure 3.10 Phase Markov Models for Figure 3.4 
To combine the three separate Markov models into a single mission Markov model, a 
multiplicative factor ([>i is appended to each phase i transition. The combined Markov 
chain has a state space defined by the union of the individual phase Markov models, 
and transitions that are defined by the sum of corresponding phase transitions, and is 
given in Figure 3.11. 
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Figure 3.11 Combined Mission Markov Model 
This combined model may be solved using a standard numerical technique. For 
solutions to phase i (tj-l :s t :s tj), Wj is set to one, and all other ~, i.:4 are set to zero 
thus removing any transition that does not belong to the current phase. The state space 
does not change and rather than transforming the state probabilities, the state 
transitions change as the phases change. 
In the case that the components are not the same in each phase, a full Markov state 
listing is formed by the expansion of all components that contribute at some point 
during the mission. For each source state in the combined Markov model, the 
destination state corresponding to the failure of a component can be different in 
different phases, and so each component must be considered several times for each 
phase of the mission~ A state in one phase that causes the system to fail is not 
necessarily a failure state of previous phases. However, if a system failure state is 
reached in phase i, it becomes absorbing for all later phases. The system states are 
then defined as 'operational for all phases' or 'failed in phase i', where phase i is the 
first phase in which the system fails. Dugan also considers this method for systems 
with imperfect coverage. 
The final combined mission Markov model results in a set of differential equations 
which must be solved numerically using methods such as Runge-Kutta. The initial 
conditions for the first phase are known, and the failure and success probability of 
each phase can be obtained using the Markov state probabilities at the end of the 
phase. The final state probability vector of each phase is passed directly to the 
following phase for further analysis. 
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This approach provides an efficient representation of the multi-phased mission. The 
construction of a single model eliminates the problems faced across a phase boundary 
if the state-space of the phases is not the same. However, the single model has a state 
space defined by all components required in the mission. In some cases a mission may 
require a large number of components that are not necessarily required through all 
phases. The resulting state space of the single model will become large and the set of 
differential equations will also increase and become very complex to solve. It is also 
not correct to assume that if a system failure state is reached in phase i, it becomes 
absorbing for all later phases. A state may be possible and reachable in a later phase 
even when it was an absorbing state in an earlier phase. The possibility of transition 
failures is not identified in this model. 
3.2.9 Modular Solution of Missions with Static and Dynamic Phases 
All of the methods discussed so far have applied to only static phases, where AND 
and OR gates are used to represent the phase failure configuration. In some cases, 
failure will only occur if components fail in a specific order, and dynamic gates are 
required. The possibility of static and dynamic phases in a multi-phased mission is 
considered by Ou and Dugan [27]. A modular solution is presented to combine BDD 
solution techniques for static modules with Markov methods for dynamic modules. 
The main deficiency of this method is that the modules must represent an independent 
subtree throughout all phases. In many cases, the configuration of a phased mission 
system will vary considerably across phases, and it will not be possible to identify 
distinct modules through the mission. Each module is solved using the same technique 
throughout the phases, and so the methods already identified can be implemented. 
3.2.10 Summary 
Much research has been employed into the analysis of non-repairable phased mission 
systems. The main features of the methods presented are: 
• The expansion of each basic event into a series of sub-events representing the 
separate performance of a component in each phase of the mission. 
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• Transformation of a multi-phased mission into an equivalent single phase 
mission to allow existing fault tree techniques to be implemented. 
• Cut set cancellation for cut sets of an earlier phase that contain cut sets of a 
later phase. 
• Parameter of interest is mISSIOn success, either by full calculation or 
appropriate approximation techniques using negative exponential component 
failure distributions. 
• Phase changes are assumed to be instantaneous, and failure rates are assumed 
to be constant within each phase. 
• Boolean algebra phase laws can be applied to combine component success and 
failure events through multiple phases. 
• Binary decision diagrams can be applied to provide an alternative 
representation of the top event of phase and mission failure with appropriate 
ordering schemes. 
• Markov methods represent the dynamic nature of component failures. 
However, it is also seen that the methods presented result in some deficiencies. The 
cut set cancellation method by Esary and Ziehms allows analysis only for the total 
mission rather than for individual phases. Also the concentration of research into 
mission success does not identify the causes of individual phase failure. The BDD 
approach is seen to provide an efficient representation of mission failure and success, 
but does not take account of the outcome of previous phases when representing each 
individual phase BDD. It would be useful to be able to identify the causes and 
quantify each phase failure with account for previous phase successes, as well as for 
the entire mission. 
The Markov model suffers a state explosion problem as the number of components 
and phases in the mission increases. As components are not necessarily required 
through all phases of the mission, it would become time consuming to expand all 
possible states for every component in the mission, and the single Markov model 
presented would become very complex. 
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A simple combinatorial method is required to allow straightforward qualification and 
quantification of both phase and mission reliability to account for the dependency 
between phases. 
3.3 Repairable Systems 
The methods presented so far have only been appropriate for non-repairable systems. 
In systems on-board an aircraft or spacecraft it would be very difficult to perform a 
repair whilst carrying out a mission, and so these methods are suitable for such system 
analysis. However, in many practical situations it will be possible for maintenance to 
be performed on a system, and the change in requirements between phases of a multi-
phased mission leads to the possibility of component repair. Methods presented for 
analysis of repairable multi-phased missions are discussed in the following sections. 
3.3.1 Combinatorial Approaches 
An extension of the work by Trivedi and Somani [20] is presented usmg 
combinatorial approaches for the solution of repairable components in a multi-phased 
mission by Somani [28]. However, this approach is very limited since a component 
can only be repaired if it is not required in a particular phase. Whilst a component is 
required for successful operation of a phase, repair cannot be initiated. 
If c is a component whose failure and repair rates in phase p are denoted by Ae and 
p 
/le ' the failure and repair times are assumed to follow an exponential distribution. 
p 
The definitions in equations (3.29) are made: 
(3.29) 
where t is the time after the system entered phase p. 
Four possible cases must be considered for the component in a phase - the component 
may begin in the working or failed state, and may end in either the working or failed 
state. Using notation whereby the first suffix is the name of the component, the second 
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represents the state of the component at the start of the phase (u=up, f =failed), the 
third represents the state ofthe component at the end of the phase and the fourth is the 
phase number, formulae are developed. 
If the component c is up at the start of the phase, the probability that it will be in the 
working or failed state at the end of the phase is given by: 
Pc (t)=ac (t)+Pc *(1-ac (t» uup p p p Pc (t)=(1-ac (t»*(1-Pc) ufp p p 
If the component c is failed at the start of the phase, the probability that it will be in 
the working or failed state at the end of the phase is given by: 
Pc (t)=~c *(I-ac (t» fup p p Pc (t) =1-~c *(I-ac (t» ~ p p 
If the probability that component c is up at the start of a phase is represented by Pc' ubp 
and down at the start of a phase is represented by Pc then the state of the component Jbp 
after time t has elapsed may be represented by equations (3.30). 
~uep (t) = PXubp * PCuup (t) + PCJbp * PCfUP (t) 
(3.30) 
~fep (t) = PCubP * PcuJp (t) + PCJbp * PcJJP (t) 
The main deficiency of this approach is that the reparability is not considered for all 
components, and is only applicable to the idle components in a phase. A method is 
required to model the situation where any components in a phase can be repaired. 
Another combinatorial approach is presented by Vaurio [29] who considers 
calculations for the system unavailability and failure intensity for each phase of the 
mission separately. The unavailability and failure intensity for a component c that is 
known to be working at the start of the mission is obtained using Laplace transforms 
and given in equations (3.31) and (3.32) respectively. 
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(3.31) 
(3.32) 
This method does not model the dependencies that arise in repairable systems and so 
the component unavailability is only an approximation. The unavailability function for 
phase j, Qj, is obtained for each phase interval using the phase specific fault tree, 
where t E (t j-1 ,t j ). The system failure intensity in each phase and expected number of 
phase failures is then calculated using equations (3.33). 
N, 8Qj(t) ~ lVi(t) 
i=l oqi 
(3.33) 
i initiating event 
At each phase boundary, a joint fault tree is constructed to represent the top event of 
phase j failure (.0) AND phase j+l failure (0+1), Zj nZj +1 • The probability of 
occurrence of this top event is then calculated using the basic event probabilities at 
t=lj. The probability of system failure at the phase transition, !l. j' can then be 
represented by equation (3.34). 
(3.34) 
The expected number of mission failures is then obtained by equation (3.35). 
m-I m 
WMISS(O,tm) =!l.o + I!l.j + I~ (3.35) 
j=1 j=1 
It can easily be seen that this method does not model the dependencies that arise in the 
situation of repairable systems. The phase unavailability and failure intensities will be 
approximations of the exact values, and thus not very useful in the solution of many 
reliability problems. Also the phase calculations involved do not include the outcome 
of previous phases. 
71 
3.3.2 Markov Methods 
The consideration of repairable phases in a multi-phased mission means that the phase 
algebra can no longer be applied. In such circumstances, combinatorial methods may 
not be used as only approximations could be calculated, and so other techniques must 
be employed .. The Markov approach is a very useful technique for the solution of 
repairable systems, and much research has been undertaken in this area. Many 
applications of the Markov approach in phased mission systems have been considered. 
The reliability of a mission cannot be obtained by the simple multiplication of the 
individual phase reliabilities since at the phase change times, for the system to 
function, it must occupy a state that allows both of the involved phases to be 
successful. Markov methods offer a means of overcoming this. 
3.3.2.1 Homogeneous Markov Model 
The homogeneous property of a Markov model means that the state transitions are not 
dependent on time, and are instead governed by a constant rate. Certain assumptions 
must be made: 
• The system is comprised of elements that may be good or bad with 
independently exponentially distributed failure and repair times. 
• Repair of a component restores it to the perfect condition. 
• Each phase may have more than one purpose. However if a system fails in a 
phase, the mission will fail. 
• Transition between successive phases occurs instantaneously. 
Early investigations into the use of Markov methods to solve phased mISSIOn 
problems were carried out by Clarotti et al [30]. 
Consider the example in Figure 3.12, 
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Phase 1 Phase 2 Phase 3 
Figure 3.12 Simple Three-Phased Mission 
There are eight possible states ofthe system, S} .. S8, defined in terms ofthe states of its 
components. The states are defined in Table 3.1. 
State A B C 
8 1 0 0 0 
82 1 0 0 
83 0 1 0 
84 1 1 0 
8s 0 0 1 
86 1 0 1 
8 7 0 1 1 
88 1 1 1 
where o working 
1 failed 
Table 3.1 System States of Component Combinations 
Considering each ofthe three phases: 
• Phase 1 (0, t}) 
The probability vector expresses the likelihood that the system resides in each of the 
eight possible states. The mission begins with all components in the working state, 
and so the initial condition probability vector, P(O), can be represented by equation 
(3.36). 
P(O) = [1 0000000] (3.36) 
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For the system to function successfully during the first phase, at least one component 
must be in the working state (Figure 3.12). If all three components reside in the failed 
state at the same time, the phase will fail. The state representative of this phase failure 
is S8 where no components are functional. 
In matrix form as defined in equation (2.44), the evolution of phase 1 may be 
represented by matrix equations (3.37). 
· T T Ps..(t) PsI(t) - 2:1 AA AB 0 Ae 0 0 0 
· PS2 (t) Ps2 (t) VA -2:2 0 AB 0 Ae 0 0 
· PS](t) PS] (t) VB 0 -2:3 AA 0 0 Ae 0 
· Ps
4 
(t) 
-2:4 PS4 (t) 0 VB VA 0 0 0 Ae 
= (3.37) 
· Pss (t) 0 0 0 -2:5 AA ~ 0 Pss(t) Ve 
· Ps6 (t) 0 Vc 0 0 VA -2:6 0 ~ Ps6 (t) 
· 
PS] (t) 0 0 Ve 0 VB 0 -2:7 AA PSr(t) 
· 
PSg (t) 0 0 0 0 
PSg(t) 
where: 0 represents an impossible state transition 
represents an absorbing state (no transition is possible out ofthe state) 
L j is the sum of the non-diagonal entries in the lh row 
At the phase change time t1, the system must occupy a successful state for both phases 
1 and 2. For phase 2 success (Figure 3.12), component A must be working along with 
either component B or C. To successfully be able to enter phase 2, the system must 
reside in one of the states representative of this, S1, S3, or S5 in Table 3.1. The 
probability of the system residing in each of these states at t=t1 is represented by 
PSI (t l ) , ps] (tl)' and PSs (tl) respectively. The probability that the system successfully 
completes the first phase and is able to enter the second phase is given by the sum of 
these probabilities in equation (3.38). 
(3.38) 
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The system will only begin this second phase if it is in one of the states S1, S3, or S5, 
and will evolve from these states at the start of the phase. All other states are 
considered to be absorbing at the phase change time since mission failure would be 
caused. The vector of initial phase 2 system state probabilities has all entries equal to 
zero apart from those corresponding to working states for both phases 1 and 2, 
PSI (tl)' P S3 (t1), and P Ss (t l ), and is shown in equation (3.39). 
The matrix equations for solution of phase 2 are given in equation (3.40). 
• T 
Pst(t) T ~Jt) - L1 
~2(t) 
~3(t) VB 
~4 (t) 0 
= ~s(t) Ve 
~6(t) 0 
~7(t) 0 
~8 (t) 0 
o 
o 
o 
o 
o 
o o 
o 0 
o 0 
Ae 0 
o Ae 
AB 0 
o AB 
-2:7 AA 
(3.39) 
(3.40) 
For the second phase to be considered successful, the system must occupy a working 
state for both phases 2 and 3 at the end of the phase. For successful entry to phase 3 
(Figure 3.12), all components must be working (state S1) at time t2 when it enters the 
third and final phase. The probability that the system has successfully achieved the 
second phase and is able to enter the third and final phase is given in equation (3.41). 
(3.41) 
• Phase 3 (t2, fJ) 
To successfully complete the mission, the system must remain in state S1 with all 
components working for the duration of the phase. The initial phase 3 state probability 
vector is given in equation (3.42). 
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P(t2) = [PSI (t2) 0000000] (3.42) 
The matrix equations for solution of phase 3 are given in equation (3.43). 
· T T PsI(t) PsI(t) - L1 AA AB 0 Ac 0 0 0 
· PS2 (t) Ps2 (t) -L2 0 AB 0 Ac 0 0 
· Ps) (t) Ps) (t) 0 
-L3 AA 0 0 Ac 0 
· Ps
4 
(t) 
-L4 PS4 (t) 0 0 0 0 Ac 
= (3.43) 
· Pss (t) 0 0 0 -Ls AA AB 0 PSs (t) 
· Ps6 (t) 0 0 0 -L6 0 AB PS6 (t) 
· 
Ps7 (t) 0 0 0 0 -L7 AA Ps7 (t) 
· 
Pss (t) 0 0 0 0 Pss(t) 
The success probability of the mission is given by the probability that the system 
resides in state S1 with all components working at the end of the mission (t=t3) in 
equation (3.44) 
(3.44) 
This method identifies that the main difference between the application of a Markov 
model to a single-phase system and a multi-phased system is the need to determine the 
initial conditions at the start of each phase. This initial condition problem is also 
identified by Gray [31] using parallel subgroups with identical components. The 
deficiencies in the method presented by Clarotti et al. are that the entire mission is 
solved using phase Markov models with the same state space. In some cases, the 
number of components required in a mission will be very large, and not all 
components will be required in every phase. The resulting Markov model will become 
very complex and difficult to solve. Also, the phase reliabilities are determined by the 
probability that the system is in a final successful state that is also a success state of 
the subsequent phase. The correct reliability should be obtained by the probability that 
the phase has completed successfully, regardless of the requirements for the following 
phase. The failure upon transition to the following phase will contribute to the 
subsequent phase failure. 
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3.3.2.1.1 Random Phase Durations 
The methods presented so far have assumed that the duration of phases in a multi-
phased mission are deterministic and thus defined at the start of the mission. Wells 
and Bryant [32] begin to consider the principle of random durations by application to 
only a single-phase system. Alam and Al-Saggaf [33] consider two approaches to 
determine an appropriate description of the marginal distributions of the mission 
phase change times (MPCTs) when the phase-change times are random variables. 
The first approach investigates a general formula for the joint probability density 
function of the MPCTs, which may be statistically dependent. The second models the 
MPCTs as order statistics of a continuous random variable. The solution to a 
probabilistic MPCT is then similar to the deterministic approach. The example 
demonstrated in Section 3.3.2.1 by Clarotti et al. produced the probability that the 
system completed each phase successfully, and was able to enter the next phase. The 
initial conditions in each phase were given in equations (3.36), (3.39), and (3.42). The 
solutions for probabilistic MPCTs require a modification to be made to these initial 
conditions, shown in equations (3.45). 
P(O) = [ 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 of 
P(T1) = [E{P1(TI)} 0 E{P3(T1)} 0 E{P5(TI)} 0 0 of 
P(T2) = [E{PI(T2)} 0 0 0 0 0 0 of 
(3.45) 
where 1j is the random variable of the mission phase change time for phase j 
The expected probability values are obtained using the probability density functions of 
the random phase change time variables over the phase durations. This method is 
further developed by Kim and Park [34] using the system eigenvalues for solution to 
the differential equations established by the Markov model. 
Random phase durations are also considered by Somani et al [35] using phase Markov 
models. The change in system failure criteria between individual phase Markov 
models requires mapping of the system states from phase i to phase i+ 1. The 
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reliability of the mission is then obtained by the successful system state probabilities 
at the end of the final phase. 
It is possible that for a particular state in a phase, there may not be an equivalent state 
in the immediately succeeding phase. Similarly, there may be numerous system states 
that have the same equivalent state in the next phase. Such situations arise due to the 
operational requirements of the components through the phases. Components may 
only be required in certain phases of the mission, and also redundancy and spares may 
be added into particular phases. The mapping of system states between phases can be 
implemented using the Hybrid Automated Reliability Predictor (HARP) software for 
phased mission systems, and is discussed by Somani et al. 
In summary, the time-homogeneous Markov model provides a suitable method for the 
solution of phased mission systems where each phase has the same state space but 
may have different failure and repair characteristics. The phase models can be 
combined sequentially, and the success initiation of a phase depends on the 
probability that the system resides in a successful state for both phases across the 
transition. The state probability vector at the end of each phase represents the phase 
success or failure probability and is linearly transformed into the initial probability 
vector for the next phase. The state probability vector at the end of the last phase 
represents the mission success or failure probability. The limitation of this approach is 
that the state space is defined by all components required in the mission, and so can be 
susceptible to state explosion problems. It would be useful if only the components 
required in a phase were included in each phase model. 
3.3.2.1.2 State Dependent Phase Sequences 
It is possible that phases may have a pre-determined time duration, but the next phase 
to be performed is chosen depending on the system state. This is discussed by Mura 
and Bondavalli [36] who present a two-level analysis method of a phased mission 
system. The higher level method models the structure of the mission with regards to 
only the pattern of phases, and the lower level method models the configuration of the 
individual phases. 
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The components can be subject to different failure and repair rates in each phase due 
to environmental conditions. Since both remain constant through the phase duration, 
the conditions are homogeneous within each phase. The order of phases in the mission 
can be dynamically adjusted depending on the state of the system at the end of a 
phase. An example system is presented of the case study of a spacecraft with phases: 
Launch (L): Launch of spacecraft. Short phase with stressing 
conditions. 
Hibernation (H): Long dormancy periods for cruIse navigation 
characterised by minimal activity. 
Planet (P): In range of planet. Short phase with stressing 
conditions. 
Scientific Observations (SO): Conducted while cruising in close proximity to space 
objects and represent the goals ofthe mission. 
The upper level model of the spacecraft mission is given in Figure 3.13. The failure of 
any phase causes failure of the mission, but this is not represented in this upper level 
model since only the possible phase sequences need to be clarified. 
S02',S 
PH1,p 
PS02,S 
1c8 
where PSI.S2 is the probability of executing state S2 after state S1 
Figure 3.13 Upper-Level Model of a Spacecraft Mission 
Each phase requires a minimum number of processors to function successfully. The 
requirements can be summarised as: 
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Hibernation 
Launch 
Planet 
clentl lC servatlOns 
Number of Processors Required 
1 (2 if possible) 
3 
3 
3 S · 'fi Ob . }cruise 
Perform Observations 1 
There are 4 identical processors to meet the requirements of the phases. The primary 
objective is S02 which must be performed, and SOl is a secondary goal. At the end 
of phase H2 if there are any faulty processors, SO 1 will be skipped and the next phase 
to be performed will be H4. If there are no faulty processors, the system is capable of 
executing SO 1 and so this will be the next phase. The determination of the subsequent 
phase to H2 is therefore state dependent. Reward rates can be cumulated to determine 
the benefits when a particular phase is executed. 
The lower level models can be represented using generalised stochastic petri nets, and 
translated into a continuous time Markov model. Each state in phase H, L, and P of 
the Markov model can be represented by the number of working, spare, and failed 
components in the form: {#Working, #Spare, #Failed}. {F} is the absorbing failure 
state. In the SO phases, since all components are required, the states are represented 
by the number of working and failed components in the form: {#Working, #Failed}. 
A separate phase transition model is presented between phases to map the final state 
probabilities of one phase to the initial state probabilities of the subsequent phase. If 
there is no choice of possible following phases, such as between phases HI and P, a 
deterministic model is applied. For the transition between phases HI and P, with the 
probability of successful reconfiguration denoted by c, the non-failure states would be 
mapped as shown in Figure 3.14. 
Figure 3.14 Deterministic Phase Transition model from HI to P 
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Since three processors are required in phase P, a successful transition from phase HI 
will only occur if there are sufficient working or spare components to satisfy the phase 
P requirement. The mapping technique of this deterministic model can be translated 
into a transition matrix where the number of rows is equal to the number of states in 
the originating phase, and the number of columns is equal to the number of states in 
the successive phase. The entries in the matrix represent the probability on each arc of 
the phase transition model. 
A probabilistic phase transition model represents the state dependencies between 
phases, and can be shown for the possible transitions from phase H2 in Figure 3.15. 
///~-------- --------------
! 
\, ..... 
............ -._---_ ... _----------_._-------
Figure 3.15 Probabilistic Phase Transition model from H2 to SDI and H4 
The transition matrix for a probabilistic transition model is obtained in the same way 
as for a deterministic model apart from the number of columns is equal to the sum of 
the state space of all possible subsequent phases. 
Each lower level model is solved in the order of the phase sequences in the upper 
level model, where the initial state probability vector for each phase is obtained by 
application of the appropriate transition model to the state probabilities at the end of 
the previous phase. The upper level model can then be solved to evaluate parameters 
of interest. Further methods for solution to phased mission systems usmg 
deterministic and stochastic petri nets are discussed by Mura et al [37]. 
3.3.2.2 Non-Markovian Models 
The traditional Markov approach involves each phase being treated separately to 
obtain a state probability vector at the time of the phase change. Each probability 
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vector is then linearly transformed into the appropriate initial condition vector for the 
next phase. This continues until the vector of the last phase is found, representing the 
predicted reliability of the total mission. However, this method is limited due to the 
assumption that phase changes occur at specified discrete points in time and are 
instantaneous and state-dependent, i.e. the system will only begin a phase if the state 
is successful for both the preceding and succeeding phases. Such a model alone is not 
able to represent the amount of work performed or the relative values of task 
accomplishment in many practical situations. 
A non-Markovian model represents the general case where the transition matrix [ A] of 
equation (2.44) contains globally time-dependent coefficients (A{t) and u{t». The 
homogenous case is the special case where these transition rates are constant (A and 
u). 
The deficiencies of the homogeneous method are identified by Smotherman and 
Zemoudeh [38]: 
• Phase changes and phase change times depend only on the current phase, and 
not individual states. This cannot represent, for example, that a degraded 
system would require longer to complete a phase than a fully functional 
system would. 
• The number of phases with a random time duration is limited, or requires the 
computation of order statistic integrals. 
• Failure and repair rates must be constant within each phase. This does not 
allow representation of burn-in effects or wear out effects of mechanical 
components. 
A generalised method is presented where the performance of the system is modelled 
by a continuous time finite-state Markov process. The distributions of phase change 
times are considered to be non-overlapping uniform distributions that are ordered 
according to the sequence of phases, and the failure and repair rates are assumed to be 
globally time-dependent. 
Transitions are generalised to represent phase changes as well as component failure 
and repairs so that arbitrary distributions of phase change times can be established in 
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hazard rate fonn as time-varying transition rates in the non-Markovian model. The 
numerical solution to the non-Markovian matrix set of differential equations is then 
solved using the fifth order Runge-Kutta method. This is extended for time-dependent 
transition rates, and includes infonnation on each type of phase change; exiting state, 
entry state(s), and the branching possibility for multiple entry states. Fixed-time phase 
changes do not affect the transition matrix but cause an instantaneous transfer of 
probability from the exiting state to the entry state(s). 
This work is continued by Smothennan and Geist [39] who introduce measures of 
effectiveness for a single non-Markovian mission model using reward rates to provide 
more infonnation on system effectiveness. This model can be applied in situations 
where' component failure is not exponentially distributed, and failure rates are not 
constant. 
If {X(t)lt ~ o} is a finite state stochastic process with state probabilities 
Ps (t) = P[X(t) = j], the set of state differential equations can be expressed by 
j 
equation (3.46). 
N 
ps! (t) = ! PSi (t)aij (t) 
i=1 
(3.46) 
where Ns is the number of system states. 
This is represented in matrix from in equation (2.44), however in this case the 
transition matrix is time dependent, [A(t)]. Each phase is represented as a separate 
subset of states of the single model. Phase changes are represented by time-varying 
transitions among these subsets, and are state dependent. Phase changes that are not 
instantaneous are modelled by including intennediate states. This allows 
representation of different phase change durations and also multi-objective missions. 
A reward model applies instantaneous and cumulative measures of weighted state 
occupancy. Each state Si has an associated weight called a reward rate, Rs/ (t) , which 
represents the relative value of the system residing in the state. Reward rates may also 
be time-dependent. 
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The vector of system state reward rates, R(t) is defined by equation (3.47). 
R(t) = [Rs (t), Rs (t), ... , Rs (t) r 
1 2 Ns 
(3.47) 
The instantaneous reward rate of the system at time t is then given by pet) R(t). The 
expected value of the accumulated reward until time t, Yet), is obtained in equation 
(3.48). 
(3.48) 
If used with proper reward rates this may give information on the expected time spent 
in a certain subset of states, and may be used as a measure for providing life cycle 
measures such as expected duty time and expected time under repair. 
A standard initial-value solution algorithm may be used to find the state probabilities 
of the system of differential equations with appropriate reward rates. The transition 
rate matrix must be re-evaluated at each time step of the algorithm since the matrix 
entries are time-varying rates. If a transition rate approaches a discontinuity, 
increasingly smaller step sizes are required and the solution process becomes 
computationally longer. Models of complex systems have potentially large state 
spaces due to the representation of all states in all phases. The possible extra 
computational effort is the main disadvantage when considering the increase in 
flexibility of the model. 
This method can be applied to an example system comprising of two components that 
is initialised and loaded and then remains on duty until the end of a 100 hour period, 
summarised in Figure 3.16. 
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Initialisation 
Sub-model 
Loading 
Sub-model 
On Duty 
Sub-model 
Inactive 
Sub-model Where: 
State 
I 3 components available 
2 2 components available 
3 I component available 
4 0 components available 
(unrecoverable system 
failure) 
5 3 components available 
6 2 components available 
7 I component available 
8 3 components available 
9 2 components available 
10 I component available 
11 Unrecoverable System 
Failure 
cr Initialisation system failure 
rate 
h,(t) Phase change rate 
).,(t) Time-dependent component 
failure rate in phase i 
Cl Coverage probability during 
initialization 
C2 Coverage probability on duty 
Figure 3.16 Non-Markovian Model Example 
This example demonstrates the possibility of state dependent phase change times. In 
the loading phase if two components are operational (state 5) then loading is 
completed at rate h2(t), however if only one component is operational (state 6), the 
loading requires a longer interval and the phase change rate h3(t) is used. This also 
demonstrates the possibility of time-dependent failure rates, for example 23(t) in phase 
3. Reward rates can be assigned by the number of components that are operational in 
the state per unit time. This example is quantified by Smotherman and Geist and 
further examples are considered to represent multi-objective and pipe leakage models. 
This work is also developed using semi-Markov models with fixed (maximum) 
durations in a given set of system states by Becker et al [40]. 
3.3.3 Summary 
The methods that have been presented for solution to repairable phased mISSIOn 
systems exhibit the following properties: 
• Combinatorial approaches do not account for possible dependencies between 
components and phases, and thus produce only an approximation for phase 
and mission unreliability. 
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• Markov methods implementing a single model eliminate the problem of state 
mapping across a phase boundary. Markov methods based on separate phase 
models result in state mapping problems at each phase transition. 
• Homogeneous Markov models require constant state transition rates within 
each phase. Non-Markovian models allow for varying state transition rates 
within a phase. 
• Phase durations can be deterministic or random. Phase sequences can be 
deterministic or state-dependent. 
A method is required to suitably represent the dynamic and dependent behaviour of a 
multi-phased mission. Since combinatorial approaches allow only approximations of 
phase and mission unreliability, Markov methods are preferred. However, Markov 
models are susceptible to state explosion problems as the number of components 
increases and so a technique is required to eliminate this. A state mapping procedure 
is required across phase transition boundaries ifusing separate phase Markov models. 
The presented methods have considered all phases in a mission to be of a single type, 
either non-repairable or repairable. There are many phased mission features that have 
not been identified. It is possible that a phase can be either discrete or continuous in 
duration. Also, little research has been undertaken into the possibility of sequential 
failure relationships with scheduled inspection policies. Therefore a general method is 
required to include the possibility of a combination of discrete and continuous phase 
durations, with non-repairable and repairable phase types and the consideration of 
sequential failures and scheduled inspection. 
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Chapter 4 Non-Repairable Phased Missions 
4.1 Introduction 
The method of calculating the reliability of a phased mission cannot simply be 
obtained by the multiplication of the reliabilities of each of the individual phases as 
this involves the false assumptions that the phases are independent and all components 
are in the working state at the beginning of each phase. To make these assumptions 
results in an appreciable over-prediction of system reliability. Other techniques must 
be applied. 
For the case of a multi-phased system containing only non-repairable components, 
various methods have been developed to assess the mission reliability. Past research 
has demonstrated that the Markov approach is susceptible to potential explosions in 
the number of state equations for even moderate sized problems. For the more simple 
case of a system allowing no repairs, the preferred approaches are that of the fault tree 
and binary decision diagram techniques. 
Previous methods have provided means of estimating the failure probability of a 
mission as a whole, but little investigation has been made into the additional 
possibility of the attainment of individual phase failure. A new fault tree method is 
proposed to enable the probability of failure in each phase to be determined in 
addition to the whole mission unreliability. For any phase, the method combines the 
causes of success of previous phases with the causes of failure for the phase being 
considered to allow both qualitative and quantitative analysis of both phase failure and 
mission failure. This will overcome some of the deficiencies of other fault tree 
techniques. The proposed method is also presented in [41]. 
The binary decision diagram method offers an alternative approach to the fault tree 
method in the aim of reducing the complexity of the problem, thus making the 
solution process more accurate and efficient. The standard binary decision diagram 
technique is consequently modified to produce a more general method for use in 
missions of multiple phases. 
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Once the probability of phase and mission failure has been determined by either the 
fault tree or binary decision diagram method, it is possible to calculate the frequency 
of phase and mission failure. 
4.2 Fault Tree Method 
The proposed method considers the performance of a system not only for the duration 
of the phase in question, but also for all preceding phases. A component that is known 
to be in the failed state in a phase could have failed at any point up to that time. By 
considering the component failing in each phase as a separate event, component 
failure in a particular phase fault tree is replaced by an OR combination of the events 
for the component failing in that and all preceding phases. The event of component 
failure in phase i is represented as the event that the component could have failed 
during any phase up to and including phase i. For example, component A failure in 
phase 2 would be represented by the OR of the failure of the component in phase 1 
(AI) and in phase 2 (A]) since the component is non-repairable, shown in Figure. 4.1. 
Figure 4.1 Replacement OR combination 
System failure in phase i is represented by the AND ofthe success of phases l..i-l and 
the failure during phase i, demonstrated in Figure. 4.2. All phase failures may then be 
combined using an OR gate to represent causes of overall mission failure as the event 
that any phase does not complete successfully. 
This method allows for the evaluation of individual phase failures, and also accounts 
for the condition where components are known to have functioned to enable the 
system to function in previous phases. However, owing to the fact that cut sets are not 
removed until a later stage in the analysis, the fault tree can be much more complex 
and require significantly more effort to solve. 
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Success in 
Previous 
Phases 
Failure 
During Phase 
; 
Failure in Failure in 
Phase 1 Phase ;-1 
Failure 
Conditions 
Met During 
Phase; 
Phase ifault tree with 
each basic event 
replaced with an OR 
combination of 
component failure in 
any phase from 1 .. ; 
Figure 4.2 Generalised Phase Failure Fault Tree 
4.2.1 Qualitative Analysis 
The failure of a system can occur in many different ways. Each unique way is referred 
to as a system failure mode, and involves the failure of either a single component, or 
the combination of failures of multiple components. 
To determine the minimal cut sets of a phase or mission, either a top-down or a 
bottom-up approach is applied to the relevant fault tree. For any phases after the first 
phase, the incorporation of the success of previous phases means that the fault tree 
will be non-coherent and not simply consist of' AND' and 'OR' gates. NOT logic will 
be required to represent this success (not failed), and the combinations of basic events 
that lead to the occurrence of the top event will be referred to as implicants. These 
implicant sets are not always minimal and so simplification techniques are required 
for reduction to prime implicant sets in phased mission systems. 
This proposed method may be applied for the simple three-phase mission given in 
Figure 4.3. 
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Phase 1 Phase 2 Phase 3 
to------~) tl ------~) t2 ------7) t3 
Figure 4.3 Reliability Network of a Simple Phased Mission System 
The failure causes for each phase may be expressed using separate fault trees III 
Figure 4.4. 
Figure 4.4 Fault Tree Representation of Individual Phase Failures 
The fault tree to represent the initial phase failure of the mission remains identical to 
the fault tree representation of the individual phase failure of phase I shown in Figure 
4.4. Failure during phase 2 can then be shown as the combination of phase 1 success 
and failure in phase 2, using the basic event expansion, in Figure 4.5. 
Figure 4.5 Phase 2 Failure Fault Tree 
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Similarly, phase 3 failure can be represented as the combination of phase 1 and 2 
successes, and failure in phase 3 in Figure 4.6. 
Figure 4.6 Phase 3 Failure Fault Tree 
4.2.1.1 Fault Tree Modularisation 
Fault tree modularisation techniques are helpful to reduce the size of a fault tree to 
enable prime implicants to be found more efficiently. These modularisation 
techniques reduce both memory and time requirements. A non-coherent extension of a 
modularisation technique has been employed in this work [42]. It repeatedly applies 
the stages of contraction, factorisation and extraction to reduce the complexity of the 
fault tree diagram. The stages are identified as: 
1. Contraction 
Subsequent gates of the same type are contracted to form a single gate. The resulting 
tree structure is then an alternating sequence of OR and AND gates. 
2. Factorisation 
Identification of basic events that always occur together in the same gate type. The 
combination of events and gate type is replaced by a complex event. However, since 
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NOT logic is included in order to combine phase success and failure, in this stage the 
primary basic events that are found to always occur together in one gate type must 
have complements that always occur together in the opposite gate type by De 
Morgans' laws, e.g. 
2000=A+B 2001 = A·B 
-- --
2000=A·B 2001 = A+B 
3. Extraction 
Searches for structures within the tree, of the form shown in Figure 4.7, that may be 
simplified by extracting an event to a higher level. 
Figure 4.7 Extraction Stage of the Modularisation Technique 
4.2.2 Prime Implicants in Phased Mission Systems 
Owing to the non-coherent nature of the fault trees, the combinations of basic events 
that lead to the occurrence of the top event of either phase or mission failure are 
expressed as prime implicants. The notation used to represent the failure of 
component A in phase i is 4. 4 represents the functioning of component A 
throughout phase i. The notation used to indicate the failure of a component in phase i 
through to and including phase j is Ay, i.e. component A fails at some time from the 
start of phase i to the end of phase j. Conversely, the success of component A in phase 
i through to and including phase j is Aij . 
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This notation enables us to define a new algebra over the phases to manipulate the 
logic equations. What is of concern in later phases is the phase during which the 
component failures occur. So we can produce a combination of events for component 
A e.g. it works successfully through phases 1 and 2 and fails in either phase 3 or phase 
4. This is expressed algebraically as: 
This means that the top event will only occur if A fails in phases 3 or 4 i.e. A34 where, 
14 
qA34 = QA(t2 ,t4 ) = ffAt)dt 
12 
where q A is the failure probability for component A in phases 3 or 4 
34 
fA (t) is the density function of failure times for component A 
The top event of phase or mission failure can contain multiple events belonging to the 
same component. Since each phase is obtained as a combination of current phase 
failure with previous phase successes, the events can represent either component 
failure or success in various phases. A new set of Boolean laws is required to reduce 
the expression for each phase failure into minimal form. The application of these laws 
will allow the prime implicant sets to be obtained for each phase. 
A summary ofthe new algebraic laws where phase i<j is: 
Component A fails in phase i AND phase i. Repeated 
Event. 
Component A fails in phase i AND phasej. These are 
mutually exclusive events so cannot both occur. 
Component A fails in phase i AND between phase i and 
phase j. As the failure of component A in phase i and 
any other phase from i+ 1 to j are mutually exclusive 
events, they cannot occur together. The common event 
is the failure of component A in phase i. 
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4. Ai ·Ai = 0 
6. Ai· Aij = Ai+1,j 
Component A works in phase i AND fails in phase i. An 
event and its compliment cannot occur at the same time. 
Component A works through phase i AND fails in phase 
j. The failure of component in phase j implies that it 
must have worked up to the start of phase j, and so the 
success event in phase i can be eliminated. 
Component A works in phase i AND fails between 
phase i and phase j. The success and failure of 
component A in phase i cannot be combined. The 
combination is the event of component A failure in 
phase i+ 1 up to and including phase j. 
Component A works through phase i up to phase j 
inclusive. Combine to standard notation. 
8. Ai + Ai+1 .. + A j = Aij Component A fails in any phase through phase i up to 
phase j inclusive. Combine to standard notation. 
If two prime implicant sets contain exactly the same components where all but one of 
which occur over the same time intervals and the other is a failure in contiguous 
phases, the two prime implicant sets may be combined with the period of failure for 
the component having time index adjusted, eg: 
) 
As the components are non-repairable, the event of component failure will only be 
possible during one of the contiguous phases. 
This simplification approach allows the prime implicants for the example with phase 
fault trees given in Figures 4.4, 4.5, and 4.6 to be obtained as follows: 
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Phase 1 
Al 
Minimal Cut Sets: BI 
Cl 
Phase 2 
The top event of failure during phase 2 is obtained by the combination of 
phase 1 success with phase 2 failure: 
The full expansion ofthis becomes: 
Using law 4, an event and its compliment cannot occur at the same time. The 
top event becomes: 
By law 5, the failure of a component in phase 2 implies that it must have 
worked through phase 1, and so the success of the component in phase 1 can 
be eliminated. The minimised top event of phase 2 failure becomes: 
The prime implicant sets for the failure of phase 2 are: ~BICI 
Phase 3 
The top event of failure during phase 3 is obtained by the combination of 
phase 1 and 2 successes with phase 3 failure: 
T2 = (AIBICJ. (CAIA2CBI +CI)'CBI +C2)'CB2 +CI )'CB2 +C2 ))· 
(CAI +A2 +A3)'CBI +B2 +B3 )'CCI +C2 +C3 )) 
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In the same way as for phase 2, using the laws of phase algebra this expression 
can be expanded and reduced to: 
The prime implicant sets for the failure of phase 3 are: 
If it is assumed that the success events of a phase have a very high likelihood of 
occurrence, the prime implicant sets can be expressed as minimal cut sets. Events that 
appear in their negated form in the prime implicant sets are deleted thus reducing the 
list to a coherent approximation. 
4.2.3 Quantitative Analysis 
Having established the prime implicants for each phase failure, they may now be used 
to quantify the probability of phase and mission failure. 
The probability density function of a component A with constant failure rate in a non-
repairable single phase mission is found by the negative exponential distribution given 
in equation (4.1). 
for t > 0 (4.1) 
It is assumed that the component is subj ect to a constant failure rate through all 
phases, regardless of whether it is required for a particular phase success. The 
unavailability of the component, q A (t), over a duration of time [O,t) is modelled by 
the cumulative probability function FA (t) in equation (4.2). 
(4.2) 
The unavailability of the component over a phase i is derived in a similar way to 
equation (4.2) by integration of the probability density function (equation (4.1)). The 
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integration time limits for phase i will be t=t;_1 to t=t;, and the component A 
unavailability in phase i is derived in equation (4.3). 
(4.3) 
The probability of failure of a non-repairable component A during phases i to j in time 
period [tH,t) is given by qAq in equation (4.4). 
J. t -J. t q = e- A 1-1 _ e A J Aij (4.4) 
The unreliability, Qi' for each individual phase i is found using the inclusion-exclusion 
expansion for the existence of phase i prime implicant sets, KII ' in equation (4.5). 
where Npil is the number of prime implicant sets in phase i 
The event of phase failure for the simple three-phase mission with prime implicant 
sets given in Section 4.2.2 can be obtained using the inclusion-exclusion expansion 
(equation (4.5», and is expressed in equations (4.6). 
Phase 1: 
Phase 2: (4.6) 
Phase 3: 
As the failure of each of the phases produces mutually exclusive causes, the 
probability of mission failure, QMISS' may be expressed as a sum of the unreliabilities 
of the individual phases in equation (4.7). 
m 
QMISS = IQ; 
;=1 
where m is the total number of phases 
97 
(4.7) 
4.2.4 Summary 
This method allows for the evaluation of individual phase failures, and also accounts 
for the condition where components are known to have functioned to enable the 
system to function in previous phases. However, due to the fact that cut sets are not 
removed until a later stage in the analysis compared with methods based on the 
technique by Esary and Ziehms [12], the fault tree can be much more complex and 
require significantly more effort to solve, especially in later phases. 
4.3 Binary Decision Diagram Method 
A fault tree structure very efficiently represents system failure logic, but is not an 
ideal form for mathematical analysis. Binary decision diagrams represent a logic 
expression and offer efficient mathematical manipulation, although it is very difficult 
to construct directly from the system definition. For larger fault trees it is more 
efficient to convert to a BDD prior to analysis. The approach of performing the 
quantification process after first converting the fault tree to a BDD form offers 
significant advantages for large complex fault trees. This is particularly true of 
structures that are non-coherent, such as the phase failure fault trees. 
4.3.1 Construction of a Phased Mission BDD 
The phased mission BDD is constructed using a similar method to the single system 
BDD (Section 2.3). The basic event of the failure of component A in phase j, Aj , can 
be represented in Figure 4.8. 
Figure 4.8 
,Cil, 
c51 
1 Occurrence of Aj 
o - Non-Occurrence of Aj 
Binary Decision Diagram Vertex for Component A Failure in Phase j 
The failure of component A in phase j can be represented using if-then-else form in 
equation (4.8). 
(4.8) 
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One of the features of the BDD structure is the ease with which the dual can be 
fonnulated. If the primary (system failure) BDD represents the structure function 
$(x), the dual function of system success, $(x), is constructed from $(x) = 1- $(x) . 
The dual BDD of a phase j represents the top event of phase success, 1j, and is 
created by switching the terminal nodes, i.e. a terminal 1 node is replaced by a 
tenninal 0, and a terminal 0 node by a tenninal 1. It must be noted that in the 
fonnulation of the dual of the BDD, the non-tenninal nodes still represent the failure 
event of components. The dual of Figure 4.8 to demonstrate the success of component 
A in phase j can therefore be represented by Figure 4.9. 
,(fj, 
~~ 
Figure 4.9 Binary Decision Diagram Vertex for Component A Success in Phase j 
The success of component A in phase j can be represented using if-then-else form in 
equation (4.9). 
(4.9) 
An ordering of the basic events in the fault tree must be chosen. At this stage, the 
components are ordered first (A<B<C), and then each component is expanded into its 
senes of sub-components III a forwards phase ordering sequence 
(A]<A2<A3<B]<B2<B3<C]<C2<C3), Ordering techniques are discussed further in 
Section 4.3.5. 
To combine basic events within a phased mission BDD, the following rules are 
applied: 
• To combine two different basic events (X; and Jj) using a logical operation EEl, 
If 
and 
If X; < Jj 
If X; = Jj 
J = ite(Xpj 1,j2) 
H = ite(Yj,g1,g2) 
J ffi H = ite(Xpjl ffi H,j2 ffi H) 
J ffi H = ite(Xi ,Jl ffi gl,j2 ffi g2) 
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These rules are general for all variable combinations. Since the Boolean laws for 
phase algebra (Section 4.2.2) are applied to the implicant sets once the BDD is 
constructed, no special laws are applied for combinations of events belonging to the 
same component. 
The simple 3-phase mission given in Figures 4.4, 4.5, and 4.6 may be represented in 
BDD form for each phase and quantified. However, the proposed method combines 
the failure in a phase with the success of all preceding phases. This is achieved using 
the logical operation methods, where the AND of previous phase successes and 
current phase failure is required, and is presented in Section 4.3.4. 
4.3.2 Qualitative Analysis 
The paths through a binary decision diagram terminate in either a 'l' or a '0' vertex. 
A terminal 'l' vertex signifies system failure, and thus those paths leading to such a 
vertex indicate the system failure modes. These disjoint paths leading to system 
failure represent implicant sets. The simplification technique is applied as in the fault 
tree approach given in section 4.2.2 using the Boolean laws to reduce the implicant 
sets to prime implicant sets. 
4.3.3 Quantitative Analysis 
The top event probability of a BDD is derived from Shannon's formula (pivotal 
decomposition). The state of a component Xi in phase j is denoted by: 
X. ={o 
I} 1 
If component Xi is working in phase j 
forj = 1,2, .... ,m 
If component Xi fails in phase j 
The phase j binary function, ~j , is then, 
~.= {o 
'J 1 
If phase j works 
If phase j fails 
forj = 1,2, .... ,m 
and ~j = ~ix), where x is the vector of all component states through phases l.j 
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$ix) is the system structure function in phase j and can be found using equation 
(4.10). 
$J'(X) =Xj $(lj ,x)+(l-xj )$(Oj ,x) forj = J,2, .... ,m 
J J J J 
(4.10) 
The probability of the top event (i.e. phase failure probability) can be found by taking 
the expectation of each term of equation (4.10) as shown in equation (4.11). 
E[$J'(x)] =qj .E[$(lj ,x)]+(1-qj )·E[$(O; ,x)] forj = J,2, .... ,m (4.11) 
J J J J 
where qj = E[xj ] is the probability that Xj fails in phase j 
J J 
The phase j failure probability can be calculated by summing the probabilities of the 
disjoint (mutually exclusive) paths through the unminimised BDD from the root 
vertex to each terminal 1 vertex (equation (4.12)). Each disjoint path represents a 
combination of working and failed components in any phase up to and including 
phase j that lead to phase j failure, and so events lying on both one and zero branches 
are included in the probability calculation. 
ndj 
Qj = LP(li) 
;=1 
where p(rj) is the probability ofthe ith disjoint path to a terminal 1 node 
ndj is the number of disjoint paths to a terminal 1 node 
4.3.4 Example 
(4.12) 
Application of this method may be demonstrated using the fault tree technique in 
Section 4.2 on the three-phased mission given in Figures 4.4, 4.5 and 4.6. Each 
success or failure basic event is assigned an ite structure according to equations (4.8) 
or (4.9), and the phases may be constructed using the logical combination rules as 
follows: 
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Phase 1 
Phase 1 failure F1 = ite(AI ,1,0) + ite(BI ,1,0) + ite(CI ,1,0) 
= ite(Aj ,I,ite(Bj ,1, ite(Cj ,1,0») 
Al 
Minimal Cut Sets: BI 
o 
Figure 4.10 Failure in Phase 1 BDD 
Al 
The disioint paths to the terminal 1 node are: A B ~ I I 
= 1-(1- q Al )(1- q BI )(1- q Cl ) 
Phase 2 
Cl 
(4.13) 
(4.14) 
The failure in phase 2 is found by the AND combination of phase 1 success and phase 
2 failure. The success of phase 1 is obtained by the dual of the BDD in equation 
(4.13), where the terminal nodes are changed from' 1 ' to '0' and '0' to '1' in equation 
(4.15). 
Success through phase 1: (4.15) 
The ite expression for phase 2 failure is obtained by the phase 2 fault tree with top 
event defined as 'failure conditions met in phase 2' in Figure 4.5, and is given in 
equation (4.16). 
Phase 2 failure: 
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The BDD for this phase 2 failure is given in Figure 4.11. 
o 
o 
Figure 4.11 Phase 2 Failure BDD (not including phase 1 success) 
The BDD for phase 2 failure in Figure 4.11 does not take into account the 
requirements for system success through phase 1. Using the proposed method to 
combine the BDDs of success through phase 1 (equation (4.15» and phase 2 failure 
(equation (4.16», the failure in phase 2 (SF2) BDD is as given in equation (4.17). 
SF2 = SI·F2 
=ite(Al ,0,ite(B1 ,0, ite(C1 ,0,1») . 
it(Al,l,it(A2,1,it(Bl,it(Cl,1,it(C2,1,(J»jt(B2,it(Cl,1,it(C2,J,0»{1)) 
= ite(~ ,0, ite(~, ite(BI ,0, ite( Cl ,0,1», ite(BI ,0, ite(B2 , ite( Cl ,0, ite( C2 ,1,0»,0»» 
(4.17) 
The BDD for failure in phase 2 is given in Figure 4.12. 
Figure 4.12 Failure in Phase 2 BDD 
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The implicant sets are found by the disjoint paths to a terminal 1 node and are 
simplified using the Boolean laws for phased mission systems in Section 4.2.2: 
Al A2Bl Cl 
Al A2B1B2 Cl C2 
The failure probability in phase 2 is then given in equation (4.18). 
(4.18) 
Phase 3 
The failure in phase 3 is found by the AND combination of phase 1 and 2 successes 
and phase 3 failure. The success of phase 1 is given in equation (4.15), and the success 
of phase 2 is obtained by the dual of the phase 2 failure BDD in equation (4.16), 
where the terminal nodes are changed from '1' to '0' and '0' to '1' in equation (4.19). 
Phase 2 success: 
S2=ite(~ ,0,ite(A2 ,0,ite(B, ,ite(C, ,0,ite(C2 ,0,1)),ite(B2 ,ite(C, ,0,ite(C2 ,0,1)),1))) (4.19) 
The ite expression for phase 3 failure is obtained by the phase 3 fault tree with top 
event defined as 'failure conditions met in phase 3' in Figure 4.6: 
Phase 3 failure: F3 = ite(~,K,ite(~,K"ite(~,K"O))) 
Kt = ite(B"K2,ite(B2,K2,ite(B3,K2'0))) 
K2 = ite( C"I, ite( C2 ,1, ite( C3 ,1,0))) 
The BDD for this phase 3 failure is given in Figure 4.13. 
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(4.20) 
o 
o 
Figure 4.13 Phase 3 Failure BDD (not including phases 1 and 2 successes) 
The BDD for phase 3 failure in Figure 4.13 does not take into account the 
requirements for system success through phases 1 and 2. Using the proposed method 
to combine the BDD of phase 1 success (equation (4.15», phase 2 success (equation 
(4.19» and phase 3 failure (equation (4.20», the failure in phase 3 (SF3) becomes as 
given in equation (4.21). 
SF3 = SI·S2·F3 
=ite(AI'O,ite(BI'O,ite(CI'0,I») . 
ite(~ ,O,ite(~ ,0,ite(B. ,ite(C. ,0,ite(Cz ,0,1»,ite(Bz ,ite(C. ,0, ite(Cz ,0,1»,1») . 
where: 
where: 
K. = ite(B .. Kz, ite(Bz, Kz, ite(B3 , Kz,O))) 
Kz = ite(C.,1,ite(Cz,1,ite(C3 ,1,0») 
L. = ite(CI'0, ite(Cz ,0, ite(C3 ,1,0») 
L2 = ite(BJ' ite(Cl'O, ite(C2 ,1,ite(C3 ,1,0»,0» 
The new BDD for failure in phase 3 becomes as shown in Figure 4.14. 
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(4.21) 
Figure 4.14 Failure in Phase 3 BDD 
The implicant sets are found by the disjoint paths leading to a terminal 1 node, and 
reduced to minimal form using the Boolean laws in Section 4.2.2. 
The quantification for phase 3 is then given in equation (4.22). 
(4.22) 
It can be seen that the unreliability of each of the phases found by the BDD method in 
equations (4.14), (4.18), and (4.22) are identical to that obtained using fault tree 
analysis in equations (4.6). 
4.3.5 Ordering 
A binary decision diagram structure is dependent on the ordering in which the events 
are considered during construction. A simple single phased mission consists of only 
the events of component failure or success, and each variable in the scheme relates to 
a different component. However, a multi-phased mission involves component failure 
or success with a time factor involved to identify the phase. This leads to an 
interesting comparison of different ordering schemes in the aim of reducing the size 
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and thus the number of nodes in the BDD to make a quicker and more efficient 
computational process. 
Application of the Boolean laws for phased mission analysis presented in Section 
4.2.2 allow any ordering of variables to be implemented when constructing each phase 
BDD. The events are initially assigned an optimal ordering sequence in each phase j, 
and then can be expanded into sub-events to represent the failure of the component 
through phases l.j. The most general sequences are discussed below, with example of 
an event order A < B < C in phase j: 
Component Forwards Ordering (CFO) 
Each event is expanded into its series of sub-events in the order of first phase to 
current phase, i.j. 
Component Backwards Ordering (CBO) 
Each event is expanded into its series of sub-events in the order of current phase to 
first phase, j .. i. 
A <···A < J <B <···<B <B <C <···<C <C j 2./"'1 J 2 1 j 2 1 
Phase Forwards Ordering (PFO) 
Each event is expanded into its series of sub-events in the order of first phase to 
current phase, i.j. The sub-events are then considered in the ordering sequence 
A < B < C for each consecutive phase i.j. 
Phase Backwards Ordering (PFO) 
Each event is expanded into its series of sub-events in the order of current phase to 
first phase, j .. i. The sub-events are then considered in the ordering sequence 
A < B < C for each consecutive phase j .. i. 
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The four ordering schemes are applied to the second phase of the example in Figure 
4.4 using the method of combining phase 1 success with phase 2 failure. The resulting 
phase BDDs are given in Figures 4.15(a), 4.15(b), and 4.15(c) and 4.15(d). 
(a) Component Forwards Ordering (b) Component Backwards Ordering 
( c) Phase Forwards Ordering (d) Phase Backwards Ordering 
Figure 4.15 Comparison ofBDD Variable Ordering Schemes 
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It can be seen from Figure 4.15 that the ordering scheme of even a simple 2-phased 
mission can make a difference in the size ofthe BDD. The largest BDD represents the 
component backwards ordering scheme with 9 non-terminal nodes, and the smallest 
BDDs represent the phase backwards and forwards ordering schemes with 6 non-
terminal nodes. All four BDD ordering patterns produce the correct prime implicant 
sets, however the complexity of the BDD will influence the ease of obtaining and 
simplifying the implicant sets. 
To construct. the most minimal phased mlSSlon BDD, the optimal ordering of 
components in a phase is obtained and then expanded using an optimal expansion of 
the sub-components. This particular feature is not considered further in this thesis but 
is a topic for further research. 
4.4 Test Cases 
The methods described have been applied to some simple systems in order to quantify 
both phase and mission failure probabilities. Comparisons may also be made to results 
obtained by a simple Monte Carlo simulation program operating the system over 
1000000 simulations. 
Four simple systems are given in Figures 4.16 - 4.19. 
Phase 1 Phase 2 
Phase 1 Phase 2 
Figure 4.16 Example 1 Figure 4.17 Example 2 
Phase 1 Phase 2 Phase 3 
Figure 4.18 Example 3 
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Phase 1 Phase 2 Phase 3 
Figure 4.19 Example 4 
The quantification of the fault tree and BDD approaches when each component is 
given a failure rate of 0.001 per hour and all phases are run for the duration of 100 
hours (Table 4.1) show that the results obtained by each of the methods are identical. 
FT BOO MC 
Example 1 
Phase 1 Failure Probability 9.5163x10-2 9.5163x10-2 9.5162x10-2 
Phase 2 Failure Probability 1.6402x10-1 1.6402x10-1 1.6405x10-1 
MISSION FAILURE PROBABILITY 2.5918x10-1 2.5918x10-1 2.5921x10-1 
Example 2 
Phase 1 Failure Probability 9.0559x10-3 9.0559x10-3 9.0561x10-3 
Phase 2 Failure Probability 3.2062x10-1 3.2062x10-1 3.2064x10-1 
MISSION FAILURE PROBABILITY 3.2968x10-1 3.2968x10-1 3.2970x10-1 
Example 3 
Phase 1 Failure Probability 2.5918x10-1 2.5918x10-1 2.5921 x1 0-1 
Phase 2 Failure Probability 7.6569x10-2 7 .6569x1 0-2 7.6568x10-2 
Phase 3 Failure Probability 1.5184x10-3 1.5184x10-3 1.5187x10-3 
MISSION FAILURE PROBABILITY 3.3727x10-1 3.3727x10-1 3.3730x10-1 
Example 4 
Phase 1 Failure Probability 9.0559x10-3 9.0559x10-3 9.0560x10-3 
Phase 2 Failure Probability 3.1217x10-2 3.1217x10-2 3.1215x10-2 
Phase 3 Failure Probability 5.7953x10-2 5. 7953x1 0-2 5. 7954x1 0-2 
MISSION FAILURE PROBABILITY 9.8226x10-2 9.8226x10-2 9.8225x10-2 
Table 4.1 Test Case Quantifications 
where FT - Fault Tree Approach 
BDD - Binary Decision Diagram Approach 
MC - Mean Failure Probability by Monte-Carlo Approach 
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4.5 Unconditional Phase Failure Intensity 
The rate of phase j failure, wj ' is the probability that phase j failure occurs per unit 
time during [~_], ~). Considering the method presented for single phase systems in 
Section 2.2.3.2, the unconditional failure intensity of phase j could be represented by 
equation (4.23). 
where A is the event that at least one phase j prime implicant set exists at time t 
Cl is the event that prime implicant set Cl occurs in phase j 
J 
or W. dt = Wj(l) dt - w.(2)dt J J (4.23) 
The first term on the right hand side of equation (4.23) represents the contribution 
from the occurrence of at least one implicant set during phase j. The second term 
represents the contribution of prime implicant sets occurring while other prime 
implicant sets already exist in phase j (i.e. phase j has already failed). This method can 
be applied to the simple 2-phased mission in Figure 4.20, and the unconditional failure 
intensity of both phases is derived in Appendix A. 
A B 
B C 
Figure 4.20 Example 2-Phase System 
The approach presented in equation (4.23) is seen to be very computationally 
intensive when applied to the simple example in Figure 4.20. It would be useful if the 
unconditional phase failure intensity could be derived using a more direct method. 
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The rate of failure of a phase j, wj ' can also be defined as the probability of phase j 
failure per unit time given that a mission is taking place. An alternative method to 
calculate this parameter is presented using the probability of phase failure, Qj' and 
the mission frequency, AMISS' in equation (4.24). 
(4.24) 
This can be applied to the example in Figure 4.20 as follows: 
Phase 1 
Top event: 
Phase failure probability: 
Unconditional failure intensity: w\ = Q\ AMISS 
(4.25) 
Phase 2 
Top event: 
Phase failure probability: 
= qA2qB2 + q A2 (1- qBI )qc12 - qA2 qB2qC12 
= (e-AJI _e-AJ2)(e-AUI _e-AU2) + (e-AJI _e-AJ2)e-AUI(1_e-Y2)_(e-AJI _e-AJ2)(e-AUI _e-AEI2 )(1_e-Y2 ) 
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Unconditional failure intensity: w2 = Q2 f... MISS 
(4.26) 
The unconditional failure intensity for the phases of the example in Figure 4.20 
(equations (4.25) and (4.26» are found to be consistent with the expressions obtained 
in Appendix A (equations (A.9) and (A.30». The relationship presented in equation 
(4.24) is therefore seen to be correct, and provides a straightforward method to obtain 
the unconditional failure intensity of a phase or mission. The fault tree method 
(Section 4.2) or the BDD method (Section 4.3) allow the failure probability of each 
individual phase to be calculated. The simple substitution of this parameter into 
equation (4.24) allows the frequency of phase failure to be obtained. 
Similarly, the unconditional failure intensity of a component c in phase j, Wc , can be 
J 
defined as the probability that the component fails per unit time during phase j given 
that it is in a mission. The unconditional failure intensity of component c in phase j 
may be obtained directly from the component c failure probability in phase j, qc , 
J 
using equation (4.27). 
Wc = qc f... MISS J J (4.27) 
h -A IJ -A IJ were q = e C -\ - e C 
cJ 
f... MISS = Mission frequency 
4.6 Summary 
The four simple systems described in Section 4.4 are useful to make a suitable 
quantification. for three different methods and allow comparisons between the 
techniques. In reality a practical system would consist of many more basic events, and 
operate over additional phases, however the principles of the method are the same. 
The techniques described in this chapter are found to be suitable for the solution of 
systems comprising of non-repairable components operating over a small number of 
phases. The fault tree method that has been developed for this analysis suffers an 
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explosion in the number of phase failure modes and complexity as the number of 
phases increases. This leads to computationally intensive calculation procedures. 
The binary decision diagram approach is found to provide an efficient alternative to 
the fault tree technique. The combination of phase failure with previous phase 
successes can be very simple with an optimal ordering scheme as the events of 
components failing through sequential phases are considered only once. The 
quantification of the binary decision diagram approach leads to an exact answer rather 
than the approximation calculated by the fault tree method. The frequency of phase 
and component failure is easily obtained using the phase or component failure 
probability. 
There are however certain limitations of this method in terms of its general 
applicability due to the assumption of non-repairable components. Whilst many 
systems such as aircraft and spacecraft missions are non-repairable, others will be 
repairable. In such circumstances the failure probability calculations would need to 
take account of components repaired upon failure and an alternative approach needs to 
be developed to account for this. 
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Chapter 5 Systems with Repairable Components 
5.1 Introduction 
In many systems, the option of component maintenance will be available. The ability 
to transform a component from a failed state into a working state is known as repair, 
and the components are described as repairable. For modelling purposes, revealed 
failures are detected instantly and upon repair a component is considered to be as 
good as new. 
A system is required to work continuously over each of the phases in order to achieve 
mission success, therefore the parameter of interest is the reliability of the system. 
Fault trees can be used to express the failure logic of a repairable system, but cannot 
be analysed for an accurate solution. The consideration of repairable components 
means that the phase algebra in Section 4.2.2 is no longer appropriate, and so other 
techniques must be employed. Simulation offers a flexible alternative analysis 
method, however it may be a very computationally time consuming option. 
The Markov approach is an appropriate analytical method for the prediction of system 
reliability (Section 2.4). Conversely this approach is also known to be susceptible to 
explosions in the number of state equations for even moderate sized problems. 
Previous research on Markov methods for the solution to phased mission problems by 
Clarotti et al [30] and Alam and AI-Saggaf [33] have provided a means of calculating 
the reliability of both individual phases and the entire mission. However these 
approaches have implemented a full component state transition table comprising of 
every possible combination of states for all components required in the entire mission. 
Little investigation appears to have been made into the possibility of reducing the size 
of the Markov model by considering phase by phase models. 
A mission may comprise of both discrete and continuous phases. A discrete phase is a 
phase which requires the relevant system function to work at an instant in time, thus 
no state transitions may occur during the phase, and any component failures which 
exist would have occurred prior to this phase. Component states will be determined by 
failures and repairs that have taken place in previous phases. A fault tree approach 
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could be applied to model such a phase. A continuous phase requires the appropriate 
system configuration to be reliable for the specified phase duration and the possibility 
of component repair requires a Markov approach. 
To illustrate the distinction between discrete and continuous phases consider a ship in 
a battle group in action. An example of the discrete phase would be for the ship to 
launch a missile at a point in time during a manoeuvre. The ship would need the 
propulsion and steering system to work over a period of time (reliability) whilst 
getting to the correct location. To defend itself by launching a missile it would need 
the missile launch system to function at the instant required. In this case, for 
efficiency, it may be possible to combine fault tree and reduced Markov methods to 
produce an accurate and efficient calculation of phase and mission reliability whilst 
reducing the complexity ofthe model and computational time. 
The methods developed to analyse a phased mission where the components are 
repairable are reviewed in the remainder ofthis chapter. Since not all components will 
be required in every phase ofthe mission, an irrelevant component is defined: 
An irrelevant component in phase j is not required for the successful operation 
ofphasej but may contribute to previous or subsequent phases of the mission. 
5.1.1 Markov Model Explosion Problem 
The Markov model for a system is susceptible to an explosion in the number of state 
equations as the number of components in the model increases. If n components are 
required in a phase and each can work or fail (i.e. 2-state), there will be 2n system 
states. To implement this model, the 2n state equations are formed using a 2n x 2n 
transition matrix. 
As the mathematical treatment of the model assumes that only one event (usually 
corresponding to a single component failure or repair) can occur in a small period of 
time dt, the possible state changes are very limited. This leads to a very sparse 
transition matrix as the number of components increases. Most matrix entries are 0, 
indicating that states cannot communicate with each other. To store every element of 
such a large matrix would require the use of substantial amounts of unnecessary 
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computer memory. This severely limits the size of the analysis which can be 
performed. It is possible to do this more efficiently by creating a linked list. Such a list 
would allocate space only to store transitions that can occur, thus freeing memory for 
other purposes. 
To demonstrate the construction of a linked list, an example system consisting of 
components A, B and C can be used, shown in Figure 5.1. 
B C 
Figure 5.1 Example 3-Component System 
There are eight possible system states, denoted by Sl(ABC) - S~ABC) • A full listing of the 
system states is given in Figure 5.2. 
A B C 
S(ABC) 
1 0 0 0 
S(ABC) 
2 0 0 I 
S(ABC) 0 I 0 3 
S(ABC) 0 1 1 where 1 Failed 4 0 Working 
S(ABC) 1 0 0 5 
S(ABC) 
6 1 0 1 
S(ABC) 
7 1 I 0 
S(ABC) 
8 I 1 I 
Figure 5.2 System states for 3-Component Model 
The failed states of this system are S~ABC) - S~ABC) • If the failed states of the system are 
known to be absorbing so that no transitions may be made out of them, the state 
transition matrix is found to be very sparse in equation (5.1). 
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-(AA +AB +Ad AC AB 0 AA 0 0 0 
Uc -(AA +AB +Uc ) 0 AB 0 AA 0 0 
UB 0 -(AA +UB +AC) Ac 0 0 AA 0 
[A] = 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 (5.1) 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
There are 64 possible system state transitions, but only 12 have non-zero values. To 
store all 64 entries in a data array would use unnecessary memory, thus only the non-
zero entries are allocated space. This dynamic memory allocation is only limited by 
the size of available memory. 
A linked list is a collection of structures, each containing a set of member variables. In 
this example, the member variables will contain data for each non-zero state transition 
- the departure state, the destination state, and the rate of transition. Each structure 
will also have a member that references the next structure in the list. By defining a 
head structure as the first entry of the list, subsequent non-zero transitions are 
referenced by sequential structures. The final entry in the list is defined as the tail 
structure, and is terminated by a NULL pointer reference. In this way it is possible to 
store only the 12 non-zero transition rate values, and access to each is obtained by 
traversing the list. 
This dynamic memory allocation with structures and pointer references IS 
demonstrated in Figure 5.3. 
Head 
From To Transition 
State State Rate 
'----'-----'-___ --"-----'-•• -.--.-)---•• -~'__3 --,1,----7 --'--_"-,-A_---'-_+-' NULL 
JJ 
Figure 5.3 Dynamic Memory Allocation - Linked Lists 
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This process has been implemented in all three modelling scenarios presented in the 
following sections. 
5.2 Reliability of a Phased Mission with Discrete and Continuous Phases 
The method for solution to a repairable phased mission system using a full Markov 
model is presented in Section 5.2.1. The possibility of reducing the size of the Markov 
model by considering phase by phase models is discussed in sections 5.2.2 and 5.2.3. 
5.2.1 Full Markov Method 
A full Markov model is generated by using a single model which works over all 
phases of the mission. This model will have a single vector [P] of system state 
probabilities for every phase of the mission. [P] is constructed including all 
components featured in every stage. The model is then formed by considering the 
different requirements for each phase success and mission success. The state transition 
matrix is used to obtain the probability of the system residing in each of the total 
possible system states (Ns). The matrix equations used to model this are represented 
by equation (5.2). 
[P] = [P][A] (5.2) 
where [A] is the state transition matrix 
At the start of a mission, it is assumed that all components are in the working state, 81. 
The initial Ns state vector would be given as equation (5.3). 
P(O) = [100 ...... 0] (5.3) 
Since all components are initially in the working state, if the first phase is discrete 
then phase success is guaranteed and the original state vector is passed straight to 
phase 2. If the first phase is continuous, the Ns x Ns state transition matrix must be 
created. All possible component state transitions are entered into the transition matrix 
[A]. The identification of states that cause system failure determines absorbing states, 
and thus no transitions out of them are possible. All entries in the row of an absorbing 
state become zero. 
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The set of differential equations are evaluated over the duration of the phase. The 
reliability of the phase is calculated by the sum of the probabilities of the system 
residing in a successful state at the end of phase 1 at t=t1. 
The system can begin a new (next) phase if and only if it is in a successful state for 
both the new phase and the preceeding phase, thus the failed and success states of the 
new phase must be identified. If a successful state of the preceeding phase becomes a 
failed state in the new phase, it is known as a transition failure and causes termination 
of the system. The total transition failure probability on commencing a new phase is 
calculated by the sum of the probability of all such cases at the phase boundary. 
The successful entry into a phase i produces a new set of initial conditions, equation 
(5.4) 
(5.4) 
This set of initial state probabilities is derived from the final state probabilities of the 
previous phase. Since the system cannot reside in a failed state for either phase at the 
transition point all states representative of this are assigned an initial probability of 0: 
For all states} that result in system success for both phases, 
(i.e. remain unchanged) 
For all states k that cause failure in either or both phases, 
If the new phase is of a discrete nature, the phase solution is obtained directly from the 
previous phase. If the new phase is continuous, all possible component state 
transitions are again entered into the transition matrix. The new set of differential 
equations are then solved over the time duration of phase i. 
This process is repeated until the end of the mission is reached. The final mission 
reliability is obtained by the sum of the probabilities that the system is in a successful 
state at the end of the final phase. The algorithm for this method is given in Figure 
5.4. 
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DISCRETE 
Start phase 1 
Initial Conditions 
P(O)=[1 00 ... 0) 
Identify from Full 
Component States those 
that cause System 
Failure and System 
Success in the phase 
Discrete or 
Continuous 
Phase? 
CONTINUOUS 
Construct Nsx Ns 
Markov State 
Transition Matrix for 
Phase i 
Solve N s differential 
equations over Phase 
i (t~1 to tl ) 
Calculate Phase Reliability 
and Unreliability: 
F~tl)=2.P failed states(tj) 
R,{tj)="i.Psuccess states(t/) 
All ~{t) - Probabilities of 
states at boundary tl 
MISSION 
SUCCESS 
PROBABILITY 
=LPsuccess states(tm) 
YES End of Mission? NO i -> i+1 
Initial conditions for 
Phase i equal to final 
state probabilities of 
Phase i-1. All states 
causing failure in 
Phase i-1 given initial 
probability of O. 
P(t/-l) = [P,(t,_,) ,P'(t/-l) ' 
P,(t,_,) , ... PN, (t/-l) 
Failed states for Phase l(t~1 )=0 
TRANSITION 
FAILURE 
PROBABILITY 
=~ P Success states for 
Phase ;-1 that cause failure 
jn Phase I (tj) 
Figure 5.4 Algorithm to Demonstrate Full Markov Method 
An example of a simple 3-phased mission illustrated in Figure 5.5 may be used to 
demonstrate this method. In this example there are a total of four components in the 
system, A, B, C, and D. Each component k has an associated failure and repair rate 
denoted by Ak and Vk respectively. The total number of component states, 24, means 
that continuous phases require the construction of a 16 x 16 state transition matrix. 
The components may be required in some or all of the phases. 
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Phase 1 
A B C 
CONTINUOUS 
Phase 2 
B D 
DISCRETE 
Phase 3 
A B 
CONTINUOUS 
Figure 5.5 Discrete and Continuous Phased Mission 
The first phase is of a continuous nature, commencing at t=O and finishing at t=t1. The 
second phase is instantaneous and thus t1=t2. The third and final phase is again 
continuous and runs from to t=t2 to t=t3. Fault trees represent the failure conditions for 
the system in each phase. 
There are 16 possible combinations of component conditions shown in Figure 5.6. 
The possible state transitions have a rate which corresponds to either the failure or 
repair of a single component. These rates are assumed to be constant for each 
component, and repair is revealed and initialised as soon as component failure occurs. 
The full state transition matrix for all possible 16 x 16 component state transitions, not 
accounting for any particular phase, is represented in equation (5.5). 
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[A] = 
A BeD 
S(ABCD) 0 0 0 0 
I 
S(ABCD) 
2 
S(ABCD) 
3 
S(ABCD) 
4 
S(ABCD) 
5 
S(ABCD) 
6 
S(ABCD) 
7 
S(ABCD) 
8 
S(ABCD) 
9 
o 0 0 1 
001 0 
o 0 1 1 
o 1 0 0 
o 1 0 1 
o 1 1 0 
Where 1 Failed S(ABCD) 
10 
S(ABCD) 
11 
o 1 1 1 
1 0 0 0 
1 0 0 1 
1 0 1 0 
o Working 
-Lt AD 
vD -L2 
Vc 0 
o Vc 
VB 0 
o VB 
o 0 
o 0 
VA 0 
o VA 
o 0 
o 0 
o 0 
o 0 
o 0 
o 0 
S(ABCD) 1 0 1 1 
12 
S(ABCD) 1 1 0 0 
\3 
S(ABCD) 1 1 0 1 
14 
S(ABCD) 1 1 1 0 
15 
S(ABCD) 1 1 1 1 
16 
Figure 5.6 Four Component State Table 
.le 0 
o .le 
-L3 AD 
vD -L4 
o 0 
o 0 
VB 0 
o VB 
o 0 
o 0 
VA 0 
o VA 
o 0 
o 0 
o 0 
o 0 
AB 0 
o AB 
o 0 
o 0 
-LS AD 
vD -L6 
Vc 0 
o Vc 
o 0 
o 0 
o 0 
o 0 
VA 0 
o VA 
o 0 
o 0 
o 0 
o 0 
AB 0 
o AB 
.le 0 
o .le 
-L1 AD 
vD -L8 
o 0 
o 0 
o 0 
o 0 
o 0 
o 0 
VA 0 
o VA 
AA 0 
o AA 
o 0 
o 0 
o 0 
o 0 
o 0 
o 0 
-L9 AD 
vD -LIO 
Vc 0 
o Vc 
VB 0 
o VB 
o 0 
o 0 
o 0 
o 0 
AA 0 
o AA 
o 0 
o 0 
o 0 
o 0 
.le 0 
o .le 
-LII AD 
vD -Lt2 
o 0 
o 0 
VB 0 
o VB 
o 0 
o 0 
o 0 
o 0 
AA 0 
o AA 
o 0 
o 0 
AB 0 
o AB 
o 0 
o 0 
-LI3 AD 
vD -Lt4 
Vc 0 
o Vc 
o 
o 
o 
o 
o 
o 
AA 
o 
o 
o 
AB 
o 
.le 
o 
where element in row j and column k represents the transition from state 
SjABCD) to SiABCD) 
and L j = sum of elements in row j (except element jj) 
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o 
o 
o 
o 
o 
o 
o 
AA (5.5) 
o 
o 
o 
AB 
o 
.le 
l 
Phase 1 
All components are considered to be in the working state at the start of a mission and 
so the initial state probabilities are defined in equation (5.6). 
P(O) = [1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0] (5.6) 
Phase I will complete successfully as long as components A, B, and C do not reside in 
the failed state at the same point in time, i.e. states Sl(~CD) and Sl(:BCD) are not reached. 
As these states cause system failure, they are defined as absorbing states. Once an 
absorbing state is entered, no transitions may be made into other states and the system 
will remain failed. All matrix entries on the row of an absorbing state are assigned to 0 
in [A] to represent this. The transition matrix becomes as shown in equation (5.7). 
-2:1 AD Ac 0 AB 0 0 0 AA 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
VD -2:2 0 Ac 0 AB 0 0 0 AA 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Vc 0 -2:3 AD 0 0 AB 0 0 0 AA 0 0 0 0 0 
0 Vc vD -2:4 0 0 0 AB 0 0 0 AA 0 0 0 0 
vB 0 0 0 -2:s AD AC 0 0 0 0 0 AA 0 0 0 
0 vB 0 0 VD -2:6 0 Ac 0 0 0 0 0 AA 0 0 
0 0 vB 0 Vc 0 -2:7 AD 0 0 0 0 0 0 AA 0 
0 0 0 vB 0 Vc VD -2:s 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 AA (5.7) [AJ= 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 -2:9 AD Ac 0 AB 0 0 0 vA 
0 vA 0 0 0 0 0 0 vD -2:10 0 Ac 0 AB 0 0 
0 0 vA 0 0 0 0 0 Vc 0 -2:" AD 0 0 AB 0 
0 0 0 vA 0 0 0 0 0 Vc vD -2:12 0 0 0 AB 
0 0 0 0 vA 0 0 0 vB 0 0 0 -2:13 AD Ac 0 
0 0 0 0 0 vA 0 0 0 vB 0 0 VD -2:14 0 Ac 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
The evaluation of the state probabilities over the period from the start of phase 1 (t=0) 
to the end of phase 1 (t=t1) allows the continuous model to be solved by the set of 
differential equations as represented in equation (5.2). This will lead to a set of values 
representing the probability that the system is in each of the 16 states at the end of 
phase 1. Phase success is achieved if the system is found to reside in any of the 
working states (Sl(ABCD) - Sl<:BCD») at the end of phase 1. As the states are mutually 
exclusive, state probabilities can be added and the reliability at the end of phase 1 may 
be represented by equation (5.8). 
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Phase 2 
14 
R(tl ) = LPj(ABCD) (tl ) 
j=1 
(S.8) 
To successfully begin phase 2, the system must reside in a state that produces a 
working system for both phases 1 and 2. For phase 2 to be in a successful state, 
component A must be working OR B and D are both working, i.e. the system must be 
in one of states S(ABCD) - S(ABCD) and S(ABCD) Transition failure will occur if the I 9 11' 
system is in a working state for the first phase, but a failed state for the second phase, 
in this case SI<:CD) and SgBCD) - SI<:"BCD). Since phase 2 is a discrete phase, the phase 
unreliability is equal to the transition failure probability in equation (S.9). 
14 
Tr(tl ) = Pl~ABCD)(tl) + LPj(ABCD) (tl ) 
j=12 
where Tr(t) is the probability of transition failure at time t 
(S.9) 
The conditions to represent successful entry to phase 2 are found by the state 
probabilities at the end of phase 1. All states that result in either phase 1 failure or 
phase 2 failure are assigned a final probability of 0 at t=t1. 
As this second phase is a discrete phase, t1=t2, and no state transitions may be made 
during the phase. Phase success is achieved if the system resides in a successful state 
upon transition from phase 1. The probability that the system successfully completes 
phase 2 is the probability that the system resides in a state which is successful for both 
phases 1 and 2, SI(ABCD) - S~ABCD) and SI(~BCD), and is found by equation (S.1 0). 
Phase 3 
9 
R(t2 ) = LPj(ABCD) (t2 ) + ~~ABCD) (t2 ) 
j=1 
(S.10) 
To successfully begin phase 3, the system must reside in a state that produces a 
working system for both phases 2 and 3. Transition failure will occur if the system is 
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in a working state for phase 2 and a failed state for phase 3, S~ABCD) - S~ABCD) and 
Sl(~BCD), and is found by equation (5.11). 
9 
Tr(t2) = LP
j
(ABCD\t2 ) + ~~ABCD)(t2) 
j=5 
(5.11) 
Phase 3 will be in the working state as long as A or B do not fail, thus the success 
states for phase 3 are Sl(ABCD) - S~ABCD). All other states are assigned an initial 
probability of O. 
The state probabilities are again evaluated over phase 3 [t2, t3) by the solution of the 
set of differential equations as represented in equation (5.2). The state transition 
matrix will resemble that of equation (5.5), however since states S~ABCD) - Sl(:SCD) are 
failed and thus absorbing states, all transition rate entries along rows 5-16 become O. 
This will again lead to a set of values representing the probability that the system is in 
each of the 16 states at the end of phase 3. Phase and mission success is achieved if 
the system is found to reside in any of the phase 3 working states (S?BCD) - S~ABCD») at 
time t=t3' Reliability at the end of phase 3 may be represented by equation (5.12) 
4 
R(t3) = LPj(ABCD) (t3) 
j=l 
And thus the probability of mission success is given by equation (5.13) 
4 
R - " p(ABCD) (t ) MISS-L,. j 3 
j=l 
5.2.2 Combined Reduced Markov and Fault Tree Method 
(5.12) 
(5.13) 
Full Markov models can get very large and in some cases become too large to 
generate and solve. More efficient ways need to be found which will reduce the size 
of the Markov model generated. It is only the continuous phases where the reliability 
calculations necessitate the use of Markov methods. As such it may be possible to 
develop a method which simplifies the Markov model, to some extent, by removing 
components which only contribute to the failure of discrete phases. 
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In segregating components that only feature in discrete phases from those which 
contribute to the failure of continuous phases, it may be possible to analyse discrete 
and continuous phases using different methods. A full Markov model for all 
components featured in only continuous phases (Nscont x NScont) may be detennined to 
identify the requirements for phase success using the set of differential equations 
given in equation (5.2). The elimination of components used in only discrete phases 
reduces the size of the full Markov model. Fault trees may then be used to obtain the 
minimal cut sets of a discrete phase to recognise working and failed phase states of the 
Markov model combined with discrete phase component states to evaluate phase 
success. 
At the start of a mission, it is assumed that all components are in the working state. 
Therefore considering continuous phases, the initial NScont state probability matrix 
would be given as in equation (5.14). 
P(O) = [100······0] (5.14) 
As the first phase will be continuous it is required to identify, from amongst the Ns 
cont 
system states of the reduced Markov model, those that cause system failure and those 
that cause system success for phase 1. The N Scont x N Scont transition matrix [ A] is 
created. All entries in the row of an absorbing failed state become zero, and the set of 
NScont differential equations are evaluated over the duration of the phase. The 
reliability of the phase is calculated by the sum of the probabilities of the system 
residing in a successful state at the end of phase 1, at time t= t1. 
If the proceeding phase is continuous, the final state probabilities with failed states set 
to zero may be directly passed to the next phase to give a set of initial state 
probabilities. All states that cause failure in the proceeding phase contribute to the 
phase transition failure and are also assigned a probability of o. The following phase 
would then be solved in the same way. 
If the proceeding phase is discrete, it may feature components that were not 
considered in the model for the previous phase. The probability of a component c that 
is not required for the Markov model of continuous phase i being in the failed and 
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-success state at the end of the phase is easily evaluated by equations (5.15) as derived 
in Section 2.4.2.2. 
ac (tj ) = 1- qc (tj ) (5.15) 
The states of the continuous phase Markov model are expanded to give the full system 
states for the proceeding discrete phase, and their likelihood determined at the end of 
the continuous phase. By the multiplication of the reduced state probabilities with the 
availability or unavailability (as appropriate) of the excluded components, it is 
possible to achieve each ofthe desired expanded state probabilities. 
The failure and success states of the discrete phase may be identified using minimal 
cut sets determined from the fault tree analysis. All states causing an instant failure in 
the phase contribute to the phase transition failure and are assigned probability 0 for 
input into the following phase. 
When entering a continuous phase from a discrete phase, the expanded discrete states 
must be reduced. This is achieved by the summation of the probabilities of all 
expanded states that contribute to each of the continuous Markov model states to 
produce a reduced list of initial state probabilities (equation (5.16)) for input to the 
next phase i. 
(5.16) 
All states that cause failure in either the current or previous phase, and also those that 
cause transition failure are assigned an initial probability of o. 
The algorithm to accomplish this method is given in Figure 5.7. The application of 
this algorithm may be demonstrated using the 3-phased mission in Figure 5.5. 
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Figure 5.7 Algorithm to Demonstrate Combined Markov and Fault Tree Methods 
Prior To Analysis 
It can be noted that component D is only required in the discrete phase 2. Therefore 
the reduced continuous phase Markov model is formed by considering the states of 
only components A, Band C as shown in Figure 5.8. The reduced state transition 
matrix, not accounting for any particular phase, is given in equation (5.17). 
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A B C 
S(ABC) 
1 0 0 0 
S(ABC) 
2 0 0 1 
S(ABC) 
3 0 1 0 
S(ABC) 
4 0 1 1 
S(ABC) 
5 1 0 0 
S(ABC) 
6 1 0 1 
S(ABC) 
7 1 1 0 
S(ABC) 
8 1 1 1 
Figure 5.8 Three Component State Table 
-Il Ae AB 0 AA 0 0 0 
Ve -I2 0 AB 0 AA 0 0 
VB 0 -I3 Ae 0 0 AA 0 
[A] = 0 VB Ve -I4 0 0 0 AA 
0 0 0 -Is Ae AB 0 
(5.17) 
vA 
0 vA 0 0 ve -I6 0 AB 
0 0 vA 0 VB 0 -I7 Ae 
0 0 0 vA 0 VB Ve -I8 
Phase 1 
The analysis for phase 1 is performed in the same way as that of the full Markov 
method. However in this case there is only one failed state, S(ABC) • As this failed state 
8 
is absorbing, the transition rate entries along row 8 become 0 and the transition state 
matrix is as shown in equation (5.18). 
-Il Ae AB 0 AA 0 0 0 
ve -I2 0 AB 0 AA 0 0 
VB 0 -I3 Ae 0 0 AA 0 
[A] = 0 VB ve -I4 0 0 0 AA 
0 0 0 -Is Ae AB 0 
(5.18) 
vA 
0 vA 0 0 ve -I6 0 AB 
0 0 vA 0 VB 0 -I7 Ae 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
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The initial conditions for the probability of each of the states are given by equation 
(S.19). 
P(O) = [1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ] (S.19) 
The solution of the set of differential equations (S.2) produces the final state 
probabilities at t] for each of the 8 states in Figure S.8. The success probability for 
phase 1 is found by the probability that the system resides in any of the phase 1 
success states, S(ABC) - S(ABC) , in equation (S.20). 
1 7 
Phase 2 
7 
R(t)) = LPj(ABC) (t)) 
j=) 
(S.20) 
Until now, the state of component D has not been considered. It is assumed that 
component D could have failed during phase 1 with failure rate A.D , and been repaired 
in phase 1 with repair rate U D. To begin phase 2, the probability of this component 
being in the failed and working state at the end of phase 1 must be calculated. As a 
discrete phase occurs at an instant of time, these probabilities are easily found by the 
unavailability and availability of the component at t=t]. Since component D is 
repairable up to this point, this would be calculated using equations (S.IS) where i=1. 
The state probabilities for the end of phase 1 may be multiplied by the availability and 
unavailability of component D at the phase change time to produce the probabilities of 
the full listing of all 16 possible phase states as shown in Table S .1. 
Phase 2 transition failure will occur if the system resides in a state representative of 
success in phase 1 but failure in phase 2 at the phase boundary, and would have a 
probability associated with it found by summing the likelihoods of all such states. 
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~ 
I 
Discrete Phase 2 
State Probability 
(Figure 5.6) 
p'(ABCD) 
1 
p(ABCD) 
2 
p(ABCD) 
3 
p(ABCD) 
4 
p(ABCD) 
5 
p(ABCD) 
6 
p(ABCD) 
7 
p(ABCD) 
8 
p,(ABCD) 
9 
p,(ABCD) 
10 
p'(ABCD) 
11 
p'(ABCD) 
12 
p'(ABCD) 
13 . 
p'(ABCD) 
14 
p'(ABCD) 
15 
p'(ABCD) 
16 
Table 5.1 
Component Calculation from Phase 1 Continuous State 
A B C D Probabilities (Figure 5.8) 
0 0 0 0 p.,(ABC) (t l ). aD (tl) 
0 0 0 1 p.,(ABC) (t l ). q D (t l ) 
0 0 1 0 p?BC) (tl). aD (tl) 
0 0 1 1 p}ABC) (tl). q D (t l ) 
0 1 0 0 P3(ABC) (tl)· aD (t l ) 
0 1 0 1 P3(ABC) (tl)· q D (tl) 
0 1 1 0 P4(ABC) (tl)· aD (t l ) 
0 1 1 1 p}ABC) (t l ). q D (t l ) 
1 0 0 0 p?BC)(tI)· aD (t l ) 
1 0 0 1 p?BC) (t l )· q D (tl) 
1 0 1 0 P6(ABC) (tl)· aD (t l ) 
1 0 1 1 P6(ABC) (t l )· q D (t l ) 
1 1 0 0 p}ABC) (tl). aD (t l ) 
1 1 0 1 P7(ABC) (tl)· q D (t l ) 
1 1 1 0 0 
1 1 1 1 0 
Obtaining Discrete Phase 2 State Probabilities from Reduced 
Continuous Phase 1 State Probabilities 
It is possible to evaluate the failed states of phase 2 using fault tree analysis. By 
obtaining the minimal cut sets for this phase it enables identification of all states that 
would cause the phase transition to result in failure of the system. In this case the 
minimal cut sets are: 
AB 
AD 
From the full component state list (Figure 5.6) it can be seen that the failed states for 
this phase are S(ABCD) and S(ABCD) _ S{IfBCD) However since states S(ABCD) _ S(ABCD) 
10 12 16·' 15 16 
represent failure in phase 1, the transition failure is found by the sum of the 
Probabilities that the system is in states S(ABCD) and S(ABCD) - S(ABCD) at the transition 10 12 14 
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point between the first and second phases in equation (5.9). So, using the extended 
(full) state listing, the success of this phase is again found using equation (5.10). 
Phase 3 
All states that cause failure in phase 2 (S(ABCD) and S(ABCD) - S(ABCD») are assigned a 10 12 16 
final probability of 0 for entry to phase 3. The expanded discrete phase 2 states must 
be reduced to give the initial continuous Markov model states for phase 3 (Figure 5.8). 
This is achieved by the summation of the probabilities of all expanded states that 
contribute to each of the continuous Markov model states to produce a reduced list of 
initial state probabilities for input to phase 3 and is summarised in Table 5.2. 
Continuous State Component State Probability from Phase 2 Discrete 
Ref (Listed in 
Figure 5.8) 
S(ABC) 
1 
S(ABC) 
2 
S(ABC) 
3 
S(ABC) 
4 
S(ABC) 
5 
S(ABC) 
6 
S(ABC) 
7 . 
S(ABC) 
s 
Table 5.2 
States State Probabilities (Figure 5.6) 
A B C 
0 0 0 p.,(ABCD) (/ 2 ) +p?BCD) (/2 ) 
0 0 1 P3(ABCD) (/2 ) + p?BCD) (/2 ) 
0 1 0 ps(ABCD) (/2 ) +p?BCD) (/ 2 ) 
0 1 1 p?BCD) (/2 ) + PS(ABCD) (/2 ) 
1 0 0 P9(ABCD) (/2 ) 
1 0 1 p,(ABCD)(1 ) 11 2 
1 1 0 0 
1 1 1 0 
Obtaining Continuous Phase 3 Initial State Probabilities from 
Expanded Discrete Phase 2 State Probabilities 
To successfully begin phase 3, the system must reside in a state that produces a 
working system for both phases 2 and 3. From the simplified component state list 
(Table 5.2) it may be identified that the states to successfully complete phase 2 are 
those where either A or B are working, Sl(ABC) - S~ABC). The success states for phase 3 
are Sl(ABC) - SJABC). Therefore phase 3 transition failure will occur if the system is in 
states SjABC) - S~ABC) and is given in equation (5.21). 
6 
Tr(t2) = Ip?BC) (t2) 
j=3 
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(5.21) 
... 
Since the success states for phase 3 are Sl(ABC) - S~ABC) , all other states are assigned an 
initial probability of 0 on entering the phase. 
The state probabilities are again evaluated over the time between the start of phase 3 
(t=t2) and the end of phase 3 (t=t3) by the solution of the set of differential equations 
as represented in equation (5.2). The state transition matrix will resemble that of 
equation (5.17), however since states S1ABC) - SiABC) are failed and thus absorbing states, 
all entries along rows 3-8 will be O. This will again lead to a set of values representing 
the probability that the system is in each of the 8 states at the end of phase 3. Phase 
and mission success is achieved if the system is found to reside in either of the 
working states (Sl(ABC)_S~ABC») at the end of phase 3. Reliability at the end of phase 3 is 
represented by equation (5.22). 
2 
R(t3) = LP?BC) (t3) 
j=i 
And thus mission success is denoted by equation (5.23). 
2 RM1SS = LP?BC) (t3) 
j=i 
(5.22) 
(5.23) 
It can be seen that by identifying components that are only present in discrete phases, 
they can be eliminated from the Markov model which then only considers components 
featuring in continuous phases. This can result in a much smaller set of system states 
and therefore equations. The model formulation is such that every component which is 
removed from the Markov model will halve its size. The state of all components used 
in only discrete phases is easily calculated at any point to allow accurate calculation of 
phase success. 
5.2.3 Combined Minimal Markov and Fault Tree Method 
The elimination of components used in only discrete phases from the full Markov 
Model results in a reduction in the number of system states and thus the number of 
differential equations to be solved over the phase duration. However, the solution of 
all continuous phases still requires a transition matrix defined by the number of 
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possible states of all remaining components i.e. components which appear in any of 
the continuous phases. The Markov models can still be large and so there is still room 
for improvement. 
The smallest possible Markov models that could be formed are those used to model 
each individual continuous phase. Analysis over a continuous phase duration is 
performed by application of a minimal Markov model (Ns, x Ns/) using only the 
components required in the particular phase i. The full set of states for the total 
mission is reduced to evaluate initial conditions for each phase, and expanded out 
again at the end of a phase to enable calculation of successful entry to the immediately 
succeeding phase. Discrete phase success may again be calculated using fault tree 
analysis. 
At the start of a mission, it is again assumed that all components are in the working 
state, which is labelled state SI. Since the first phase will be a continuous phase, the 
initial Ns, state probability matrix is given by: 
P(O) = [1 0 0····· ·0] (5.24) 
Identification of the success and failure states out of the minimal Ns, states allows the 
Ns, x Ns, transition matrix [A] to be created. All entries in the row of an absorbing 
failed state become zero, and the set of N s. differential equations are evaluated over 
I 
the duration of the phase. The reliability of the phase is calculated by the sum of the 
probabilities of the system residing in a successful state at the end of phase 1 (t=tl). 
As proceeding continuous phases may not reqmre the same components, it is 
necessary to expand the reduced continuous phase component state probabilities into 
the full Ns state probabilities regardless of whether the next phase is discrete or 
continuous. By the mUltiplication of the reduced state probabilities with other 
excluded component availabilities and unavailabilities at the end of the phase, it is 
possible to achieve each ofthe desired full state probabilities. 
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The failure and success states of a discrete phase may be identified using fault tree 
analysis. All states causing an instant failure in the phase contribute to the phase 
transition failure and are assigned a probability 0 for input into the following phase. 
To begin a later continuous phase it is necessary to identify the initial state 
probabilities. The full Ns states are minimised to states that account for only those 
components contributing to the phase. This is achieved by the summation of the 
probabilities of all full states that contribute to each of the reduced states to produce a 
minimal list of initial state probabilities for input to the next phase i, given in equation 
(5.25). 
(5.25) 
All states that cause failure in either the current or the previous phase, and also those 
that cause transition failure are assigned an initial probability of O. 
This method leads to a sequence whereby the reduction of component states during a 
phase is expanded to give a full set of Ns state probabilities at all phase boundaries. 
The probability of each component c that is not required for a particular continuous 
phase Markov model being in the failed or success state at the end of the phase is 
evaluated using equations (5.15). 
The minimal Markov model state probabilities at the end of phase i are multiplied 
with the unavailability or availability of all components not required in the phase to 
evaluate the full Ns state probabilities. These full state probabilities are then easily 
combined to provide reduced state probabilities for input into further minimal Markov 
models. The algorithm for this method is given in Figure 5.9. 
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Figure 5.9 Algorithm to Demonstrate Minimal Markov and Fault Tree Method 
Demonstrating the Minimal Markov model approach, the simple 3-phased mission 
example defined earlier (Figure 5.5) is again used. 
Phase 1 
The first phase requires all components that are not discrete phase components and 
therefore the analysis is the same as in Section 5.2.2. The success probability ofphas~ 
1 is evaluated by equation (5.20). 
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Phase 2 
This discrete phase is solved in the same way as Section 5.2.2 to obtain a full solution 
of all Ns state probabilities (Table 5.1), and calculations of phase (transition) failure 
(equation (5.9)), and phase success (equation (5.10)). All phase 2 failure states are 
assigned a final probability of zero for entry to phase 3. 
Phase 3 
The final phase requires only 2 out of the 4 possible components, A and B. Therefore 
the full 16 states representing all component combinations can be reduced to a 4 state 
list shown in Table 5.3. 
Full states from Figure 5.6 A B 
S(ABCD) S(ABCD) S(ABCD) S(ABCD) 
1 '2 '3 '4 • 
S(AB) 
1 0 0 
S(ABCD) S(ABCD) S(ABCD) S(ABCD) 
5 '6 '7 '8 • 
S(AB) 
2 0 1 
S(ABCD) S(ABCD) S(ABCD) S(ABCD) • 
S(AB) 1 0 
9 , 10 , 11 , 12 3 
• 
S(AB) 1 1 S(ABCD) S(ABCD) S(ABCD) S(ABCD) 4 
13 , 14 , 15 , 16 
Table 5.3 Two Component State Table 
The full possible 2-component state transition matrix A is given by equation (5.26). 
-Ll AB AA 0 
[A] = VB -L2 0 AA 
0 
-L3 AB 
(5.26) 
VA 
0 VA VB -L4 
Since SiAB) - S~AB) are failed and thus absorbing states, the state transition matrix for 
this phase becomes as shown in equation (5.27). 
-Ll AA AB 0 
[A] = 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
(5.27) 
0 0 0 0 
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The initial probabilities are calculated by the reduction of the full set of system states 
to those states required for phase 3. For this phase, the four minimal states SI(AB)-
S~AB) would have initial probabilities found by the full Ns state list (Table 5.3) as 
shown in equations (5.28). 
Full States 
4 
~(AB)(t2) = LP';(ABCD) (t2) 
j=1 
Full States 
12 
~(AB)(t2) = LP?BCD) (t2) 
j=9 
Full States 
8 
p?B) (t2) = LP?BCD) (t2) 
j=5 
Full States 
16 
P4(AB) (t2) = LP?BCD)(t2) 
j=i3 
(5.28) 
From the simplified component state list (Table 5.3) it may be identified that the states 
to successfully complete phase 2 are those where either A or B are working, SI(AB)_ 
SjAB) . The success state for phase 3 is SI(AB). Therefore phase 3 transition failure will 
occur if the system is in states S~AB) - SjAB) ,and is given in equation (5.29). 
3 
Tr(t 2) = L p';(AB) (t 2) 
j=2 
(5.29) 
Since the success state for phase 3 is SI(AB) , all other states are assigned an initial 
probability of 0 on entering the phase. 
The initial minimal phase state probabilities may be entered into the system of state 
differential equations (5.2) with transition matrix (5.27) and solved over the duration 
of phase 3 to calculate the probability of the system residing in each of the 4 possible 
states at the end of the phase. Phase success would only be found if the system was in 
state SI(AB) of Table 5.3 with both components working at the end of the phase in 
equation (5.30). 
R(t3) = ~(AB) (t3) (5.30) 
And thus mission success maybe found by equation (5.31). 
(5.31) 
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If subsequent phases were present in the mission, these 4 minimal phase 3 state 
probabilities would again be expanded to produce a full set of system state 
probabilities. It is possible to calculate the availability and unavailability of all 
components not required in the phase using equations (5.15). The probability of the 
system residing in each of the 4 minimal system states would be multiplied by every 
possible failure and success combination of all other components at the end of the 
phase. This produces a full set of system state probabilities at the phase boundary for 
input to the next phase. 
The extra computational effort required in the expansion and reduction of system 
states between phases is insignificant compared with the considerable reduction of 
intensive effort required to solve the reduced system state differential equations over a 
long time period. 
5.2.4 Comparison of Results 
A general computer program has been developed using C to implement the three 
methodologies for the phased mission analysis of repairable systems. The problem 
- defined in Figure 5.5 has been analysed by this software. 
The components A, B, C and D are each given a failure and repair rate (per hour) as 
follows: 
AA =0.001 \) A = 0.02 
AB =0.0005 \)B = 0.001 
Ac =0.0008 \)c = 0.04 
AD =0.002 \)D = 0.002 
The phases are defined to be: 
Phase 1 Continuous 100 hour 
Phase 2 Discrete 
Phase 3 Continuous 200 hours 
The comparison of outputs for phase failure, transition failure and mission success by 
each of the three methods is given in Table 5.4. 
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Full Markov Method Reduced Markov and Minimal Markov and FT Method FT Method 
Mission Reliabilit 6.7709x10-1 6.7707x10-1 6.7705x10-1 
Phase 1 Unreliabili 1.2523x10-4 1.2522x10-4 1.2521 x1 0-4 
Phase 2 Unavailabili 8.4371 x1 0-3 8.4353x10-3 8.4353x10-3 
Phase 3 Unreliabilit 2.3668x10-1 2.3666x10-1 2.3666x10-1 
Phase 2 Transition Failure 8.4371 x1 0-3 8.4353x10-3 8.4353x10-3 
Phase 3 Transition Failure 7.7732x10-2 7.7725x10-2 7.7725x10-2 
Table 5.4 Comparison of Mission Reliability Data for Three Methods 
It can be seen that all methods produce consistent results for the test problem. The 
differences in part will be due to the errors in the numerical solution routine for the 
differential equation using time increments of L\t=0.05s. In this small problem, the 
gains in efficiency cannot be demonstrated. However for large, real systems, problems 
this can reasonably be expected to be significant. 
5.2.4.1 Further Example 
To test this method more fully and justify the generality of the methods, a mission 
consisting of an increased number of phases and components may be considered in 
Figure 5.10. 
Phase 1 Phase 3 Phase 5 ~I 
Phase 2 Phase 4 
A B A B C A C 
BD E C D 
CONTINUOUS DISCRETE CONTINUOUS DISCRETE CONTINUOUS 
Figure 5.10 Further Example 
The component usage may be summarised as follows: 
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Component Phases Required Failure Rate (Per hour) Repair Rate (per hour) 
A 1,2,3,5 0.0001 0.02 
B 1,2,4 0.00005 0.001 
C 2,3,4, 5 0.00008 0.04 
D 4,5 0.0002 0.002 
E 4 0.0005 0.005 
Phase 1 : Continuous 100.0 Hour 
Phase 2: Discrete 
Phase 3 : Continuous 200.0 Hours 
Phase 4: Discrete 
Phase 5: Continuous 100.0 Hour 
The phase results by each method are given in Table 5.5. 
Full Markov Reduced Markov Minimal Markov 
Method and FT Method and FT Method 
Mission Reliability 9.8201 x1 0-1 9.8194x10-1 9.8283x10-1 
Phase 1 Unreliability 3.8140x10-5 3.8135x10-5 3.8132x10-5 
Phase 2 Unavailability 1 . 7633x1 0-5 1.7631x10-5 1. 7629x1 0-5 
Phase 3 Unreliability 1.1591x10-4 1.1590x10-4 1 .1596x1 0-4 
Phase 4 Unavailability 2.0213x10-3 2.0213x10-3 2.0223x10-3 
Phase 5 Unreliability 1.0274x10-2 1.0272x10-2 1.0282x10-2 
Phase 2 Transition Failure 1.7633x10-5 1.7631x10-5 1 . 7629x1 0-5 
Phase 3 Transition Failure 0 0 0 
Phase 4 Transition Failure 2.0213x10-3 2.0213x10-3 2.0223x10-3 
Phase 5 Transition Failure 4.9308x10-3 4.9311x10-3 4.9340x10-3 
Time Taken to Process Results (s) 45.0 6.0 4.0 
Table 5.5 Comparison of Mission Reliability Data for Three Methods 
The minimal method is found to vastly reduce computational time whilst producing 
consistent results to the other methods using time increments of ~t=0.05s in the 
numerical solution routine for the differential equations. This minimal method greatly 
reduces the time required to perform reliability calculations on a phased mission 
compared to the full Markov solution implemented in the past. 
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5.3 Reliability of a Mission with Non-Repairable Continuous Phases 
So far only missions comprising of repairable continuous phases and instantaneous 
discrete phases have been considered. Another possibility is that maintenance may not 
be allowed for certain periods of time throughout a mission. For such a continuous 
phase the components would be classed as non-repairable. 
The proposed methods in the previous sections allowed the application of fault tree 
methods to discrete phases to obtain the minimal cut sets for the phase and thus 
establish working and failed phase states. However, as no state changes were possible 
at this discrete phase, state probabilities remained the same once transition from the 
previous phase had been completed. 
The introduction of missions that comprise of both non-repairable and repairable 
continuous phases means that the methods presented in Sections 4.2.3 and 5.2.3 to 
model the failure of a component over a continuous phase cannot be implemented. 
Component failure probability distributions are not consistent throughout the duration 
of the mission, and must be modelled separately for each phase. Methods are 
presented to calculate the probability that a component resides in a working or failed 
state at the end of a repairable or non-repairable continuous phase in Sections 5.3.1 
and 5.3.2. A technique is presented for solution of missions comprising of both non-
repairable and repairable continuous phases in Section 5.3.3. 
5.3.1 Component Failure Probability Over a Non-Repairable Phase 
The probability density function of a component c in a non-repairable mission is 
found by the negative exponential distribution given in equation (5.32). 
for t>O (5.32) 
The unavailability of the component, qc(t) , with time over the mission duration is 
modelled by the cumulative probability function Fe (t) in equation (5.33). 
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(5.33) 
In the case of a completely non-repairable mission (Chapter 4), the failure distribution 
of all components remains constant throughout the mission. The unavailability of a 
component c over the duration of the mission would be modelled as shown in Figure 
5.1 1 (a), and for each separate phase in 5.1 1 (b). 
Unavailability 
qc(t) 
1 
Phase 1 Phase 2 : 
1 
o 
1 1 
1 1 IPhase 41 Phase 3 
--!--~--
(a) Over the Mission 
Unavailability 
t t;-1 
(b) During Phase i 
Figure 5.11 Unavailability of a Non-Repairable Component 
t 
The unavailability of the component over phase i would be derived in a similar way to 
equation (5.33) by integration of the probability density function (equation (5.32)). 
The integration time limits for phase i would be t=t;_1 to t=t; in equation (5.34). 
(5.34) 
For sequences of repairable and non-repairable phases, the unavailability of a 
component over a non-repairable phase becomes more complex. The cumulative 
probability function cannot be represented as in equation (5.33) since this implies that 
the negative exponential distribution is continuous from t=O to t=tm and that the initial 
component c unavailability, qc(ti-l) , in any non-repairable phase i of a multi-phased 
mission is found by equation (5.35). 
q (t. ) = 1-e-Adl- I C I-I (5.35) 
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Each non-repairable phase following any sequence of repairable and non-repairable 
phases will have a different negative exponential distribution dependent on the 
probability of the component being in the failed state at the start of the phase. The 
distribution of a non-repairable component unavailability can be obtained by Laplace 
transforms (Section 2.4.2.1). The Laplace transform of a single component 
unavailability (equation (2.47)) with initial failure probability qc(O) at t=0 is given in 
equation (S.36). 
(S.36) 
The inverse of equation (S.36) gives the appropriate exponential distribution with time 
t in equation (S.37). 
q c (t) = 1-a
c 
(O)e -Act (S.37) 
where t is measured from the start of the mission 
Since we require the unavailability of the component over phase i, the initial failure 
probability of component c at t=ti-l is q c (ti-l) , and t must be replaced by t-ti-l as shown 
in equation (S.38). 
(S.38) 
The probability that the component is in the failed state at the end of phase i can be 
found by solution of equation (S.38) at t=ti in equation (S.39) 
q (t.) = 1- a (t. )e-'<c(t;-t;-I) c , c ,-1 (S.39) 
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The probability of component c failure during this non-repairable phase is then 
evaluated as the difference in unavailability between the start of the phase (t=t,.-I) and 
the end of the phase (t=t,.) in equation (5AO). 
q = (l-a (t. )e-A.c(ti-ti-I»)_(l_a (t. )e-A.C(ti-l-ti-I») Ci C 1-1 C 1-1 
= (1- a
c 
(tj-l )e-Ac(li-ti-l) )- (1- a
c 
(t,._I)) (5AO) 
= a
c 
(tj-l) (1- e -A.c(t/-ti - 1) ) 
The initial component c availability in phase i, aC(ti-I) ' is obtained directly from the 
previous phase and will be dependent on the nature of phase i-I. 
5.3.2 Component Failure Probability Over a Repairable Phase 
The solution to a repairable phase is achieved by the Markov method. If a component 
c is required for successful system operation in a repairable phase, the final 
component availability would be derived from the Markov state model. The 
probability that the component is in the working or failed state at the end of the phase 
i is found by the sum of all Markov states with contribution from the component 
working or failed respectively in equations (SAl). 
ac(tJ = L~(tJ 
j slates with 
cworldng 
qc(tJ = L~(tJ 
k states with 
cfailed 
(SAl) 
If the component is not required during the repairable phase, the final component 
availability must be obtained using alternative methods. The unavailability of a 
component not required in a repairable single phase mission is given in equation 
(2.56). For missions of multiple phases, this equation cannot be used since it implies 
the exponential distribution is continuous from t=O to t=tm and the initial component c 
unavailability, q c (tj-}) , in any phase i of a multi-phased mission is found by equation 
(5A2). 
(5A2) 
The probability that a component will fail during a repairable phase given any initial 
value of unavailability is required. This is modelled in Figure 5.12. 
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Unavailability qc(t) 
A 
__ c_ 
A +0 
C C 
ti-1 t 
Figure 5.12 Unavailability of a Discrete Phase Component During Continuous 
Phase i 
In the same way as for a component over a non-repairable phase, the exponential 
unavailability model must be derived using Laplace transforms. The Laplace 
transform for the unavailability of a single repairable component (equation (2.54)) is 
given in equation (5.43). 
This function is inverted at t=ti_1 in equation (5.44). 
(5.44) 
Since a
c 
(tH) + q c (tH) = 1, the distribution of unavailability of the component 
becomes as given in equation (5.45). 
The probability that the component is in the failed state and success states at the end 
of phase i is found by equations (5.46) and (5.47) respectively. 
(5.46) 
(5.47) 
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The initial component availability, aC(ti-t) and unavailability, qc(ti-t), in phase i is 
obtained directly from the previous phase and will be dependent on the nature of 
phase i-I. 
5.3.3 Combined Minimal Markov and Continuous Phase Fault Tree Method 
It may be possible to reduce the Markov models further where non-repairable 
continuous phases are encountered if the failure of the continuous non-repairable 
phase can also be modelled using a fault tree. It is possible to use the previously 
described Markov based methods with repair rates set to zero in non-repairable 
phases. However there would be processing advantages if the results can be 
accomplished using smaller models. 
To demonstrate a method which can accomplish the analysis of such systems, an 
adaptation ofthe example given in Figure 5.5 will be used, shown in Figure 5.13. 
Phase 1 
A B C 
CONTINUOUS 
NON-REPAIRABLE 
Phase 2 
B 0 
DISCRETE 
Phase 3 
A B 
CONTINUOUS 
REPAIRABLE 
Figure 5.13 Discrete and Continuous Phased Mission with Repairable and Non-
Repairable Phases 
The probability of a component residing in the working or failed state at the start of a 
non-repairable phase i is obtained from the solution of the previous phase. If the 
previous phase was non-repairable, this would be determined using the method 
presented in Section 5.3.1 (equation (5.39». If the previous phase was repairable, this 
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would be obtained using either of the techniques demonstrated in Section 5.3.2 
(equation (5.41) or (5.46». In the example given in Figure 5.13, the non-repairable 
continuous phase is phase 1, and the system will start at to with all components 
working. If the non-repairable phase were to come later in the mission then failures 
could exist at the start of the phase. 
Qualitative analysis can be implemented to determine the minimal cut sets of a non-
repairable continuous phase i. If the initial availability of each component c is known, 
the probability that component c fails during phase i can be obtained using equation 
(5.40). The failure probability of phase i, Q;, can then easily be obtained using a 
simple inclusion-exclusion expansion of the probability of existence of phase i cut sets 
in equation (5.48). 
Nma, Nma, j-I 
Q; = LP(Cj)- LLP(Cji nCk)+ .. ·+(-I)Nmai-Ip(Cli nC2, n ... nCNma) (5.48) 
j=1 j=2 k=1 
where N is the number of minimal cut sets in phase i 
mcsl 
The probability that each component is in the failed or working state at the end of 
non-repairable continuous phase i is obtained using equation (5.39). This is passed 
directly to the next phase which will be solved depending on the type of phase i+ 1: 
• Phase i+ 1 Continuous and Non-Repairable 
The state probabilities for each component can be passed directly to phase i+ 1, 
which will be solved in the same way. 
• Phase i+ 1 Discrete 
The state probabilities for each component can be passed directly to phase i+ 1. 
The probability of the discrete phase failure is obtained by the inclusion-
exclusion expansion of the existence of phase i+ 1 cut sets (that did not cause 
phase i failure) at the end of phase i. 
• Phase i+ 1 Continuous and Repairable 
The component state probabilities must be transformed to the required vector 
of initial system state probabilities for solution of the phase i+ 1 Markov 
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model. This is achieved by the combination of the relevant final component 
state probabilities. 
This method can be applied to the example in Figure 5.13 in the following way: 
Phase 1 
The first phase of the mission is non-repairable and all components are assumed to 
begin phase 1 in the working state, i.e. qc(O) = 0 for all c. There is only one minimal 
cut set in this initial phase, {AI. BI. Cl}, and so the phase 1 failure and success 
probabilities are obtained using equation (5.48) in equation (5.49). 
Al = 1 - q A qo qc I I I (5.49) 
where qCI for each component c is obtained using equation (5.40) 
The final phase 1 component state probabilities are obtained using equation (5.39), 
and are given in equations (5.50). 
(5.50) 
Phase 2 
The second phase of the mission is of a discrete nature. The minimal cut sets for this 
phase are CI={A, B} and C2={A, D}. If either minimal cut set exists at the end of 
phase 1, system failure will occur on transition to phase 2. The probability that a phase 
2 minimal cut set exists at the end of phase 1 is obtained using the inclusion-exclusion 
expansion (equation (5.48)) of the existence of phase 2 cut sets at t=t1 in equation 
(5.51). 
Q2 = qC
1 
(t\) + qC
2 
(t1) - qC1 qC2 (t1) 
Q2 = q A (tl)qo (t\) + q A (t\)q D (t\) - q At\)qo (t\)qD (t\) (5.54) 
and 
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The final component state probabilities at the end of phase 2 can then be passed 
directly to phase 3. 
Phase 3 
The Markov model for phase 3 requires the initial state probability vector determined 
by components A and B. This would be obtained by the component state probabilities 
at the end of the discrete phase 2 as demonstrated in Table 5.6. 
State Ref A B Initial Phase 3 State Probabilit 
S(AB) 0 0 a A (t2 ) ·aB(t2 ) 1 
S~AB) 0 1 aAt2 ) ·qB(t2 ) 
S(AB) 
3 
1 0 qAt2 ) . aB (t2 ) 
S(AB) 
4 
1 1 qAt2 ) 'QB(t2 ) 
Table 5.6 . Initial State Probabilities of Repairable Ph ase 3 from Discrete Phase 2 
However, since the event of components A and B both residing in the failed state at 
the discrete second phase would have caused phase 2 failure, it is not possible for the 
system to begin phase 3 in state S!AB) . This is assigned a state probability of zero at 
the start of phase 3. 
The phase 3 transition failure is determined by the event that either of components A 
or B are failed at the start of phase 3 using equation (5.29). The phase 3 Markov 
model is again defined by the transition model given in equation (5.27). Phase 3 
success is found by the probability that the system resides in state SI(AB) at the end of 
the mission in equation (5.30), and the mission success is obtained using equation 
(5.31). 
Using this method, it is possible for repairable and non-repairable continuous phases 
to be solved separately. Each non-repairable phase can be solved using standard fault 
tree techniques, and each repairable phase can be solved by application of a Markov 
model. The expansion of the state probabilities at the end of each phase allows the 
unavailability or availability of all components to be calculated for transition to the 
next phase. The failure probability of an irrelevant component over a non-repairable 
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or repairable phase can easily be obtained using the methods presented in Sections 
5.3.1 and 5.3.2. 
5.3.4 Comparison of Results 
Using the same component and phase data as in Section 5.2.4, the 3-phased mission 
example given in Figure 5.13 may be solved using a full Markov model, and also 
using the proposed combined minimal Markov model with continuous phase fault tree 
method. The phase and transition failure probabilities and mission success probability 
for each method are compared in Table 5.7 using a time increment value of 8t=0.05s 
for the minimal solution routine for the differential equation. It can be seen that using 
the combined minimal Markov and continuous phase fault tree technique produces a 
very close agreement to that found by the full Markov method. 
Full Markov Method Combined Minimal Markov and 
Continuous Phase Fault Tree Method 
I----M-is-s·-Io-n -R-el-ia-b-ility--+---6-.3-7-93-X-1-0·T1 --t- 6.3777x10.1 
Phase 1 Unreliability 3.5691x10"" 3.5683x10-4 
Phase 2 Unreliability 2.0697x1 O'~ 2.0693x1 D· 
Phase 3 Unreliability 2.2299x10" 2.2294x10'1 
Phase 2 Transition Failure 2.0697x10'~ 2.0693x10' 
Phase 3 Transition Failure 1.1832x10'1 1.1824x1O·1 
Table 5.7 Comparison of Mission Reliability Data for Two Methods 
To gain confidence in this methodology and its computer implementation, the method 
has been applied to the example considered before in Section 5.2.4.1. In this analysis 
all phases are considered repairable apart from phase 3 and a time step value of 
8t=0.05s is used for the minimal solution routine for the differential equation. The 
results presented in Table 5.8 were obtained. A second model analysis was then 
performed for the same example with different repairable and non-repairable phases. 
Results from this further example where phases 1 and 5 were assumed non-repairable 
with all other phases repairable are given in Table 5.9. 
Close agreement between the methods is agam evident. The updated method of 
dealing with non-repairable phases gives faster processing times and offers a 
significant advantage. It is reasonable to expect that this would be even more dramatic 
for larger system problems. 
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Phase 3 Non-Repairable 
Full Markov Method 
Mission Reliabili 9.4861x10' 
Phase 1 Unreliabili 3.8140x10' 
Phase 2 Unreliabili 1.7633x10' 
Phase 3 Unreliabili 4.1806x10-4 
Phase 4 Unreliabili 1.7454x10' 
Phase 5 Unreliabili 1.0007x10·2 
Phase 2 Transition Failure 1.7633x10' 
Phase 3 Transition Failure o 
Phase 4 Transition Failure 1.7454x10·2 
Phase 5 Transition Failure 2.3554x10' 
Time Taken to Process Results (s) 38.0 
Combined Minimal Markov and 
Continuous Phase Fault Tree Method 
9.4829x10' 
3.8136x10' 
1.7630x10' 
4.1858x10-4 
1.7464x10' 
1.0003x10' 
1.7630x10' 
o 
1.7464x10' 
2.3567x10·2 
1.0 
Table 5.8 Comparison of Further Mission Reliability Data for Two Methods 
Phase 1,5 Non-Repairable 
Full Markov Method 
Mission Reliabili 9.8268x10' 
Phase 1 Unreliabili 4.9644x10' 
Phase 2 Unreliabili 1.1827x10-4 
Phase 3 Unreliabili 1.5214x10-4 
Phase 4 Unreliabili 2.0280x10-3 
Phase 5 Unreliabili 1.0372x10·2 
Phase 2 Transition Failure 1.1827x10-4 
Phase 3 Transition Failure o 
Phase 4 Transition Failure 2.0280x10'3 
Phase 5 Transition Failure 5.0312x10·3 
Time Taken to Process Results (s) 40.0 
Combined Minimal Markov and 
Continuous Phase Fault Tree Method 
9.8256x10' 
4.9627x10' 
1.1823x10-4 
1.5213x10-4 
2.0240x10 
1.0280x10·2 
1.1823x10-4 
o 
2.0240x10·3 
5.0305x10' 
1.0 
Table 5.9 Comparison of Further Mission Reliability Data for Two Methods 
5.4 Summary 
The methods presented in this chapter allow solution of a mission that is capable of 
repair in some or all phases. The inclusion of both discrete and continuous phase 
models many practical situations where a system is required to work on demand. A 
non-repairable phase can be solved using standard fault tree techniques, and a 
repairable phase can be solved by application of a minimal Markov model. The 
expansion of the state probabilities at the end of each phase allows the unavailability 
or availability of all components to be calculated for transition to the next phase, and 
thus any sequence of repairable and non-repairable phases can be modelled. 
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The main deficiency of this model is that dependencies between components have not 
been considered. Methods to account for dependencies such as sequential failures and 
maintenance policies are presented in the following chapters. 
154 
Chapter 6 Sequential Failures 
6.1 Introduction 
In some situations, the top event of a fault tree can only be caused by a sequence of 
basic event occurrences, thus the order in which components fail will be of 
importance to the system outcome. This concept of sequential failures was introduced 
in Section 2.2.3.5.3. 
An example of a situation where the system outcome is dependent on the failure 
ordering of components is a safety protection system designed to protect against a 
specific hazard (Figure 2.3). If the hazardous event occurs while safety protection 
devices are functioning, the top event will not occur and a shutdown would be 
instigated. If the hazardous event occurs while safety protection devices are not 
working a more catastrophic system level failure will occur. In this type of situation, 
failed safety features are known as enabling events. The occurrence of the hazardous 
event is known as an initiator. In a system, an initiator may act as either an enabler or 
an initiator, whereas an enabler can only act in this capacity. Every minimal cut set of 
the system requires at least one initiator in order to cause system failure. 
A limited ordering requirement is introduced on the basic events. The last event to 
occur needs to be the hazardous one. If the safety features have failed in any order 
prior to this then the system failure represented by the fault tree will occur. 
6.1.1 Failure Modes 
A system may fail through a number of different causes. The order in which 
components fail in a system may contribute to different outcomes (failed system 
states), and the outcomes are defined as failure modes. The failure modes of the safety 
system example given in Figure 2.3 could be classified as 'Safe System Shutdown' 
and 'Catastrophic System Failure'. A safe system shutdown will happen if the 
initiating event occurs while an enabling event does not exist, whereas a catastrophic 
failure will be caused if the initiating event occurs when all the enabling events 
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already exist. Both cause the system to cease functioning, however the consequences 
of catastrophic system failure would be far more serious than a safe system shutdown. 
Fault tree representation allows the logical development of each failure mode 
individually in an inverted tree structure, however this method is not appropriate to 
accurately account for the dynamic relationship between component failures. 
Consider all possible component failure orderings which can be demonstrated using a 
tree structure. The component failure events are considered in every possible order to 
determine the maximum number of system states possible and the appropriate system 
outcome noted. However in a practical situation once a catastrophic system failure 
state is reached, the system resides in an absorbing failed state and further component 
failures are irrelevant. Take the example shown in Figure 2.3, considering only two 
component level events. One is the enabler CE), the second the initiator (I), then all 
sequences may be represented as given in Figure 6.1: 
< If: 
- - Cawtrophlc System Fa""", 
If f---=~---j Safe System Shutdown 
Figure 6.1 Failure Event Tree 
Each system outcome may have a different consequence. A safe system shutdown 
would allow defective items to be repaired to good as new condition and the system 
would be restored to full working order. In the event of a catastrophic failure 
maintenance may not be possible, further complications may be caused, and if the 
reliability of the system is to be modelled it would be considered to reside in an 
absorbing failed state. 
For a system where the order of component failures can result in a different system 
state outcome, it is important to be able to identify the outcomes to ensure that 
adequate protection is provided in a system. 
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6.2 Reliability of a System with Sequential Failures 
Two methods are considered by which the reliability of a system involving sequential 
failures can be calculated: 
6.2.1 Fault Tree Method 
A logic gate has been developed whereby the gate outcome depends on the order in 
which the events occur. This gate is defined as a priority-AND gate and is represented 
in Figure 6.2. 
Figure 6.2 Priority-AND gate 
The events must occur in the order A}, A2 ••• An for the output of the gate to be true. If 
the events occur in any other sequence to this, the gate output will be false. 
Gates such as this where the order of component failure is important are classed as 
dynamic gates. Other non-sequential tree structuring such as AND and OR gates are 
classed as static gates. Methods have been developed to calculate the reliability of 
static fault tree structures [3], however to perform analysis on a dynamic gate type it is 
necessary to develop further methods. The Markov method is suitable for dynamic 
fault tree analysis. 
6.2.2 Markov Method 
The Markov method models the possible system states and transitions to allow the 
reliability of a system to be calculated over a duration of time. In order to model the 
distinction between initiating and enabling events requires the event ordering to be 
considered and increases the number of possible system states in the model. 
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In previous Markov models developed, the states in the model took no account of the 
order of failure. Thus without the distinction between initiating and enabling events, a 
2-component parallel system Markov model for system unreliability would be 
represented by Figure 6.3. 
o = Absorbing State 
o = Non-Absorbing State 
Figure 6.3 2-Component Markov Model 
If both components A and B fail, the system will reside in the absorbing state 4. 
However this state does not account for the order in which the components have 
failed. If component B can only cause system failure when component A is down, 
component A failure is the enabling event and component B failure is the initiating 
event. The Markov model for this situation would be given in Figure 6.4. 
')..B 
Figure 6.4 2-Component Markov Model with Initiating and Enabling Events 
Since the order of component failures is important, states that involve more than one 
component failure must be expanded to denote the sequence of event occurrence. 
Where originally state 4 in Figure 6.3 represented both components residing in the 
failed state, the Markov diagram is now expanded to allow for all possible failure 
sequences, given by states 41 and 42• The two failure sequences result in a different 
type of system failure. State 41 leads to catastrophic system failure - failure of 
component A enables failure of component B to cause system failure. This state is 
absorbing and thus the system remains in the failed state. State 42 does not result in a 
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catastrophic system failure. The system would be safely shut down and both the 
components could be restored to the new condition with repair rate VAB. This would 
bring the system back into state 1 with all components functioning successfully, and 
allow the phase to continue. 
As the number of components increases, the number of possible orders of component 
failure increases rapidly. This may be demonstrated in Figure 6.5 for systems 
comprising of 1, 2, 3 and 4 components using a tree structure. 
0--A--Q 
1 Component - 1 Order of Failure 
~B-O ()-<:::B---()-A-D 
2 Components - 2 Orders of Failure 
3 Components - 6 Orders of Failure 4 Components - 24 Orders of Failure 
Figure 6.S Failure Order Combinations for Different Numbers of Components 
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The development of a Markov model allowing for sequential failures results in an 
increase of possible system states. For 2 components a full Markov model requires 
only one extra state, however as the number of components increases the number of 
possible Markov system states shows a dramatic explosion (Table 6.1). 
No. Of Components 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
Number Of Markov System States 
Without Se uential Failures With Se uential Failures 
2 2 
4 5 
8 16 
16 65 
32 326 
Table 6.1 Number of States in a Markov Model With Sequential Failures 
Since the order of occurrence of the enablers does not matter and it is only the initiator 
that has to be the last to occur it is possible to reduce the number of states. For 
example in a system comprising of three components in parallel, if the failure of 
components A and B are enabling events and the failure of component C IS an 
initiating event, a full Markov model would be represented by Figure 6.6. 
Figure 6.6 Full Markov Model for Cut Set ABC 
Catastrophic system failure will occur if the enabling events, components A and B 
fail, before the failure of component C. A non-catastrophic failure will occur if the 
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components fail in any other order. Therefore the only concern is the order of failure 
for component C. It is possible to combine the failure states in the model; the 
absorbing failure states 84 and 86 represent a catastrophic failure and are combined to 
form state 84,6, the non-catastrophic failure states 81. 82, 83, and 85 can be combined to 
form state 81,2,3,5. Similarly since catastrophic failure will only occur if components A 
and B fail first in any order, states 7 .. and 72 can be combined to form state 71,2. Non-
catastrophic failure will occur if the initiating event of component C failure occurs 
before either of the enabling events, and so states 41 and 42 can be combined to form 
state 41,2, and 6.. and 62 can be combined to form state 61,2. The reduced Markov 
model is given in Figure 6.7. 
Figure 6.7 Reduced Markov Model for Cut Set ABC 
This state reduction technique becomes more complex when applied to phased 
mission systems and will be discussed later. 
6.3 Initiating and Enabling Events in Phased Mission Systems 
To apply enabler and initiator theory to multi-phased missions there is the possibility 
that a component is not required during certain phases of the mission. In any phase, 
the events may be divided into categories: 
• Enabler - will only allow initiating events to cause the top event to 
occur, cannot cause direct phase failure. An enabling event failure may 
occur in any phase prior to the occurrence of an initiating event. 
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• Initiator -Upon failure, if enablers are failed then phase failure will 
occur, otherwise maintenance may be performed to restore all 
components to full working order. It is also possible for an initiator to 
act as an enabler for other initiators if they both occur in the same 
minimal cut set. 
• Not Required - The component is not required for the particular phase, 
but may have been used previously and may be required in future 
phase configurations. That is to say the system state is not dependent 
on these component failure modes in this phase. 
When considering phased missions it is possible that a component may change 
function through different phases. A simple example of a road sign illumination 
system may be used to demonstrate this, shown in Figure 6.8. 
Light 
~'-------ll Switch 
Battery 
City Power 
Figure 6.8 Power Source System 
In the first phase the light is required to work continuously to illuminate a road sign 
for motorists. The light is powered by the city power supply, however in the event of a 
power failure the switch will transfer over to the backup battery. After a specified 
period of operation the bulb must be replaced and so the second phase requires 
disconnection of the light from the power supply in order for the bulb to be changed 
safely. The failure events in this system are given as: 
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L - Bulb Failure 
P - City Power Supply Failure 
B - Battery Failure 
Si - Switch Control Fails to Isolate Power Source 
Sb - Switch Control Fails to Transfer to Backup Source 
Phase 1 Failure will occur if the light does not work continuously for the specified 
duration of time as an accident could arise. The city power supply will be used 
constantly unless failure occurs, at which point the switch control will be activated 
and the battery is used as a backup source. If the battery is in the working state at the 
time of the failure of the city power supply, it will be put into operation and used 
continuously until the city power supply is restored. When the city power supply is 
restored, the switch control will activate the city power supply as being the primary 
power source. In the event that the battery fails before the city power supply has been 
restored, no power will be supplied to the bulb and the light will go out. The road sign 
will not be illuminated until the city power supply is restored. In such a situation, the 
failure of the city power supply is the initiating event due to the continuous 
requirement for successful operation. If this event occurs, the switch control is 
activated in order for the backup battery to take over. The failure of the switch control 
is therefore the enabling event. If this event occurs prior to the initiating event, the 
failure of the city power supply causes the light to go out and a potential dangerous 
situation to arise. If the enabling event occurs after the initiating event, the light will 
remain lit since the power supply has already been successfully transferred to the 
backup battery. 
The second phase requires a successful routine bulb change. The continual 
requirement for the bulb to be lit in the first phase meant that a demand was only 
placed on the switch control in the event that the city power supply failed. The 
successful shutdown of the system in the second phase to enable a safe bulb change 
places a demand on the switch control to cut off both power supplies to the bulb. 
Since the failure of the switch control on its own can fail the system it becomes an 
initiating event. 
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It is possible to construct fault trees to represent Phase 1 failure - Light Does Not 
Work Continuously and Phase 2 failure - System not Shutdown for Period Routine 
Maintenance, shown in Figure 6.9. 
P B 
Phase 1 Failure-
Light Does Not 
Work 
Continuously 
Phase 2 Failure -
System Not 
Shutdown for 
Routine 
Maintenance 
1 I 
Figure 6.9 Road Sign Illumination System 
It can be noted that the switch component failure will contribute differently to the 
system failure mode in different phases. In this case the failure of the switch control in 
phase 1 acts as an enabling event. Failure of the switch control in phase 2 acts as an 
initiating event. Similarly the role of the failure of the city power supply and the 
battery in phase 1 act as initiating events and change in phase 2 to have no 
requirement. This demonstrates the possibility for the event of component failure to 
change contribution through different phases. 
6.4 Maintenance Policies 
A further consideration is the way in which the components are maintained. So far, it 
has been assumed that all components begin repair as soon as failure occurs. However 
as an enabler may not be required continuously, the failure may not be detected unless 
an inspection takes place or an initiating event occurs and a demand is placed on it to 
respond. Such a situation can arise in a safety system which is not required until a 
component fails and places a demand on it to react. As the safety system is dormant 
and not used continuously, a failure will not be detected. Failures can therefore be 
categorised as either revealed or un revealed. 
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A revealed failure is detected as soon as a component fails. This generally applies to 
components that are monitored continually over periods of time, or when they fail 
cause a noticeable system effect. The repair of such a failure assumes that there is no 
detection time and that the repair rate will depend only on the time to repair the 
component. 
An unrevealed failure is usually detected by a scheduled maintenance routine. This 
type of maintenance policy is commonly used in safety and standby systems where 
components are not continuously operational. Otherwise the failure may not be 
noticed until a demand is placed on the component to work. The time that the 
component remains in the failed state depends not only on the component repair time, 
but also on the time taken to detect the failure. It is commonly assumed that the item 
is inspected every () time units. 
The failure of a component in a phase may be detected in different ways. The failure 
of a component causing an initiating event is detected instantly, however a component 
failure acting only as an enabling event or a component not used in the phase are not 
monitored continuously and thus failure can occur and remain unrevealed until the 
next inspection takes place. This is summarised in Table 6.2. 
Component Contribution Type of Failure 
Initiator 
Enabler 
Not Required 
Revealed 
Unrevealed 
Unrevealed 
i 
Table 6.2 Component Failure Types 
The calculation of phase and mission reliability of a system that contains both 
initiating and enabling component failure events becomes very complex due to the 
large number of combinations of revealed and unrevealed failures that can occur. 
6.4.1 Markov Model for Revealed and Unrevealed Failures 
For an enabler or a component that is not required in a particular phase, it is possible 
to use a Markov model for the relationship between the revealed and unrevealed 
failure states as shown in Figure 6.10. 
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Figure 6.10 Unrevealed Component Failure in Markov Model 
If the component begins life in the working state (W) with probability P1(t) it is 
possible for a transition to occur to the unrevealed failed state (Funrevealed) at any point 
in time with failure rate A. 
If a scheduled inspection of the component takes place every ne (n=I,2 ... ), an 
unrevealed failure will not be detected until the next planned maintenance point. The 
probability of the component residing in this unrevealed failure state is denoted by 
P2(t). As soon as the failure is detected at ne, the component state moves directly from 
the unrevealed failure state into the revealed failure state (Frevealed). The component 
may then be restored to full working order with repair rate u. The probability of the 
component residing in this revealed failure state is denoted by P3(t). 
Transitions linking working and failed states can only occur between inspection points 
of a phase i. If phase i begins at time t=t;_1 and ends at t=t;, the state change model is 
shown in Figure 6.11. 
t 
------------------------------7) 
F unrevealed Pit) 
for t;-1 ~ t ~ t; 
t-:j:. ne 
Figure 6.11 Markov Model Between Inspection Points 
At every ne, any unrevealed failures are detected and thus an instant transition 
between the unrevealed and revealed failure states occurs, shown in Figure 6.12. 
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Figure 6.12 Markov Model At Inspection Points 
The probability of the component residing in the unrevealed failed state (P2 * (n()) and 
revealed failed state (P3 * (n()) just after every n() is given by equations (6.1) 
* ~ (nS) = P2 (nS) + ~ (nS) 
P2* (nS) = 0 
n = 1,2, .. (6.1) 
where P
n 
* (t) is the probability of the component residing in state n just after time t. 
The concept for a single component Markov model for revealed and unrevealed 
failures may be extended to represent a system comprising of enablers, initiators, and 
components that are not required for a particular phase. If a mission is considered in 
its entirety, a total of Ne components from all phases must be considered throughout 
the mission duration. 
Until now the states in the Markov models used for phased mission analysis have 
taken no account of scheduled inspection and the distinction between initiating and 
enabling events has not been made. A 2-component parallel system Markov model to 
calculate system unreliability was represented by Figure 6.3. Considering the 
possibility of sequential failures where all component failures are revealed, the 2-
component Markov model was expanded to allow for sequential failures with 
component A failure as an enabling event and component B failure as an initiating 
event (Figure 6.4). 
If a mission is considered in its entirety, a complete set of system states must be 
developed. As the failure of a component could act as an enabling event or an 
initiating event and in some phases not be required, there is a possibility that any 
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component could fail unrevealed and thus a full Markov model must be developed to 
represent this. A new set of notation is introduced, 
o Component in the working state 
Inu Component is the nth to fail. Failure unrevealed. 
InR Component is the nth to fail. Failure revealed. 
For a 2-component system, the full set of system states may be summarised in Table 
6.3. 
State A B 
1 0 0 
21 0 11U 
22 0 11R 
31 11U 0 
32 11R 0 
41 12U 11U 
42 11U 12U 
43 12U 11R 
44 11U 12R 
45 12R 11U 
46 11R 12U 
47 12R 11R 
48 11R 12R 
Table 6.3 Possible States for a Mission Comprising of2 Components 
The Markov model in Figure 6.4 must be further expanded to identify revealed and 
unrevealed failures as repair of the enabling event cannot be initiated until a failure is 
identified at an inspection point. The Markov model would become that illustrated in 
Figure 6.13. 
Figure 6.13 2-Component Markov Model with Unrevealed failures 
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If the system begins with both components working (state 1), component failure may 
occur in either order. If the initiating event, component B revealed failure, occurs first 
with rate AB and component A is in the working state, system failure does not occur 
and the system will reside in state 22. From state 22 two transitions may be made. 
Component B may be restored to the good as new condition with repair rate VB and 
transfer back to state 1. Alternatively before component B is repaired, component A 
may fail unrevealed and the system will make a transition to state 43. As the initiating 
event occurred prior to the enabling event, the resulting state with both components 
failed is a non-catastrophic system failure. A non-catastrophic failure occurs if the 
initiating event puts a demand on the safety system when the enabler allows safe 
shutdown. The enabler may be restored, therefore either component B is repaired with 
rate VB back to state 3t. or the next scheduled inspection point reveals the failure of A 
and the system moves directly to state 47, where both components may be repaired 
with rate VAB back to state 1. 
The alternative sequence is that the enabling event, component A failure, occurs first. 
This failure will be unrevealed and the system will make a transition from state 1 to 
state 31• The occurrence of the enabling event first puts the system into a critical state 
for component B. Two transitions are possible - component A failure is revealed at 
the next inspection point, or component B fails before the failure of component A is 
detected. If the failure of component A is revealed at the next inspection point, instant 
transition to state 32 will occur where it may be restored to new condition (state 1) 
with rate VA. State 32 is also a critical state for component B. If component B fails 
during the critical time that the system resides in state 31 or 32, instant system failure 
will occur. This will automatically reveal the fact that component A has failed and the 
system will transfer to state 48• This catastrophic failure is absorbing and the system 
will remain in this state. 
It is seen that when considering a two-component parallel system with no sequential 
failures or scheduled inspection (Figure 6.3) there was only 1 state to represent both 
components in the failed state (4). This represented the only system failure mode. 
Once initiating and enabling events are taken into consideration with both unrevealed 
and revealed failures, there becomes a possibility of 8 failure states (41-8 in Table 6.3). 
Now there are two revealed system failure outcomes, states 47 and 48. If the enabling 
event occurs and allows the initiating event to cause system failure, the result is 
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catastrophic. If the initiating event occurs prior to the enabling event, repair is possible 
and the outcome is non-catastrophic. 
For a 2-component system with both unrevealed and revealed component failures 
there is a possibility of 13 system states (Table 6.3). However, since component B 
failure is an initiator and thus cannot fail unrevealed, states 21,41,42,45, and 46 will not 
be used in the model. As the number of components in a system increases, the 
consideration of scheduled inspection points and sequential failure relationships 
results in an explosion of possible system states. Table 6.4 gives a comparison of how 
the possible number of system states increases as the number of components in the 
system increases. The elimination of system states that are not required for a particular 
model due to the function of components is discussed further in Chapter 7. 
No. Of Components 
1 
2 
3 
4 
Number Of States 
Revealed Failure Only Model Revealed and Unrevealed Failure Model 
2 3 
4 13 
8 79 
16 553 
------------------~ 
Table 6.4 Number of System States for Revealed and Unrevealed Failures 
6.5 Summary 
If events are categorised as initiators or enablers which fail revealed or unrevealed 
respectively, the Markov model gets very large for even small or moderate numbers of 
components. A method is required to reduce the number of possible system states as 
far as possible. If components that are not required for a particular phase can be 
identified, and separated from the components that are required in the phase and the 
failures that act as initiating or enabling events, a reduced Markov model may be 
constructed. For a two component system (one initiator), this is shown by comparison 
of the complete list of 13 system states (Table 6.3) with the reduced 7 state diagram 
(Figure 6.13). Rules to identify the possible system states in any phase required for a 
Markov model are presented in the following chapter. 
It is also possible that an initiating event may only cause system failure if it occurs 
during a particular phase. If it occurs prior to the phase in question, the phase failure 
will not occur. Each type of initiating event must be modelled accordingly. Methods 
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are required to solve such a phased mission system where the function of a component 
failure and appropriate maintenance policy can change through the phases. This is 
discussed in the next chapter. 
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Chapter 7 Phase Specific and Non- Phase Specific Initiating Events 
7.1 Introduction 
A component failure that acts as an initiating event in a phase may occur either prior 
to, or during the phase in question. In some cases, the top event of phase failure will 
only occur if the initiating event fails during a particular phase. If the initiating event 
occurred prior to the phase, it will not contribute to phase failure. This type of 
initiating event is defined as phase specific (PS) and is denoted by Ip. Other initiating 
events that can contribute to a phase failure regardless of which phase they occurred 
in are non- phase specific (NPS) and are defined by 1. 
The general case of non- phase specific initiators will be considered first in Section 
7.2, followed by the introduction of phase specific initiators in Section 7.3. 
7.2 Non-Phase Specific Initiators 
This section considers a phased mission system comprising of only NPS initiating 
events. Failure of a phase may be caused by the existence of a sequential cut set 
regardless of whether the events in the cut set occurred prior to or during the phase in 
question. 
When considering a phased mission, it is possible that component failures can act in 
different capacities through the phases. The analysis of a phased mission involving 
enabling events and NPS initiating events can be demonstrated using a simple 
example consisting ofthree components, A, B and C (Figure 7.1). 
The three phases are of a continuous nature. No state transitions can occur during a 
discrete phase and so a priority-AND gate would not occur in this type of phase. Since 
the inclusion of discrete phases is accommodated by simply checking for system 
compliance conditions at the appropriate time point it is not felt necessary to consider 
this in the demonstration example. 
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A component failure event can be categorised as a different type in each of the three 
phases. An event that only acts as an enabler in a phase may result in either an 
unrevealed or revealed component failure. If an enabling event occurs unrevealed, it 
will become revealed either by the occurrence of an initiating event from the same 
sequential cut set or at the next inspection point. The Markov model representing 
unrevealed enabling events requires states to signify both the unrevealed and revealed 
failure possibilities. If an enabling event only occurs revealed, it cannot reside in the 
unrevealed failure state at any point in the phase. The Markov model representing 
revealed enabling events requires states to signify only the revealed failure. Since 
considering the worst case scenario (in terms of model development) where enabling 
events occur unrevealed encompasses the simpler situation where an enabling event 
can occur revealed, enabling events will be treated as unrevealed. 
Figure 7.1 
A B 
(E) (I) 
REPAIRABLE 
where E 
I 
lIE 
A B 
(lIE) (lIE) 
REPAIRABLE 
Enabling Event 
A B 
(E) (I) 
NON-REPAIRABLE 
Initiating Event not Specific to Phase 
Initiating Event Capable of Enabling 
Mission with Sequential Failures and NPS Initiating Events 
The occurrence of an initiating event is a revealed component failure. It is possible 
that an initiating event can also act as an enabler, for example in a parallel 
arrangement of 2 components where at least one component is required to work for 
the system to function successfully. The failure of either component would act as an 
enabling event for the initiating failure of the other component. 
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The type of event caused by component failure in each of the phases of Figure 7.1 is 
summarised in Table 7.1. 
Component Failure Phase 1 Phase 2 Phase 3 
A Enabler Initiator! Enabler Enabler 
B Initiator Initiator! Enabler Initiator 
C Not Required Initiator! Enabler Initiator 
Table 7.1 Component Failure Events in 3-Phased Mission 
7.2.1 Full Markov Model 
Since the phases in the example (Figure 7.1) are either repairable or contain dynamic 
gates, a suitable method for analysis is the Markov method. Using a full Markov 
model as described in Section 5.2.1, a complete list of possible system states can be 
constructed. As component failure may occur revealed or unrevealed and is subject to 
change through the phases, the full list requires the inclusion of each type of failure 
for every component. The ordering of failure events is also important, thus for each 
state involving failures a suitable representation must be given for the sequential 
failure ordering. 
For a system with three components the list is developed and all possible system states 
with appropriate ordering and failure type are given in Table 7.2. 
Using the relevant sub-set of states from the full listing in Table 7.2, a full Markov 
model comprising of every component and appropriate state transitions can be 
constructed for each of the three phases, represented by Figures 7.2, 7.3 and 7.4 
respectively. 
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State Ref . Component States State Ref Component States 
A 
l(ABC) 0 
2(ABC) 
I 0 
2(ABC) 
2 0 
3(ABC) 
I 0 
3(ABC) 
2 0 
4(ABC) 
I 0 
4(ABC) 
2 0 
4(ABC) 
l 0 
4(ABC) 
4 0 
4(ABC) 
5 0 
4(ABC) 
6 0 
4(ABC) 
7 0 
4(ABC) 
8 0 
S(ABC) 
I 11U 
S(ABC) 
2 11R 
6(ABC) 
I 12U 
6(ABC) 
2 11U 
6(ABC) 
3 12U 
6(ABC) 
4 11U 
6(ABC) 
5 12R 
6(ABC) 
6 11R 
6(ABC) 
7 12R 
6(ABC) 
8 11R 
7(ABC) 
I 12U 
7(ABC) 
2 11U 
7(ABC) 
3 12U 
7(ABC) 
4 11U 
7(ABC) 
5 12R 
7~ABC) 11R 
7~ABC) 12R 
7(ABC) 
8 11R 
S(ABC) 
I 13U 
S(ABC) 
2 12U 
S(ABC) 
3 13U 
S(ABC) 
4 12U 
S(ABC) 
5 11U 
S(ABC) 
6 11U 
S(ABC) 
7 13U 
S(ABC) 
8 12U 
S(ABC) 
• 13U 
where 
Table 7.2 
B 
0 
0 
0 
11U 
11R 
12U 
11U 
12U 
11U 
12R 
11R 
12R 
11R 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
1 1U 
12U 
11R 
12R 
11U 
12U 
11R 
12R 
12U 
13U 
11U 
11U 
13U 
12U 
12U 
13U 
11U 
C A B 
0 S(ABC) 10 12U 11U 
11U S(ABC) 11 11U 13U 
11R S(ABC) 12 11U 12U 
0 S(ABC) Il 13U 12R 
0 S(ABC) 14 12U 13R 
11U S(ABC) IS 13U 11R 
12U S(ABC) 16 12U 11R 
11R S(ABC) 17 11U 13R 
12R S(ABC) 18 11U 12R 
11U S(ABC) I. 13U 12R 
12U S(ABC) 20 12U 13R 
11R S(ABC) 21 13U 11R 
12R s(ABC) 22 12U 11R 
0 S(ABC) 23 11U 13R 
0 S(ABC) 24 11U 12R 
11U S(ABC) 25 13R 12U 
12U S(ABC) 26 12R 13U 
11R S(ABC) 27 13R 11U 
12R S(ABC) 28 12R 11U 
11U S(ABC) 2' 11R 13U 
12U S(ABC) 30 11R 12U 
11R S(ABC) 31 13R 12U 
12R S(ABC) 12 12R 13U 
0 S(ABC) II 13R 11U 
0 s(ABC) 34 12R 11U 
0 S(ABC) 35 11R 13U 
0 S(ABC) 36 11R 12U 
0 S(ABC) 37 13R 12R 
0 S(ABC) 38 12R 13R 
0 S(ABC) 3. 13R 11R 
0 S{ABC) 40 12R 11R 
11U S(ABC) 41 11R 13R 
11U s(ABC) 42 11R 12R 
12U S(ABC) 4l 13R 12R 
13U s(ABC) 44 12R 13R 
12U S(ABC) 45 13R 11R 
13U S(ABC) 46 12R 11R 
11R S(ABC) 47 11R 13R 
11R s(ABC) 48 11R 12R 
12R 
Component in the working state 
Component is the nth to fail. Failure unrevealed. 
Component is the nth to fail. Failure revealed. 
C 
13R 
12R 
13R 
11U 
11U 
12U 
13U 
12U 
13U 
11R 
11R 
12R 
13R 
12R 
13R 
11U 
1 1U 
12U 
13U 
12U 
13U 
11R 
11R 
12R 
13R 
12R 
13R 
11U 
11U 
12U 
13U 
12U 
13U 
11R 
11R 
12R 
13R 
12R 
13R 
Full State Representation of 3-Component System with Sequential 
Failures and Scheduled Inspection 
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Figure 7.2 Full Markov Model for Phase 1 
Figure 7.3 Full Markov Model for Phase 2 
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Figure 7.4 Full Markov Model for Phase 3 
Out of the 79 possible system states, only 38 are used during the three phases of the 
mission. It must also be noted that from these 38 mission system states, several are not 
possible within some phases. To analyse the full Markov model using the matrix 
method would produce a very sparse transition matrix and would require the solution 
ofthe full set of 79 differential equations. The full Markov method was investigated in 
Section 5.2.1 and demonstrated the susceptibility to state space explosion with only 
revealed failures. In this case components can fail both revealed and unrevealed and 
ordering is important thus the state space explosion becomes increasingly problematic. 
As found in Section 5.2.1 it uses unnecessary computer memory resources and extra 
computational time to develop a full Markov model for every phase in an entire 
mission. The solution process can be made significantly more efficient if unused states 
can be eliminated from the model. 
7.2.1.1 State Identification 
If the mission is taken in its entirety, it is very difficult to identify all states that can be 
eliminated from the full model listing (Table 7.2) due to the change in sequential 
failure relationships throughout the mission. Considering each component 
contribution over the phases of the mission (Table 7.1), there are two impossibilities 
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that allow some states to be removed from the full Markov model. These are 
summarised in Table 7.3. 
Impossibility 
1. Every cut set of a phase must involve an initiating event. 
is impossible for all components to be in the unrevealed 
failure state at any point in time. 
2. A component that is required in all phases and only 
ever fails as an initiating event can never fail unrevealed. 
(component B) 
8(ABC} _ 8(ABC} 
I 6 
3 (ABC) 4 (ABC) _ 4 (ABC) 7(ABC} _ 7(ABC} 
I 'I 4' I 2' 
7(ABC} _7(ABC} S(ABC) _ 8(ABC} S(ABC} _ S(ABC} 
5 6' I 12' 25 36 
Table 7.3 Summary of Impossible System States due to Component 
Contributions 
Application of these two rules to the full state listing (Table 7.2) eliminates 33 states 
from the model. However since these rules apply for the whole mission, the generality 
of them fails to identify all of the states that are never required and also the states that 
are not possible within each individual phase. Identification of all states that the 
system cannot reside in both for the entire mission and also within each phase can 
only be accomplished by examination of the individual sequential failure relationships 
and cut sets of the mission. For the example mission shown in Figure 7.1, the cut sets 
are given by, 
Phase 1 
Phase 2 
Phase 3 
A IIEe liE 
B liE C liE 
where E = Enabling Event 
I = NPS Initiating Event 
liE = Initiating Event Capable of 
Enabling 
There are certain points to be noticed from the full list of cut sets of this mission that 
allow further state reduction of the full Markov model, summarised in Table 7.4. 
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Impossibility States Removed 
1. The system cannot reside in a state where component A has failed 
unrevealed and component B fails after this revealed. This is justified since in 
7(ABC) g(ABC) g(ABC) _ g(ABC) 
4 , 14 , 17 18' 
Phases 1 and 3 the failure of component B automatically reveals the failure of g(ABC) g(ABC) _ g(ABC) 
20 '23 24 
component A, and in Phase 2 component A cannot fail unrevealed. 
2. The system cannot reside in a state where components A and B fail revealed 
in the order of A then B, and component C fails last unrevealed. This state is 
not possible since in phases 1 and 3 system failure will occur after the first two 8(ABC) 42 
failures and no further state transitions may take place, and in phase 2 
component C cannot fail unrevealed. 
Table 7.4 Summary of Impossible System States due to Mission Cut Sets 
This state reduction method becomes very complex with increasing numbers of 
components, making it more difficult to identify all states from the full expansion 
(Table 7.2) that are not possible at any point during the mission. Since these points 
identify state impossibilities that are consistent through the entire mission, the 
generality of them fails to recognise all of the impossible system states in each 
individual phase. 
A general set of rules for any phased mission system is produced to enable the 
removal of impossible system states from the full Markov model within each phase. 
Given a full list of system minimal cut sets it is possible to identify the unattainable 
system states for each phase of the example given in Figure 7.1, shown in Table 7.5. 
Impossibility Impossible States 
Phase 1 Phase 2 Phase 3 
1. An initiating 
3~ABC) ,4~ABC) _ 4~ABC) ,7~ABC) _ 2~ABC) ,3~ABC) ,4~ABC) _ 4~ABC), 2~ABC) ,3~ABC) ,4~ABC) _ 4~ABC), 
event cannot fail 
7~ABC), 7~ABC) _ 7~ABC) ,8~ABC) _ 5~ABC) ,6~ABC) _ 6~ABC), 7~ABC) _ 6~ABC) _ 6~ABC) ,6~ABC) _ 6~ABC) , 
unrevealed 8~~C) ,8~1BC) - 8~:SC) 7~ABC) ,8~ABC) _ 8~~C) 
7~ABC) _ 7~ABC) , 7~ABC) _7~ABC) , 
8~ABC) _ 8~:SC) ,8~~C) _ 8~~C) 
2. The occurrence 
of a sequentially 
ordered cut set 7~ABC) ,8~:SC) ,sl~C) - Sl:BC) , 7~ABC) ,sl:aC) ,g~~C) , 
-
reveals failures of 8~~BC) ,8~fC) _ 8~~C) g~~C) _ g~~BC) 
all components in 
the cut set. 
3. Once a cut set 4~ABC) ,6~ABC) ,6~ABC) , 
occurs, no further g(ABC) g(ABC) S(ABC) _ g(ABC) g(ABC) gl:SC) ,S~;SC) ,g~~C) -
component failures 42 , 48 43 4S' 47 g~~C) ,s~fC) _ g~~BC) 
may take place. 
Table 7.5 State Removal within Each Individual Phase 
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If all the possible system states through the duration of the mission are identified, the 
full Markov model can be implemented. However since this requires the use of 
identical system states throughout the phases, the full Markov model for each phase 
must include all ofthe 38 possible system states listed in Table 7.6. 
State Ref Component States Phase 1 Phase 2 Phase 3 
A B C 
l(ADC) 0 0 0 W W W 
2(ADC) 
I 0 0 11U W R R 
2(ADC) 
2 0 0 11R W W F 
3(ADC) 
2 0 11R 0 W W W 
4(ADC) 
5 0 12R 11U W R R 
4(ADC) 
" 
0 11R 1 2U W R R 
4(ADC) 
7 0 12R 11R W F R 
4(ADC) 
8 0 11R 12R W F F 
s(ADC) 
I 1 1U 0 0 W R W 
s(ADC) 
2 11R 0 0 W W W 
6(AliC) 
I 1 2U 0 11U W R R 
6(ABC) 
2 11U 0 1 2U W R R 
6(ABC) 
3 12U 0 11R W R R 
6(ABC) 
4 11U 0 12R W R F 
6(ADC) 
5 12R 0 11U W R R 
6(ADC) 
" 
11R 0 1 2U W R R 
6(ABC) 
7 12R 0 11R W W R 
6(ABC) 
8 11R 0 12R W W F 
7(ABC) 
3 1 2U 11R 0 W R W 
7(ADC) 
7 12R 11R 0 W F W 
7(ADC) 
8 11R 12R 0 F F F 
g::BC) 13U 12R 11U W R R 
g(ADC) 
15 13U 11R 1 2U W R R 
g(ADC) 
I" 1 2U 11R 13U W R R 
g(ASC) 
19 13U 12R 11R W R R 
g(ABC) 
21 13U 11R 12R W R R 
g(ADC) 
22 1 2U 11R 13R W R F 
g(ADC) 
37 13R 12R 11U W R R 
g(ASC) 
38 12R 13R 11U F R R 
g(AIiC) 
39 13R 11R 1 2U W R R 
g(ASC) 
40 12R 11R 13U W R R 
g(ADC) 
41 11R 13R 1 2U F R R 
g(ABC) 
43 13R 12R 11R W R R 
g(ADC) 
44 12R 13R 11R F R R 
g(ABC) 
45 13R 11R 12R W R R 
g(ADC) 
4" 12R 11R 13R W F F 
g(ASC) 
47 11R 13R 12R F R R 
g(ADC) 
48 11R 12R 13R R F R 
W - Working State in Phase F - Failed State in Phase R - Unreachable State in Phase 
Table 7.6 Possible System States for Full Markov Model of 3-Component 
System Example with Sequential Failures and Scheduled Inspection 
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The full Markov model system states may be classed as either required or 
unreachable during each phase of the mission. A required system state is achievable 
during a phase, where as an unreachable system state is not possible during a phase 
but may be attainable during other phases of the mission. An unreachable state will 
have no transitions either into or out of it, in which case a series of zero entries will 
appear in the corresponding row and column ofthe full 38 x 38 state transition matrix. 
Since the probability of the system residing in an unreachable state is zero, only the 
equations to represent the possible system states must be solved in each phase. In the 
same way as for the full Markov model in Section 5.2.1, the sparse nature of this 
matrix must be accounted for and memory storage allocated as described in Section 
5.1.1. 
7.2.1.2 State Combination 
It may be possible to combine states with the same failure mode to reduce the Markov 
model further. If a component is identified that never contributes to a sequential 
failure cut set during the mission, it is possible to remove that component failure from 
the ordering scheme. Since the order of failure of the component compared to other 
components is irrelevant throughout the mission, state combination will be consistent 
through all phases. At this stage using a full Markov model it is not possible to 
remove components from the failure ordering scheme during individual phases. Since 
the initiating events are not phase specific, the ordering of a component failure not 
contributory to a particular phase sequential cut set may become important in a later 
phase. 
This state combination technique can be applied to the example in Figure 7.1. 
Component C is not an input to a dynamic gate in any phase of the mission and so it is 
not necessary to consider the order of failure of component C in relation to the other 
components. Component C is not required during phase 1 but it is possible that it can 
fail during this phase. The failure of component C can be classed as either lu or l R, 
with no representation of order. All other component failures may then be re-ordered 
with respect only to each other. The possible mission system states after this re-
ordering process are given in Table 7.7. 
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State Ref 
l(ABC) 
2(ABC) 
I 
2(ABC) 
2 
3(ABC) 
2 
4(ABC) 
S 
4(ABC) 
6 
4(ABC) 
7 
4(ABC) 
8 
S(ABC) 
I 
S(ABC) 
2 
6(ABC) 
I 
6(ABC) 
2 
6(ABC) 
3 
6(ABC) 
4 
6(ABC) 
S 
6(ABC) 
6 
6(ABC) 
7 
6(ABC) 
8 
7(ABC) 
3 
7~ABC) 
7(ABC) 
8 
g(ABC) 
13 
g(ABC) 
IS 
g(ABC) 
16 
g(ABC) 
19 
g(ABC) 
21 
g(ABC) 
22 
g(ABC) 
37 
g(ABC) 
38 
g(ABC) 
39 
g(ABC) 
40 
g(ABC) 
41 
g(ABC) 
43 
g(ABC) 
44 
g(ABC) 
4S 
g(ABC) 
46 
g(ABC) 
47 
g(ABC) 
48 
Table 7.7 
Component States Phase 1 Phase 2 
A B 
0 0 
0 0 
0 0 
0 11R 
0 11R 
0 11R 
0 11R 
0 11R 
11U 0 
11R 0 
11U 0 
11U 0 
11U 0 
11U 0 
11R 0 
11R 0 
11R 0 
11R 0 
12U 11R 
12R 11R 
11R 12R 
12U 11R 
12U 11R 
12U 11R 
12U 11R 
12U 11R 
12U 11R 
12R 11R 
11R 12R 
12R 11R 
12R 11R 
11R 12R 
12R 11R 
11R 12R 
12R 11R 
12R 11R 
11R 12R 
11R 12R 
Where 
C 
0 W W 
1u W R 
1R W W 
0 W W 
1u W R 
1u W R 
1R W F 
1R W F 
0 W R 
0 W W 
1u W R 
1u W R 
1R W R 
1R W R 
1u W R 
1u W R 
1R W W 
1R W W 
0 W R 
0 W F 
0 F F 
1u W R 
1u W R 
1u W R 
1R W R 
1R W R 
1R W R 
1u W R 
1u F R 
1u W R 
1u W R 
1u F R 
1R W R 
1R F R 
1R W R 
1R W F 
1R F R 
1R R F 
W - Working State in Phase 
F - Failed State in Phase 
R - Unreachable State in Phase 
Phase 3 
W 
R 
F 
W 
R 
R 
R 
F 
W 
W 
R 
R 
R 
F 
R 
R 
R 
F 
W 
W 
F 
R 
R 
R 
R 
R 
F 
R 
R 
R 
R 
R 
R 
R 
R 
F 
R 
R 
Possible System States for Full Markov Model of 3-Component 
System Example with No Ordering of Component C 
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The removal of component C from the order of failure has produced multiple states 
representing the same failure mode in the model. It is possible to combine all states 
with the same combination of component failures into a single state. For example 
states 4~ABC) and 4~ABC) now represent the situation that component B fails revealed, 
and component C has failed unrevealed either before or after the failure of component 
B. The replication of the state means that states 4~ABC) and 4~ABC) can be combined to 
form a single state, and is defined by 4~::C). In general, the combination of replicated 
states is defined by equation (7.1). 
(7.1) 
All replicated states in Table 7.7 may be combined using this method. However, in 
some phases an unreachable state will be combined with a required phase state. For 
example, states 4~ABC) and 4~ABC) now represent the same component combination 
where component B fails revealed, and component C has failed revealed either before 
or after the failure of component B. In phase 3, state 4~ABC) was previously an 
unreachable state since component B cannot fail after component C, and state 4~ABC) 
was an achievable phase state. In such a case the new combined state takes the place 
of the achievable phase state and results in the same success or failure outcome. The 
final combined states are consistent through all phases of the mission and are given in 
Table 7.8. 
The single states in each of the three phases given by Figures 7.2, 7.3, and 7.4 may be 
replaced where possible by the new combined states. The full Markov models for 
phases 1,2, and 3 become as shown in Figures 7.5, 7.6, and 7.7 respectively. 
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State Ref Component States Phase 1 Phase 2 Phase 3 
A B C 
l(ABC) 0 0 0 W W W 
2(ABC) 
1 0 0 1u W R R 
2(ABC) 
2 0 0 1R W W F 
3(ABC) 
2 0 11R 0 W W W 
4(ABC) 
',. 
0 11R 1u W R R 
4(ABC) 
7,8 0 11R 1R W F F 
s(ABC) 
1 11U 0 0 W R W 
s(ABC) 
2 11R 0 0 W W W 
6(ABC) 
1,2 11U 0 1u W R R 
6(ABC) 
3,' 11U 0 1R W R R 
6(ABC) 
',. 11R 0 1u W R R 
6(ABC) 
7,8 11R 0 1R W W F 
7(ABC) 
3 12U 11R 0 W R W 
7(ABC) 
7 12R 11R 0 W F W 
7(ABC) 
8 11R 12R 0 F F F 
g(ABC) 
13,15,16 12U 11R 1u W R R 
g(ABC) 
19,21,22 12U 11R 1R W R F 
g(ABC) 
37,39,40 12R 11R 1u W R R 
g(ABC) 
38,41 11R 12R 1u F R R 
g(ABC) 
43,45,46 12R 11R 1R W F F 
g(ABC) 
44,47,48 11R hR 1R F F R 
Table 7.8 Possible System States for Full Markov Model of 3-Component 
System Example with Sequential Failures and Scheduled Inspection 
Figure 7.5 Full Markov Model with Combined States for Phase 1 
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Figure 7.6 Full Markov Model with Combined States for Phase 2 
Figure 7.7 Full Markov Model with Combined States for Phase 3 
It can be seen that combining states in the full Markov diagram produces a more 
compact model for analysis. For example in Phase 1 (Figure 7.2) there were 
previously three paths leading to a catastrophic system state. The path to state 78 
cannot be combined with any others since there are no other states representing the 
same component failure combination. The two paths originally resulting in a 
catastrophic state with all three components A, B, and C in the failed state are shown 
in Figure 7.8. 
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Path 1 
Path 2 
Figure 7.8 Original Paths Leading to Catastrophic Failure in Phase 1 
The identification of states representing the same system failure mode allows the two 
paths in Figure 7.8 to be combined into a single path as shown in Figure 7.9. 
Figure 7.9 Combined Paths Leading to Catastrophic Failure in Phase 1 
The combination of states representing this particular catastrophic failure mode has 
halved the number of possible system states from 12 to 6. 
The comparison between the number of states forming the original full Markov model 
for each phase and the reduced number of states using this combination technique is 
summarised in Table 7.9. 
Phase 
1 
2 
3 
Table 7.9 
Number of States in Number of States in Combined 
Original Full Markov Model State Full Markov Model 
37 21 
12 10 
13 13 
Comparison of the Number of States of the Original Full Markov 
Model and the Combined State Markov Model 
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This state combination technique is seen to reduce the number of states required for 
the full Markov model, especially in the first phase. The reduced number of system 
states results in a much smaller model for analysis, thus reducing the computational 
time and memory requirements. 
Once the achievable system states have been identified and the state combination 
technique has been applied, the final phase Markov models are defined by Figures 7.5, 
7.6, and 7.7 with all possible system states of the full Markov model listed in Table 
7.8. 
7.2.1.3 Phase Transition Problem 
When considering the full Markov model for a system with no sequential failure 
relationships or scheduled inspection as presented in Section 5.2.1, the states are 
common from one phase to another. The probability of a system residing in a 
particular state can be directly passed to the same state in the immediately proceeding 
phase at any transition point. Since only static fault tree gates are considered, a failure 
outcome is achieved if the events of a cut set occur in any order. The system will 
reside in a model state representative of the components that have failed, regardless of 
how this state was achieved. When considering the possibility of sequential failures, 
further analysis must be carried out across a phase boundary. 
At transition points between phases the situation may arise where a working system 
state in the previous phase is not an achievable system state in the immediately 
succeeding phase. The reasons for this are discussed as follows: 
• A component failure cannot occur unrevealed in the next phase 
An initiating event will always occur revealed in a phase. In the case that an 
unrevealed enabling event at the end of one phase assumes the role of an initiating 
event at the start of the next phase, the component failure will automatically be 
revealed at the time of transition. A similar situation occurs if a component that does 
not contribute to the system failure for a particular phase experiences failure, if it acts 
as an initiating event in the immediately succeeding phase the failure of the 
component is revealed at the phase transition. States that represent the unrevealed 
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failure of the event become unreachable in the following phase when it begins to act 
as an initiator. 
Application of this rule to the example in Figure 7.1 identifies that enabling event A in 
phase 1 becomes an initiating event in phase 2. All states representative of an 
unrevealed component A failure at the end of phase 1 become equivalent to the same 
state with component A in the revealed failure state on transition to phase 2. Similarly 
component C does not contribute to the failure conditions in phase 1 and so failure 
will occur unrevealed. The failure of component C in phase 2 acts as an initiating 
event and so at the time of transition to phase 2 this failure will also become revealed. 
The probability of the system residing in a state with the component in the unrevealed 
failure state at the end of the phase is redistributed to the probability of the system 
residing in the same state with the component in the revealed failure state, and the 
unrevealed failure state probability is set to zero. The final re-assigned phase 1 system 
state probabilities for entry to phase 2 become as shown in equations (7.2). 
p(ABC)(1 ) = p(ABC)(I ) + p(ABC)(I ) 
~ 1 ; 1 ~ 1 P(ABC)(I ) ~ 0 2, 1 
p(ABC)(1 ) = p(ABC) (I ) + p(ABC)(I ) 
4',11 1 4,,6 1 47 ,1 1 P(ABC)(/) ~ 0 4,,6 1 
p(ABC)(/) = p(ABC)(1 ) + p(ABC)(I ) 
5, 1 5, 1 5, 1 P(ABC)(I ) ~ 0 5, I 
p(ABC) (I ) = p(ABC) (I ) + p(ABC) (t ) + p(ABC) (t ) + p(ABC) (I ) 
~ 1 ~ 1 ~ 1 ~ 1 ~ 1 P,(ABC)(/) P,(ABC)(I ) p(ABC)(1 ) ~ 0 61,2 I' 63,4 I' 6,,6 1 
p(ABC)(1 ) = p(ABC)(I ) + p(ABC)(I ) 
7, 1 7, 1 7, 1 P(ABC)(I ) ~ 0 7, I 
p(ABC) (I ) - p(ABC) (I ) + p,(ABC) (t ) + p,(ABC) (I ) + p(ABC) (I ) 
843,,,,,46 1 - 811,15,16 I 819,21,22 t 837 ,39,40 1 843 ... '.46 1 
p,( ABC) (I ) p( ABC) (I ) p.( ABC) (I ) ~ 0 
8 13,15.16 l' 8 19,21.22 I' 8 37 ,39,40 1 
p'(ABC) (I ) = p(ABC) (I ) + p'(ABC) (I ) 
8 .... ,.7,'1 1 Sn,... 1 8«,47,41 1 
P.,(ABC)(I ) ~ 0 
831 ,41 1 
(7.2) 
• A particular combination of component failures cannot occur 
A phase system state representing a particular combination of component failures can 
be unreachable if the phase fails prior to the state being reached. Consider the simple 
2-phase example in Figure 7.10. 
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B 
A B 
(a) Phase 1 Markov Model (b) Phase 2 Markov Model 
Figure 7.10 Two Phase Example 
State 4~AB) represents the revealed failure of component B followed by the revealed 
failure of component A. This is a working state in phase I since the sequential cut set 
{A (E) B(I)} has not occurred. State 4~AB) becomes unreachable in the second phase 
since phase 2 failure occurs after the failure of component B (state 2~AB» and no 
further component failures can take place. If such a situation occurs across a phase 
boundary, the working system state probability will directly contribute to the phase 
transition failure probability into the following phase. In the example in Figure 7.10, 
transition failure will occur if the system resides in a working phase 1 state that is 
failed in phase 2 (2~AB», or a working phase 1 state that becomes unreachable in phase 
2 because the state cannot be reached (4~AB) and 4~AB», 
Tr(t ) = p(AB) (t ) + p(AB) (t ) + p(AB) (t ) . 
1 22 1 4) 1 47 1 
If the reverse situation occurs whereby an impossible system state becomes possible 
in a later phase, it will be assigned an initial state probability of zero. 
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7.2.1.4 Final Full Markov Model Solution Process 
The reliability of each phase and the overall mission illustrated in Figure 7.1 would be 
solved using a full Markov model in the following way: 
Phase 1 
The full 21 Markov model states are listed in Table 7.8. The system can reside in any 
of these 21 system states in phase 1, as shown in Figure 7.5. The mission is assumed 
to commence with all components in the working state 1 and so the initial 21 state 
probability matrix is given by equation (7.3). 
P(O) = [100······0] (7.3) 
The set of differential equations to give transient state probabilities are solved over the 
duration of phase 1. The reliability of phase 1 is found by the sum of the final 
probabilities of the system residing in a successful state (Table 7.8), given by equation 
(7.4). 
R(t ) = 1- (p(ABC) (t ) + p,(ABC) (t ) + p.,(ABC) (t ») 
I 78 I 838,41 I 8«,47,48 1 (7.4) 
Phase 2 
All states that cause failure or are not possible in phase 1 are assigned a probability of 
o at the phase termination. The final set of sequential state probabilities at the end of 
phase 1 must then be combined to form a reduced set of state probabilities 
representative ofthe possible phase 2 states. 
As described in Section 7.2.1.3, the enabling event of component A failure in phase 1 
becomes a NPS initiating event in phase 2. Also, the event of component C failure 
which does not contribute to system failure in phase 1 becomes an initiating event in 
phase 2. At the transition point between phases 1 and 2, the failure of components A 
and C will automatically become revealed. The first step is to re-assign all 
probabilities for states representative of components A or C in the unrevealed state to 
contribute to the identical system state with components A or C respectively in the 
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revealed state. The final re-assigned phase 1 system state probabilities are given in 
equations (7.2). 
Transition failure will occur if the system resides in a successful phase 1 state that 
represents the. existence of a phase 2 minimal cut set. In this case, both the phase 2 
minimal cut sets are non-sequential, {A,C} and {B,C}. Transition failure will occur if 
the system resides in any states with components A and C, or B and C failed, 
irrelevant of failure order at the end of phase 1. Transition failure must account for all 
successful phase 1 states representative of phase 2 failure including those states that 
become unreachable and do not contribute to the system states in phase 2 (Section 
7.2.1.3). Phase 2 transition failure is found by equation (7.5). 
(7.5) 
Each possible phase 2 system state is assigned an initial probability equal to the 
corresponding state probability at the end of phase 1. All states that were not possible 
in phase 1, or that cause phase 2 transition failure, are assigned an initial probability of 
zero in phase 2. The initial sequential state probabilities for phase 2 are given in 
equations (7.6). 
p,(ABC) (t ) - p,(ABC) (t ) 
I I - I I 
p(ABC)(t ) = p(ABC)(t ) 
22 I 22 I 
p(ABC) (t ) = p,(ABC) (t ) 
32 I 32 I 
p(ABC) (t ) = 0 
47,. I 
p'(ABC) (t ) = 0 
67,. I 
p(ABC)(t ) = p(ABC)(t ) 
77 I 77 I 
P7~ABC) (tl ) = 0 
p,(ABC) (t ) = 0 
843 ,45,46 I 
p,(ABC) (t ) = 0 
844,47,48 I 
(7.6) 
The full Markov model with transitions between states (Figure 7.6) may then be 
solved over the duration of phase 2 taking into account the sparse nature of the matrix. 
The reliability of phase 2 is found by the sum of the probabilities that the system 
resides in a successful state at the end of the phase in equation (7.7). 
R(t ) = p,(ABC)(t ) + p(ABC)(t ) + p,(ABC)(t ) + p'(ABC)(t ) + p(ABC)(t ) + p(ABC)(t ) (7.7) 
2 I 2 22 2 32 2 52 2 77 2 7. 2 
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Phase 3 
The final state probabilities at the end of phase 2 are passed directly to phase 3, where 
all states that cause failure or are not possible in phase 2 are assigned a final 
probability of zero. Since all events in phase 2 are required and initiating, there will be 
no unrevealed component failures at the start of phase 3. 
The system must reside in a state that is successful for both phases 2 and 3 to 
complete the transition successfully. In the same way as for the transition to phase 2, 
transition failure will occur if the system resides in a state representing the existence 
of a phase 3 minimal cut set. There are two phase 3 minimal cut sets; non-sequential 
{Cl, and sequential {A(E),B(I)}. Transition failure will occur if the system resides in a 
successful final phase 2 state with component C in the failed state (2~ABC»), or in a 
state representative of the failure sequence of components A then B (7~ABC»). In this 
case there are no successful phase 2 states that become unreachable and thus 
contribute to the transition failure in phase 3. The phase 3 transition failure is given by 
equation (7.8). 
Tr(t ) = p(ABC) (t ) + p(ABC) (t ) 
2 22 2 78 2 (7.8) 
The final phase 2 state probabilities are passed directly to the identical state in phase 
3. All states that were unreachable in phase 2 but become possible in phase 3, and also 
states causing phase 3 transition failure are assigned an initial probability of zero. The 
initial phase 3 system state probabilities become as given in equations (7.9). 
p,(ABC) (t ) - p,(ABC) (t ) 
p,(ABC) (t ) = 0 I 2 - I 2 
P2~ABC)(t2) = 0 
67,8 2 
P7~ABC) (t2 ) = 0 
p(ABC) (t ) = p(ABC) (t ) 
32 2 32 2 p(ABC) (t ) = p(ABC) (t ) 
p(ABC) (t ) = 0 77 2 77 2 (7.9) 
47,8 2 P7~ABC) (t2 ) = 0 
p?BC) (t2 ) = 0 1 p,(ABC) (t ) = 0 
p,(ABC) (t ) = p,(ABC) (t ) 
819,21,22 2 
52 2 52 2 
p,(ABC) (t ) = 0 
p(ABC) (t ) = 0 843,45,46 2 
63,. 2 
The full Markov model with transitions shown in Figure 7.7 may then be solved over 
the duration of the phase. The reliability of phase 3 is found by the sum of the 
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probabilities that the system resides in a successful state at the end of the phase in 
equation (7.10). 
R(t3) = ~(ABC)(t3) + ~;ABC)(tJ + LPs~ABC)(t3) + LP"~BC)(t3) (7.10) 
}=I,2 }=3,7 
The total mission unreliability is the probability that the system failed during the 
mission, thus does not reside in a successful system state at the end of phase 3. This is 
given in equation (7.11). 
Q - 1- (p'(ABc) (t ) + p,(ABC) (t ) + "'" p(ABC) (t ) + "'" p(ABC) (t )J MISS - 1 3 32 3 L..J 5) 3 L..J 7) 3 
j=I,2 j=3,7 
(7.11) 
7.2.2 Reduced Markov Model 
The Markov models can become very large with only a moderate number of 
components and so this process needs to be made more efficient if at all possible. By 
considering only the Markov model for each phase it may be possible to further 
reduce the size and complexity ofthe problem. 
There are two methods by which the Markov model can be reduced further. One is 
through the elimination of irrelevant component states from the phase Markov model, 
and the other is the implementation of fault tree analysis for solution to non-repairable 
phases. At the end of each phase, the reduced models are expanded to represent the 
required states of all components contributing to later phases in the mission for entry 
to the next phase. 
7.2.2.1 Phase Transition Model 
A new model is defined between phases, the phase transition model. This is the 
minimal model required at a particular point in the mission. At the start of the mission, 
all components that do not contribute to any NPS sequential minimal cut sets in any 
phase are eliminated from the ordering scheme of the full Markov state model as 
discussed in Section 7.2.1.2. This defines the initial transition model. 
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At each following transition point, a new transition model can be defined. If a 
component is not required in any later phases, it may be removed from the transition 
model completely. All further components that do not contribute to any NPS 
sequential minimal cut sets in later phases can be eliminated from the ordering scheme 
ofthe most recent transition model. 
Minimisation of the Markov model within each individual phase may only be 
implemented where components do not contribute to any NPS sequential minimal cut 
sets in later phases. At the end of each phase the minimised model is expanded back to 
the transition model for input to the next phase. 
In the example in Figure 7.1, the initial transition model for components A, B, and C 
is defined by identifying that component C does not contribute to any NPS sequential 
cut sets during the mission (Section 7.2.1.2). Since all three components are required 
in the final phase, it is not possible to remove any components completely from the 
transition model. Components A and B both contribute to a NPS sequential cut set in 
phase 3, and so this transition model cannot be further reduced at any phase 
boundaries through the mission. The transition model is discussed further with 
inclusion of PS sequential minimal cut sets in Section 7.3.1. 
7.2.2.2 Removal oflrrelevant Components 
A smaller Markov model in a repairable phase could be formed by including only the 
components contributing to the phase failure. Analysis over a continuous phase 
duration is performed by application of a minimal Markov model (Ns, xNsj ) using 
only the components required in the particular phase i. The full set of states for the 
transition model is reduced to evaluate the N s. initial conditions for each phase, and 
, 
expanded out to the transition model at the end of a phase to enable calculation of 
successful entry to the immediately succeeding phase. 
This method may only be implemented for situations where an irrelevant component 
only contributes to non-sequential cut sets or PS sequential minimal cut sets in later 
phases. If the component failure is known to contribute to a NPS sequential minimal 
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cut set later in the mission, the order of failure of the component with respect to other 
components would be required and so cannot be removed from the model. 
As described in Section 5.2.3, it is possible to eliminate components that are not 
required in a phase from the full Markov model. In the example shown in Figure 7.1, 
state removal due to non-required components is only possible in phase 1. Component 
C is irrelevant during this phase, and only contributes to static gates in later phases. 
The phase 1 Markov model can be reduced to 7 system states dependent on only the 
status of components A and B (Table 7.10 and Figure 7.11). 
State A 8 
I(AB) 0 0 
2(AB) 
1 0 11U 
2(AB) 
2 0 11R 
3fAB) 11U 0 
3~AB) 11R 0 
4(AB) 
1 12U 11U 
4(AB) 
2 11U 12U 
4(AB) 
3 12U 11R 
4(AB) 
4 11U 12R 
4(AB) 
s 12R 11U 
4(AB) 
6 11R 12U 
4(AB) 
7 12R 11R 
4(AB) 
• 11R 12R 
Table 7.10 States of A and B Figure 7.11 Reduced Phase 1 Markov Model 
The failure of a component c that is not required in a particular phase is assumed to 
occur with rate Ae and is unrevealed since it is not continuously monitored. This failure 
will be revealed at the next inspection point or where it appears as an initiator in a 
later phase, and the component may then be restored to new condition at repair rate VC' 
The scheduled inspection of a component c takes place every n()e (n=I,2, .. ), where ()e 
remains consistent for each component through the mission and n;max ()e is the last 
inspection point for component c in phase i. The inspection period ()e is considered to 
be much larger than the mean repair time. 
There are two possibilities of scheduled maintenance in phase i. The first assumes that 
if the component was monitored continuously in the previous phase, or maintenance is 
known to begin at the start of a phase, then scheduled inspection points begin at (i-1. 
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The unavailability of an irrelevant component under scheduled maintenance that 
begins at ti-1 over the duration of phase i can be given as a function of time as shown 
in Figure 7.12. 
Unavailability 
qc(t) 
t; 
Time 
Figure 7.12 Unavailability of an Irrelevant Component Under Scheduled Inspection 
beginning at ti-1 
Alternatively if the scheduled maintenance of the component is continued from the 
previous phase, the scheduled inspection points depend on the most recent inspection 
time in the last phase. The last scheduled inspection of component c in phase i is 
defined as being at t= tn . The unavailability of an irrelevant component under 
/max 
scheduled maintenance in phase i that continues from phase i-I can be given as a 
function of time as shown in Figure 7.13. 
Unavailability 
qlt) 
t + 2() 
n(l-Il max C t + n. () f. n(l-I) max I max C I 
Time 
where· t 
n(i-llmax is the last inspection point in phase i-I 
tn + n. Bc is the last inspection point in phase i (/-llrnax ,max 
Figure 7.13 Unavailability of an Irrelevant Component Under Scheduled Inspection 
Continuing from Phase i-I 
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Considering the first phase of the mission, all components are known to begin in the 
working state and so the initial unavailability of an irrelevant component will be zero. 
As the mission progresses it is possible that the component will not begin a phase in 
the working state, and the initial component unavailability in a phase i will be greater 
than zero. 
Using the derivations in Section 5.3.1 of component failure probability with time for a 
component beginning a phase i with initial unavailability greater than zero (equation 
5.38), it is possible to obtain the unavailability ofthe component with time up until the 
first inspection point in a repairable phase. The unavailability of an irrelevant 
component c in phase i is given as a function oftime from the start of phase i, at t=ti_1, 
to the first inspection point by equation (7.12), and from the first inspection point to 
the end ofthe phase, at t=lj, by equation (7.13). 
1- a (t. )e-'<c(I-li-l) for t. :::; t:::; (t + e) 
C I-I I-I n(i-I)max C (7.12) 
for (tn. +(n-1)8c):::;t:::;(tn +n(}c) n=2,3, ... ,n. +1 (I-I}max (/-I)max I max 
(7.13) 
where t"(l-I)max = t i- 1 ifthe first scheduled inspection point is at t =ti- 1 
Since the component is not required in the phase, the reliability of the component over 
the phase duration is not important. The only requirement is the probability of the 
component residing in the working or failed state at the end of the phase for transition 
into the next phase. If the phase finishes before the first inspection point, the 
unavailability ofthe component at the end of the phase i is given by equation (7.14). 
q (t.) =1-a (t. )e-Ac(ti-ti-I) C I C 1-1 (7.14) 
If phase i finishes after the first inspection point, the final unavailability of the 
component is found by equation (7.15). 
(7.15) 
where t", = t i- 1 if the first scheduled inspection point in phase i is at t =ti- 1 
··,I-I)max 
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The initial component c availability in phase i, a
c 
(tH ) , is obtained depending on the 
configuration of the previous phase. If the previous phase i-I was non-repairable and 
component c did NOT contribute to a sequential failure relationship (Section 7.2.2.3), 
regardless of whether the component was required in the previous phase, the 
probability that c is available at the end of phase i-1 is obtained from equation (5.39) 
in equation (7.16). 
(7.16) 
where a
c 
(tl_2 ) is the initial availability of component c in phase i-1 
In the case that the previous phase i-1 was non-repairable and component c 
contributed to a sequential failure relationship, or if the previous phase i-1 was 
repairable and component c was required in the phase configuration, the probability 
that c is in the working state at the end of phase i-1 is obtained using the previous 
phase Markov model in equation (7.17). 
(7.17) 
where j are successful phase i-1 states with contribution of component c working 
If the previous phase was repairable but component c was not required in the phase 
configuration, the final component availability would be obtained using equation 
(7.14) or (7.15). 
In the same way as presented in Section 5.2.2, the probability of the reduced set of 
Markov states may be multiplied by the unavailability and availability of irrelevant 
components at the end of a phase to produce a full set of transition model state 
probabilities for input to the next phase. If an irrelevant component failure acts as an 
enabler or is not used in the following phase, the unavailability of the component 
relates to the initial unrevealed failure state. If an irrelevant component failure acts as 
an initiating event in the following phase, the unavailability relates to the initial 
revealed failure state. Since the component does not contribute to any NPS sequential 
minimal cut sets in later phases, the order of failure of the component in the transition 
model is not important. The only requirement is the probability that the component is 
in the working or failed state at the end of the phase. 
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The failure of a component that is not required during a non-repairable phase and does 
not contribute to any NPS sequential minimal cut sets in later phases is modelled as 
described in Section 5.3.1. 
Once any irrelevent components are removed from the state model and the required 
system states for a phase have been identified, the reduced Markov models for each of 
the individual phases may be solved. 
7.2.2.3 Combined Fault Tree and Markov Method 
If a phase is non-repairable, other methods may be investigated for solution. Fault tree 
methods allow the calculation of system unreliability for systems comprising of only 
non-repairable components. It is possible to combine solutions of event probability for 
static and dynamic gate types to calculate phase unreliability. 
It can be seen that phase 3 in example Figure 7.1 consists of only non-repairable 
components. However the fault tree representation of the system uses both static and 
dynamic gate types to show the logic of the top event occurrence of phase 3 failure. A 
static gate may be solved using simple fault tree analysis. Since a dynamic gate 
involves sequential failures, treating a priority-AND gate as a normal AND gate 
would give a pessimistic result. Solution of the top event occurrence probability 
including a dynamic gate requires a method that allows for dependencies in a system 
such as a Markov model. 
A combination of fault tree and Markov methods may be implemented for situations 
where components that are input to static gates of a non-repairable phase do not 
contribute to any NPS sequential minimal cut sets of later phases. If a component is 
known to contribute to a later NPS sequential minimal cut set, the ordering of the 
component with respect to the other components would be required later in the 
mission. The component could not be treated independently from the components 
input to dynamic gates and eliminated from the Markov model. In this example, 
component C does not contribute to any later NPS sequential minimal cut sets, and so 
it is possible to model the component failure probability using fault tree analysis. 
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Figure 7.14 shows the labelling of the output events for gates in phase 3 of Figure 7.1. 
A B 
Figure 7.14 Phase 2 Representation 
The top event occurrence, phase 3 failure, is the output of gate G 1 and can be 
represented by logic equation (7.18). 
G1 =C+G2 (7.18) 
Gate G2 is a dynamic gate which since it is independent of the rest of the fault tree 
can be considered as a separate subsystem for analysis. The dynamic nature of G2 
means that the probability of the system residing in a state that allows occurrence of 
G2 must be found using a Markov Model. The Markov model would be represented 
using the state listing in Table 7.10 and is given in Figure 7.15. 
A-F2R 
.... )... B-F'R 
4r"" 
Figure 7.15 Markov Model of Dynamic Gate G2 
The final state probabilities from phase 2 may be combined to give a set of initial 
reduced Markov system state probabilities for phase 3 by removing component C 
from the transition model. The solution of the set of differential equations for this 
model over the phase 3 duration results in a final set of system state probabilities at 
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t=t3' The probability that gate G2 fails and thus contributes to the top event 
occurrence is found by the probability that the enabling event, component A failure, 
occurs prior to the initiating event of component B failure. This is represented by the 
probability that the system resides in state 4~AB) in Figure 7.15 at the end of the phase. 
The probability of event G2 is found by equation (7.19). 
(7.19) 
Equation (7.18) demonstrates the relationship between the occurrence of the top event, 
Gl, and the dynamic gate occurrence, G2. Once the probability of occurrence of G2 
has been calculated it is possible to incorporate the results into the event of the static 
gate G 1 occurrence. 
Since component C failure is an initiating event, it is automatically revealed. The 
probability that component C fails during phase 3 and thus contributes to the top event 
occurrence is required. This is found by fault tree analysis as derived in Section 5.3.1 
(equation (5.40», and is given by equations (7.20). 
(7.20) 
where ac (t2 ) is found by the contribution of all transition model state probabilities 
with component C working at the end of the previous phase. 
The results can then be combined to allow calculation of the probability of the top 
event occurrence, Gl, in equation (7.21). 
(7.21) 
7.2.2.4 Final Reduced Markov Model Solution Process 
The final solution process for a phased mission system where all sequential cut sets 
are NPS can be summarised in algorithmic form in Figure 7.16. The proposed method 
for solution to a mission comprising of both non-repairable and repairable continuous 
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phases with only NPS sequential minimal cut sets and scheduled inspection will be 
demonstrated in more detail by application to the example given in Figure 7.1. 
Non-Repairable----< 
Assign initial phase; 
sequential Markov state 
probabilities taking into 
account phase transitions 
NO 
Non-repairable or 
repairable ph .. e? 
i=i+1 
Fonn new TRANSITION MODEL 
YES (N.-y-z) non-sequential components 
z sequential components 
YES 
Remove irrelevant 
component(s) from 
state list to give 
minimal phase 
Markov model 
(Section 7.2.2.2) 
Repairable 
Combine final minimal 
Mat'koy state probabilities 
with failure/success 
probability of any 
irrelevent components 
removed from model to 
give transition Markov 
model 
>-________ .-___ NO ________ L-__ ~~ 
YES 
Remove component(s) from 
state list to give minimal 
M arkov ph .. e model 
(Section 7.2.2.3) 
Solve minimal 
Markovmodel 
Combine final minimal Markov 
state probabilities with failurel 
success probability of 
components input to static gates 
Figure 7.16 Algorithm to Solve a Phased Mission System with only NPS Sequential 
Failure Relationships 
Phase 1 
The important things to notice are that, 
• Component C is not required in the phase, but will be used in later phases. 
• There is a sequential relationship between components A and B. 
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Since component C is not required during this phase and does not contribute to any 
later NPS sequential cut sets, it can be removed from the sequential ordering of the 
Markov model and the initial transition model is defined by the state listing in Table 
7.8. In this first phase, component C can be eliminated from the Markov model 
completely to reduce computational time and model complexity as discussed in 
Section 7.2.2.2. 
The initial sequential phase 1 states must represent the sequential failure relationship 
between components A and B, and are listed in Table 7.10. Referring to the rules as 
given in Sections 7.2.1.1 it is possible to identify all system states that are not required 
in phase 1. There is only one minimal cut set that contributes to the occurrence of the 
top event, AB. However in order to cause phase 1 failure, the components must fail in 
the order of A first and B second. Failure of component B only ever acts as an initiator 
and so can never occur unrevealed. This eliminates states 2 (AB) 4 (AB) 4 (AB) 4 (AB) 1 , 1 , 2 , 5 , 
and 4~AB) from the model. If component A fails before component B fails, the 
enabling event allows the initiating event to cause phase 1 failure. This automatically 
reveals the fact that component A has failed and thus state 4 ~AB) is also an impossible 
system state for this phase The remaining states I(AB) 2(AB) 3(AB) 3(AB) 4(AB) 
. ' '1 '2'3' 
4~AB) , and 4~AB) , are all possible system states in phase 1 as shown in Figure 7.11. 
It is assumed that all components begin the mission in the working state and so the 
probability that the system resides in state 1 (AB) is assigned the value of 1.0 whilst all 
other non-sequential states are assigned an initial probability of 0.0. 
In the same way as in Section 5.2.3, the set of differential equations for this reduced 
Markov model are solved over the duration of Phase 1. Although states 4~AB) and 
4~AB) represent both of the components in the failed state, the phase can still continue 
and restoration of the components is allowed. Since the only system state that causes 
phase termination is state 4~AB) , phase 1 reliability can be obtained by equation (7.22). 
(7.22) 
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Phase 2 
The second phase of this mission introduces component C which until now has not 
been required. Since the component was known to be working at the start of the 
mission, the unavailability of component C at the end of the repairable first phase is 
found depending on the appropriate situation: 
• Scheduled Inspection - phase 1 ends before first scheduled inspection point. 
Use: equation (7.14) where i=i 
• Scheduled Inspection - phase 1 ends after first scheduled inspection 
Use: equation (7.15) where i=i and tn . = 0 (.-I)max 
• Constant Monitoring - component C failure automatically revealed (equation 
5.46) 
The availability of component C at the end of phase 1 can be found by adt.), 
whereacCtJ = l-qc(tJ. 
The beginning of a new phase requires a set of initial transition model system state 
probabilities. To calculate the initial system state probabilities in phase 2, the 
probability that the system resides in any working transition model state (Table 7.8) at 
the end of phase 1 is required. 
Since component C was excluded from the phase 1 Markov model, the probability of 
component C being in the working or failed state at the end of the phase must now be 
incorporated. The probability that component C is in the failed and working state at 
the end of phase 1 is included using the calculation method for the unavailability of 
irrelevant components at the end of a phase (7.2.2.2). Component C is assumed to be 
maintained under scheduled inspection in phase 1. Since component C was not 
required in phase 1 and acts as an initiator in phase 2, the final phase 1 failure is 
classed as revealed. The final revealed failure probability of component C is obtained 
using equations (7.14) or (7.15). The transition model state probabilities at the end of 
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the first phase are obtained from the working states of the reduced Markov model in 
Figure 7.11, as shown in Table 7.11. 
Transition Com~onent States Reduced Markov Model 
Model (Figure 7.10) with Component 
State Ref A B C C Final State Probability 
l(ABC) 
0 0 0 p.(AB) (I.) . ac(t.) 
2(ABC) 
• 0 0 1u 0 
2(ABC) 
2 0 0 1R ;:(AB) (I.)· qc (t.) 
3(ABC) 
2 0 11R 0 P2;AB) (t.). ac (t.) 
4(ABC) 
5 •• 0 11R 1u 0 
4(ABC) 
7.8 0 11R 1R p2;AB) (t.). qc (t.) 
S(ABC) 
• 11U 0 0 p~AB)(t.). ac(t.) 
S(ABC) 
2 11R 0 0 P3~AB)(t.). ac(t.) 
6(ABC) 
•• 2 11U 0 1u 0 
6(ABC) 3.' 11U 0 1R P3~AB) (t.). qc (t.) 
6(ABC) 
5 •• 11R 0 1u 0 
6(ABC) 
7.8 11R 0 1R P3~AB) (t.) . q C (t.) 
7(ABC) 
3 12U 11R 0 P.~AB)(/.)' ad/.) 
7(ABC) 
7 12R 11R 0 p.~AB)(t.). ac(/.) 
7(ABC) 
8 11R 12R 0 0 
g(ABC) 
13,15.16 12U 11R 1u 0 
g(ABC) 
19,21,22 12U 11R 1R P4~AB) (t.). qc(t.) 
g(ABC) 
37.39,40 12R 11R 1u 0 
g(ABC) 
38,41 11R 12R 1u 0 
g(ABC) 
43.45,46 12R 11R 1R p.~AB)(t.). qc(t.) 
g(ABC) 
44,47,48 11R 12R 1R 0 
Table 7.11 Phase 1 Final Transition Model State Probabilities 
As described in Section 7.2.1.3, the enabling event of component A failure in phase 1 
becomes an initiating event in phase 2. At the transition point between phases 1 and 2, 
the failure of component A will automatically become revealed. The probabilities of 
all transition model states (Table 7.11) representative of component A in the 
unrevealed state must be re-assigned to contribute to the identical system state with 
component A in the revealed state. The final re-assigned phase 1 transition model 
state probabilities are given in equations (7.23). 
p(ABC)(t )=P(ABC)(t )+P(ABC)(t) 
52 1 SI 1 52 1 p(ABC) (t ) ~ 0 5, • 
p(ABC) (t ) = p(ABC) (t ) + p(ABC) (t ) 
6". 1 63.4 1 67,. I 
p(ABC) (t ) ~ 0 
6],4 I (7.23) 
p(ABC) (t ) = p(ABC) (t ) + P(ABC) (t ) 
77 I 7] I 7, I p(ABC)(t ) ~ 0 7, • 
P(ABC) (t ) = p(ABC) (t ) + p(ABC) (t ) 
843 ,45,46 I 819,21.:n 1 8U ,4'.46 I 
p(ABC) (t ) ~ 0 
819,21,22 1 
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Transition failure will occur if the system resides in any successful phase 1 state that 
represents the existence of a phase 2 minimal cut set. The phase 2 minimal cut sets are 
{A, C} and {B, Cl, thus phase 2 transition failure will occur if the system resides in a 
transition model state with either components A and C, or Band C in the failed state 
at the end of phase 1, and is given in equation (7.5). 
Since phase 2 is repairable and requires all three components, the Markov model 
shown in Figure 7.6 is solved over the duration of phase 2, [t], t2), with initial state 
probabilities given in Table 7.11 and redefined in equations (7.23). Any states that 
cause phase 1 or phase 2 failure are assigned an initial state probability value of zero. 
The reliability of phase 2 is found by the sum of the probabilities that the system 
resides in a successful state at the end of the phase (t=t2) in equation (7.7). 
Phase 3 
Since the phase 2 Markov model required the full transition model states, the state 
probabilities can be passed directly to phase 3, and all states that caused phase 2 
failure are assigned a probability of zero on entering phase 3. All components were 
required in phase 2 and so the final failure probabilities are classed as revealed. 
Transition failure will occur if the system resides in a working phase 2 state 
representing the existence of a phase 3 minimal cut set. There are two phase 3 
minimal cut sets; non-sequential {Cl, and sequential {A(E),B(I)}. Transition failure 
will occur if the system resides in a successful final phase 2 state with component C in 
the failed state (2~ABC», or in a state representative of the failure sequence of 
components A then B (7~ABC». In this case there are no successful phase 2 states that 
become unreachable and thus contribute to the transition failure in phase 3 (Section 
7.2.1.3). The phase 3 transition failure is given by equation (7.8). 
Since the third phase consists of only non-repairable components, the method 
described in Section 7.2.2.3 can be applied for solution. Component C is only input 
into a static gate and does not contribute to any later NPS sequential minimal cut sets, 
thus can be removed from the dynamic Markov model of the phase. To solve this 
reduced Markov model (Figure 7.15) we are only interested in the states of 
components A and B at the start of the third phase. The successful transition model 
states listed in Table 7.11 must be reduced to represent only the states of components 
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A and B and are given in Table 7.12. For example, state 7~ABC) in Table 7.11 
represents the event that component B fails revealed followed by component A 
revealed failure. Since component C is not required in the model, this state is 
equivalent to state 4~AB) in Table 7.12 with the same failure combination of 
components A and B. All states that cause phase 3 failure are assigned an initial state 
probability of zero. 
State Ref 
2(AB) 
2 
Table 7.12 
Component States Combination of Initial 
A B 
0 0 
0 11R 
11U 0 
11R 0 
12U 11R 
12R 11R 
11R 12R 
Transition State Probabilities 
(Table 7.11) 
-------I 
p"(ABC) (t
2
) 
P3~ABC)(t2) 
o 
P5~ABC) (t 2) 
o 
P7~ABC)(t2) 
o 
--------' 
Phase 3 Initial Non-Sequential State Probabilities 
The set of Markov differential equations can now be solved over the duration of phase 
3. The end system state probabilities can be combined with the unavailability of 
component C over the duration of the phase to calculate the reliability of phase 3. 
Using equations (7.19), (7.20) and (7.21), the reliability of phase 3 is expressed in 
equation (7.24) 
(7.24) 
where 
In many practical situations it is likely that a system will comprise of phase specific 
sequential cut sets. The inclusion of phase specific sequential cut sets is discussed in 
the following sections. 
7.3 Phase Specific Initiators 
This section considers the possibility of phase specific (PS) initiating events. In such a 
situation, failure during a phase will only be caused if the PS initiating event of a 
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sequential minimal cut set occurs during the phase in question. If a PS sequential 
minimal cut set exists at the start of a phase, it will not contribute to the phase failure. 
This allows further state reduction between phases to achieve a minimal transition 
Markov model. The possibility of the minimisation of the model allows us to reduce 
the size of the phase transition matrices and decrease computational time. 
Consider the example shown in Figure 7.1 where the initiating events of the sequential 
minimal cut sets are PS. The phase failure criteria are given in Figure 7.17. 
REPAIRABLE 
A B 
(liE) (liE) 
REPAIRABLE NON-REPAIRABLE 
Figure 7.17 Mission with Phase Specific Initiating Events 
7.3.1 Phase Transition Model 
The transition model was discussed for only NPS sequential minimal cut sets in 
Section 7.2.2.1. This is the minimal model required at a particular point in the 
mission, and can be redefined at each transition point. All components that are not 
required for the remaining phases can be removed from the transition model. Any 
further components that do not contribute to any NPS sequential minimal cut sets in 
later phases can be eliminated from the ordering scheme of the most recent transition 
model. Since PS sequential minimal cut sets can only cause phase failure if the 
initiating event occurs during a particular phase, the transition model can be expanded 
at the start of the phase to include the order of failure of the components contributing 
to the cut set. At the end of the phase the expanded model is reduced back to the 
transition model for input to the next phase. 
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At the start of the mission in Figure 7.17, it can be seen that none of the components 
contribute to a NPS sequential cut set during any phase. The transition model is 
defined by eliminating the failure ordering of all components in the Markov model, as 
discussed in Section 7.2.1.2, from the full state listing in Table 7.6. This is given in 
Table 7.13. 
It can be seen that the removal of the order of failure of all components has produced 
mUltiple states representing the same failure mode in the model. It is possible to 
combine all states with the same combination of component failures into a single 
state. The final combined states ofthe transition model are given in Table 7.14. 
Since none of the transition model states in Table 7.14 represent component failure 
ordering, this is the minimal transition model possible and is defined as non-sequential 
for all components. No further minimisation can be implemented due to components 
not contributing to NPS sequential minimal cut sets at later phase boundaries. Also, 
since all components are required in phases 2 and 3, no components can be completely 
removed from the transition model at any stage. 
PS sequential· minimal cut sets must be identified at the start of each phase. The 
transition Markov model states between each phase must be expanded to allow for 
sequential failures during the proceeding phase. 
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State Ref 
l(ABC) 
2(ABC) 
I 
2(ABC) 
2 
3(ABC) 
2 
4(ABC) 
S 
4(ABC) 
6 
4(ABC) 
7 
4(ABC) 
8 
s(ABC) 
I 
S(ABC) 
2 
6(ABC) 
I 
6(ABC) 
2 
6(ABC) 
3 
6(ABC) 
4 
6(ABC) 
S 
6(ABC) 
6 
6(ABC) 
7 
6(ABC) 
8 
7(ABC) 
3 
7(ABC) 
7 
7(ABC) 
8 
g(ABC) 
13 
g(ABC) 
IS 
g(ABC) 
16 
g(ABC) 
19 
g(ABC) 
21 
g(ABC) 
22 
g(ABC) 
37 
g(ABC) 
38 
g(ABC) 
39 
g(ABC) 
40 
g(ABC) 
41 
g(ABC) 
43 
g(ABC) 
44 
g(ABC) 
4S 
g(ABC) 
46 
g(ABC) 
47 
g(ABC) 
48 
Table 7.13 
Component States Phase 1 Phase 2 Phase 3 
A B C 
0 0 0 W W W 
0 0 1u W R R 
0 0 1R W W F 
0 1R 0 W W W 
0 1R 1u W R R 
0 1R 1u W R R 
0 1R 1R W F R 
0 1R 1R W F F 
1u 0 0 W R W 
1R 0 0 W W W 
1u 0 1u W R R 
1u 0 1u W R R 
1u 0 1R W R R 
1u 0 1R W R F 
1R 0 1u W R R 
1R 0 1u W R R 
1R 0 1R W W R 
1R 0 1R W W F 
1u 1R 0 W R W 
1R 1R 0 W F W 
1R 1R 0 F F F 
1u 1R 1u W R R 
1u 1R 1u W R R 
1u 1R 1u W R R 
1u 1R 1R W R R 
1u 1R 1R W R R 
1u 1R 1R W R F 
1R 1R 1u W R R 
1R 1R 1u F R R 
1R 1R 1u W R R 
1R 1R 1u W R R 
1R 1R 1u F R R 
1R 1R 1R W R R 
1R 1R 1R F R R 
1R 1R 1R W R R 
1R 1R 1R W F F 
1R 1R 1R F R R 
1R 1R 1R R F R 
Transition Model States for 3-Component System Example with 
PS Sequential Failures and Scheduled Inspection 
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Transition Component States 
Model A B C 
l(ABC) 0 0 0 
2(ABC) 
I 0 0 1u 
2(ABC) 
2 0 0 1R 
3(ABC) 
2 0 1R 0 
4(ABC) 
5,6 0 1R 1u 
4(ABC) 
7,' 0 1R 1R 
S(ABC) 
I 1u 0 0 
S(ABC) 
2 1R 0 0 
6(ABC) 
1,2 1u 0 1u 
6(ABC) 
3,' 1u 0 1R 
6(ABC) 
5,6 1R 0 1u 
6(ABC) 
7,' 1R 0 1R 
7(ABC) 
3 1u 1R 0 
7(ABC) 
7,8 1R 1R 0 
g(ABC) 
13.15,16 1u 1R 1u 
g(ABC) 
19,21,22 1u 1R 1R 
g(ABC) 
37,38,39,40,41 1R 1R 1u 
g(ABC) 
43,44,45,46,47,48 1R 1R 1R 
Table 7.14 Transition Model State Listing 
7.3.2 Phase Transitions for PS Sequential Cut Sets 
When considering PS sequential minimal cut sets, it is not always possible to assign 
the probability of the system residing in a particular state to the same state in the next 
phase. Where phases contain dynamic gates, the system level outcome depends on the 
order of component failure. In some cases an initiating event may be PS and only 
relevant to the phase in which it occurs. 
For example when considering the 3-phased mission in Figure 7.17, it is seen that 
there is a PS sequential failure relationship between components A and B CA must fail 
before B) in phase 3 which is reflected in the phase failure modes of the reduced 
Markov model in Figure 7.15. The enabling event of component A failure could have 
occurred in any phase prior to and including phase 3, however for this sequential cut 
set to occur, the PS initiating event of component B failure must occur during phase 3. 
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If the system reaches the state in phase 2 where component C is working and 
components A and B have failed in the order of A then B with both failures revealed, 
phase 2 failure will not occur. The state representative of this failure relationship is 
state 7~ABC) in Table 7.8. If the same failure sequence occurred in phase 3, however, 
this would cause system failure. 
Using the method for only NPS initiators as demonstrated in Section 7.2, if this state 
were achieved in phase 2 then failure would occur on transition to phase 3 (due to the 
NPS initiator) where it satisfies the phase failure requirements and state 7~ABC) 
represents the absorbing failure state 4~AB) of phase 3 (Figure 7.15). However, as 
failure of component B in phase 3 is a PS event this is not now the situation. Since the 
failure sequence occurred in phase 2, it is not representative of the same failure state 
in phase 3. Misrepresentation occurs if the two states are taken to be the same in the 
two phases. This state only results in failure in phase 3 if the initiating event, B, 
occurs in phase 3 not on phase transition if it has occurred previously. 
In such cases, a temporary state is introduced to the phase model that represents the 
same combination of component failure conditions but makes a distinction as to the 
failure mode of the state. This state cannot occur during the phase, but can exist at the 
start of the phase. Thus no state transitions into the state are possible during the phase, 
however state transitions may be made out of the state during the phase. In the event 
that state transitions are possible out of a temporary state, the correct destination state 
must be identified with the appropriate failure mode. For example, considering the 
phase 3 Markov model in Figure 7.15, the only state that causes phase failure due to 
just the occurrence of the PS sequential minimal cut set is state 4~AB). A temporary 
state is introduced, 4~~), to represent the same component failure combination but 
with a failure outcome that does not cause phase failure. No state transitions are 
possible into the state during phase 3, and in this case since the phase is non-
repairable and component C is not represented in the model, no transitions are 
possible out of the state. The probability of the system residing in this temporary state 
will remain constant until the end of the phase. This is demonstrated in Figure 7.18. 
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Figure 7.18 Reduced Phase 3 Markov Model 
The reliability of phase 3 remains as given in equation (7.24). If there were later 
phases in the mission, the probability that the system resides in the original state with 
components A and B failed in the order of A then B at the end of the phase becomes 
equal to the temporary state (4~1B») (equation (7.25)) for input to the next phase, and 
the temporary state is removed. 
p(AB) (t ) = p(AB) (t ) 
48 3 48, 3 
p(AB)(t ) ~ 0 
4 8, 3 
(7.25) 
7.3.3 Final Solution Process 
The methods presented in Sections 7.2.2.2 and 7.2.2.3 can again be applied to systems 
comprising of PS sequential minimal cut sets as long as the failure order of 
components removed from the model is not required for any later NPS sequential 
minimal cut sets. The general method to solve a phased mission system comprising of 
PS and NPS initiating events is summarised in Figure 7.19. 
213 
No .... Repairable'-----< 
YES 
Expand transition model 
to identify failure ordering 
of components 
contributory to phase 
specific sequential cut 
sets 
sSlgn 101 a p ase I 
sequential Markov state 
probabilities taking Into 
account phase transitions 
NO 
No .... repalrable or 
repairable phase? 
1=/+1 
Form new TRANSITION MODEL 
YES (N,Y-z) non-sequential components 
z sequential components 
NO 
Remove Irrelevant 
component(s) from 
state list to give 
minimal phase 
Markovmodel 
(Section 7.2.2.2) 
Reduce sequential 
Markov model Into 
transition model for input 
to next phase 
Combine final minimal 
Markov state probabilities 
with fallure!success 
probability of any 
Irrelevent components 
removed from model to 
give full phase Markov 
model 
Repairabl Solve Markov model 
~-------.-------------NO------~ 
YES 
Remove component(s) from 
state list to give minimal 
Markov phase model 
(Section 7.2.2.3) 
Solve minimal 
Markovmodel 
Combine final minimal Markov 
state probabilities with failure! 
success probability of 
components input to static gates 
Figure 7.19 Algorithm to Demonstrate Solution to a Phased Mission System with both 
PS and NPS Sequential Failure Relationships 
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This may be applied to the example in Figure 7.17 in the following way: 
Phase 1 
Since no components contribute to any later NPS sequential cut sets, the failure 
ordering of all components can be removed from the full Markov model to reduce 
computational time and model complexity as discussed in Section 7.3.1. The 
transition model is defined by the non-sequential state listing in Table 7.14. 
The initial sequential phase 1 states must represent the sequential failure relationship 
between components A and B, and are listed in Table 7.10. By application of the rules 
to identify all system states that are not required in phase 1 (Section 7.2.1.1), the 
possible states are I(AB), 2~AB), 3~AB), 3~AB), 4jAB), 4~AB), and 4~AB), and are shown in 
the phase 1 Markov model of Figure 7.11. 
We assume that all components begin the mission in the working state and so the 
probability that the system resides in state I(AB) is assigned the value of 1.0 whilst all 
other non-sequential states are assigned an initial probability of 0.0. Since the only 
system state that causes phase termination is state 4~AB), phase 1 reliability can be 
obtained by equation (7.22). 
Phase 2 
The beginning of a new phase requires a set of initial system state probabilities. To 
calculate the initial phase 2 system state probabilities, we require the probability that 
the system resides in any working state of the transition model at the end of phase 1. 
The most minimal transition model listed in Table 7.14 requires no representation of 
component failure orderings. The Markov model states at the end of the first phase 
(Figure 7.11) may be represented in non-sequential form using Table 7.15. The state 
probabilities are assigned in equations (7.26) where all states that caused phase 1 
failure are given a final probability of zero. 
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State Component 
Ref A B 
1 (AB) 0 0 
2(AB) 
2 0 1R 
3(AB) , 1u 0 
3(AB) 
2 1R 0 
4(AB) 
3 1R 1u 
4(AB) 
7 1R 1R 
4(AB) 
• 1R 1R 
Non-
Sequential 
1 (AB) 
2(AB) 
2 
3(AB) , 
3(AB) 
2 
4(AB) 
l 
4(AB) 
7,8 
Final Phase 1 
Non-Sequential State 
EfAB)(t1) 
l{,AB)(t1) 
11,AB)(t1) 
F{AB)(t1) 
~AB)(tl) 
p:AB)(t) 4". 1 
= 
= 
= 
= 
= 
= 
Final Phase 1 
Sequential State 
FfABJ(t,) 
RAlJ}(t) 
2, , 
I{,ABJ(t,) + I{,ABJ(t,) =I{,ABJ(tl ) 
(7.26) 
Table 7.15 Final Phase 1 Non-Sequential States 
The second phase of this mission introduces component C which until now has not 
been required. The unavailability of component C at the end of the first phase is 
obtained in the same way as presented in Section 7.2.2.2 using equation (7.14) or 
(7.15). Since component C failure acts as an initiating event in phase 2, the final 
failure is classed as revealed. The probability of component C being in the working or 
failed state at the end of phase 1 must be included in this model. The transition model 
state probabilities at the end of the first phase using the working states of the reduced 
Markov model in equation (7.26) are found using Table 7.16. 
As described in Section 7.2.1.3, the enabling event of component A failure in phase 1 
becomes an initiating event in phase 2. At the transition point between phases 1 and 2, 
the failure of component A will automatically become revealed. The probabilities of 
all transition model states representative of component A in the unrevealed state must 
be re-assigned to contribute to the identical system state with component A in the 
revealed state. The final re-assigned phase 1 transition model state probabilities are 
given in equations (7.27). 
p,(ABC)(t ) = p,(ABC)(t ) + p,(ABC)(t ) 
5, 1 5, 1 5, 1 p,(ABC) (t ) ~ 0 S, I 
p,( ABC) (t ) = p,( ABC) (t ) + p,( ABC) (t ) 
6". 1 6". 1 6". 1 (7.27) 
. p(ABC)(t ) = p(ABC)(t ) + p(ABC)(t ) 
7~ 1 ~ 1 ~A 1 
p(ABC)(t ) ~ 0 
7, I 
p,(ABC) (t ) - p,(ABC) (t ) + p,(ABC) (t ) 
84l.4!:.~,41.41 1 - 819,21.22 1 8.0.":5,46, .. ,,018 1 
p,(ABC) (t ) ~ 0 
819•21,21 1 
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Transition Reduced Markov Model 
Model 
Component States (Figure 7.10) with 
State Ref Final Component C A B C State Probability 
l(ABC) 0 0 0 p,(AB) (t,). ac (t,) 
2(ABC) , 0 0 1u 0 
2(ABC) 
2 0 0 1R ~(AB)(t,)·qc(t,) 
3(ABC) 
2 0 1R 0 P2~AB)(t,). ac(t,) 
4(ABC) 
5,6 0 1R 1u 0 
4(ABC) 
7,8 0 1R 1R P2~B)(t,), qdt,) 
s(ABC) , 1u 0 0 ~~AB)(t,). ac (t,) 
s(ABC) 
2 1R 0 0 ~~AB)(t,). adt,) 
6(ABC) 
',2 1u 0 1u 0 
6(ABC) 
3,4 1u 0 1R P3~AB)(t,), qc(t,) 
6(ABC) 
5,6 1R 0 1u 0 
6(ABC) 
7,8 1R 0 1R P3~AB)(t,), qc(t,) 
7(ABC) 
3 1u 1R 0 P4~AB) (t,) , ac (t,) 
7 (ABC) 
7,8 1R 1R 0 P4~~,B) (t,) , ac (t,) 
g(ABC) 
13.15,16 1u 1R 1u 0 
g(ABC) 
19,21,22 1u 1R 1R P4;AB) (t,) , q C (t,) 
g(ABC) 
37,38,39,40,41 1R 1R 1u 0 
g(ABC) 
43,44,45,46,47,48 1R 1R 1R p}AB) (t,)' q cCt,) 7,1 
Table 7.16 Final Phase 1 Transition Model State 
Transition failure will occur if the system resides in any successful phase 1 state that 
represents the existence of a phase 2 minimal cut set. The phase 2 minimal cut sets are 
{A, C} and {B, Cl, thus phase 2 transition failure will occur if the system resides in a 
transition model state with either components A and C, or B and C in the failed state 
at the end of phase 1, and is given in equation (7.28). 
Tr(t ) - RABC) (t ) + R-ABC) (t ) + RABC) (t ) 
I - 47,8 I 67,8 I 843,44,45,46,47,48 I 
(7.28) 
Phase 2 is repairable and requires all three components. Since there are no sequential 
failure relationships that contribute to phase 2 failure, the transition model states do 
not need to be expanded and the phase 2 Markov model can be represented by Figure 
7.20. 
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Figure 7.20 Non-Sequential Phase 2 Markov Model 
The Markov model shown in Figure 7.20 is solved over the duration of phase 2, [t], 
t2), with initial state probabilities given in Table 7.16 and equations (7.27). Any states 
that cause phase 1 or phase 2 failure are assigned an initial state probability value of 
zero. The reliability of phase 2 is found by the sum of the probabilities that the system 
resides in a successful state at the end ofthe phase in equation (7.29). 
R(t ) = p,(ABC) (t ) + p'(ABC) (t ) + p,(ABC) (t ) + p,(ABC) (t ) + p'(ABC) (t ) 
2 1 2 22 2 32 2 S2 2 7,,8 2 
(7.29) 
Phase 3 
Since the phase 2 Markov model required the full non-sequential states of the 
transition model, no reduction of sequential states is applied at the end of phase 2. The 
phase 2 failure states are assigned a final probability of zero, and all working 
transition model states can be passed directly to phase 3. 
Transition failure will occur if the system resides in a state representing the existence 
of a phase 3 minimal cut set. There are two phase 3 minimal cut sets; non-sequential 
{Cl, and sequential {A(E),B(Ip)}. However since cut set {A(E),B(IP)} is PS, it cannot 
exist at the start of phase 3. Only non-sequential and NPS sequential minimal cut sets 
can exist at the start of a phase. Phase 3 transition failure can only occur if the system 
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resides in a successful final phase 2 state with component C in the failed state (2~ABC) 
in Figure 7.20). The phase 3 transition failure becomes as given by equation (7.30). 
(7.30) 
Since the third phase consists of only non-repairable components, the method 
described in Section 7.2.2.3 can be applied for solution. We are only interested in the 
states of components A and B (Table 7.10) at the start of the third phase to solve the 
reduced Markov model. The phase 3 specific sequential minimal cut set {A(E),B(Ip)} 
cannot exist at the start of the phase, and so state 4~AB) is an impossible initial phase 3 
state. As discussed in Section 7.3.2, a temporary state (4~~» is introduced to 
represent the same failure conditions but signifying a failure mode that does not cause 
phase 3 failure, and is shown in Figure 7.18. 
The transition model states listed in Table 7.14 must be reduced to represent only the 
states of components A and B. In this case, since the transition model is representative 
of only non-sequential failures and the components are non-repairable, the probability 
that both components are in the failed state can be passed to either of the non-
catastrophic failure mode states, 4~AB) or 4~1B) . In the event that the transition model 
contained sequential states or repairable components, this may not be possible. The 
reduced phase 3 Markov model states are obtained in Table 7.17. All states that cause 
phase 3 failure are assigned an initial state probability of zero. 
Combination of Initial 
State Ref Component States Transition Model State 
Probabilities (Table 7.14) 
A B 
l(AB) 0 0 ~(ABC)(/2) 
2(AB) 
2 0 11R p(ABC)(t ) 32 2 
3(AB) 
I 11U 0 0 
3(AB) 
2 11R 0 p'(ABC) (I ) 52 2 
4(AB) 
3 12U 11R 0 
4(AB) 
7 12R 11R 0 
4(AB) , 11R 12R 0 
4(AB) ,. 11R 12R p(ABC)(1 ) 71.1 2 
Table 7.17 Phase 3 Initial Non-Sequential State Probabilities 
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The set of Markov differential equations can be solved over the duration of phase 3. 
The final system state probabilities can be combined with the unavailability of 
component C over the duration of the phase to calculate the reliability of phase 3. 
Using equations (7.19), (7.20) and (7.21), the reliability of phase 3 is expressed in 
equation (7.31) 
(7.31) 
where q C
3 
= ac (t2 )(1- e -AC(t3-12») 
and (Figure 7.20) a (I ) = p,(ABC) (t ) + p(ABC) (t ) + p,(ABC) (I ) + p(ABC) (t ) C 2 1 2 32 2 S2 2 77,. 2 
7.4 Summary 
The methods presented in this chapter provide a means of analysing a phased mission 
system with sequential failure relationships. The state explosion problem encountered 
when applying Markov models to phased mission systems is reduced by the definition 
of a minimal model between the phase transitions. 
At each transition point, a new transition model is defined. All components that do not 
contribute to any further phases of the mission may be removed completely from the 
transition model. All remaining components that do not contribute to any NPS 
sequential minimal cut sets in later phases are expressed in non-sequential form, and 
all components that do contribute to a later NPS sequential minimal cut set must 
remain in sequential form. The model can then be expanded to represent PS failure 
relationships within each phase. Minimisation of each phase model due to either 
irrelevant components or components input to only static gates in a non-repairable 
phase may only be implemented if the components do not contribute to any NPS 
sequential minimal cut sets in later phases. At the end of each phase the minimised 
model is expanded back to the transition model for input to the next phase. By 
minimising the size of the Markov model, both at the phase boundaries and within 
each phase, an optimal solution for analysis is achieved. 
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Chapter 8 
8.1 Introduction 
Importance Measures for Non-Repairable Phased 
Missions 
Measures of importance may be developed for components that are used in one or all 
phases of a multi-phased mission. Such measures will allow the criticality of each 
component to both individual phases and the entire mission to be calculated. 
Although the· importance of component failure will be assessed using the same 
method in each of the phases, the consequence of phase failure is not considered. For 
example in the flight pattern of an aircraft a failure in the initial phase where the 
aircraft is taxiing to the runway will not be catastrophic. The aircraft could remain 
grounded and repair initiated. However, if a later phase failure occurs while the 
aircraft is in flight, it is likely that the consequences would be more severe. From a 
risk perspective, components would have a higher importance in phases where failure 
has catastrophic consequences. Traditional importance measures can only analyse the 
importance of each component to a phase, the consequence of phase failure is not 
considered. 
In this chapter, importance measures for non-repairable phased mission systems are 
developed. The minimal cut sets in each phase are non-sequential, and so phase failure 
will be caused by the occurrence of the events in a minimal cut set regardless of order. 
Further importance measures for repairable phased mission systems and sequential 
failure relationships are considered in Chapter 9. 
All measures that are proposed to analyse the importance of components in non-
repairable phased mission systems will be demonstrated by application to an example. 
In this case a mission comprising of 3 phases and non-repairable components A, B, C, 
and D will be used, shown in Figure 8.1. 
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Figure 8.1 3-Phased Mission 
8.2 Deterministic Importance Measures 
A detenninistic measure of importance will analyse the importance of a component to 
a phase with no reference to its probability of occurrence. 
8.2.1 Phase Structural Importance Measure 
For a single system comprising of n components, the structural measure of importance 
for a component was defined by equation (2.17). A component c is in a critical system 
state if the remaining (n-1) components are in a condition such that the failure of the 
component will cause the system to go from a working to a failed state. 
If we treat each phase of the multi-phase mission in Figure 8.1 as a separate single-
phase system, the critical states for component A in phases 1, 2 and 3 as defined in 
Section 2.2.3.5.1 are summarised in Table 8.1. 
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Phase 1 
Phase 2 
Phase 3 
Table 8.1 
States For Other Components in Phase 
B C D 
0 0 -
0 1 -
1 0 
-
1 1 
-
0 
-
0 
0 - 1 
1 - 0 
1 - 1 
-
0 1 
- 1 0 
where 0 = Component Success 
1 = Component Failure 
-= Not Required in Phase 
Critical State For Component 
Yes 
No 
No 
No 
No 
Yes 
No 
No 
No 
Yes 
Critical States for Component A in Each Phase of Example 
The structural measure of importance for component A in each of the phases is found 
using equation (2.17) to be: 
(8.1) 
However, SInce this measure does not take into account the behaviour of the 
components or the system through all previous phases, and also the performance of 
components that are not required in a particular phase, the results are not very 
informative. Treating each phase as a separate system assumes that all components are 
in the working state at the start of a phase. We require a method to obtain the critical 
system states for a component dependent on past and present behaviour of all other 
components in the system. The method must be capable of eliminating states which 
would have resulted in system failure in a previous phase. 
The total number of components required in a multi-phased mission is Ne, however 
not all components will be required in every phase of the mission. There will be a total 
of Ns possible system states in phase j that are formed by the pattern of all Ne 
J 
component success and failure combinations through all preceding phases up to and 
including phase j. The system will be in a critical state for a component if the 
223 
combination of component states through the previous phases presents a working 
system state in phase j such that the failure of component c in phase j will cause phase 
failure. The structural measure of importance for a component c in phase j is defined 
in equation (8.2). 
I ST = number of critical system states for component c in phase j 
CJ number of phase j possible system states for (Nc -1) remaining components 
(8.2) 
To obtain the possible system states in phase j, all valid combinations of component 
failure and success must be considered through all previous phases. As an example we 
can consider a system comprising of two components, A and B. To obtain the critical 
states for component A in phase 2 we must analyse the behaviour of component B 
through phases up to and including phase 2. There are four possibilities, B can work 
throughout phase j, Bj' or fail during phase j, Bj' in each of the two phases (;=1,2). 
The four possibilities are presented in Table 8.2. 
Performance of Component B Definition Combinatior 
Phase 1 Event Phase 2 Event 
- - -
Success Bl Success E2 Component works through both Bn 
phases 1 and 2 
-
Success Bl Failure E2 Component works through phase 1 B2 
and fails in phase 2 
-
}BJ 
Failure Bl Success E2 } Not Possible. If component B fails 
in phase 1 it will remain failed in 
Failure Bl Failure E2 phase 2 as it is non-repairable. No 
further behaviour is considered. 
Table 8.2 Performance of Component B over 2 Phases 
For a larger mission, the performance of components through the phases must be 
considered in a similar way with all impossible states eliminated. A state that is 
representative of component failure in a phase need not consider the later performance 
for that component since once it has failed it must remain in the failed state. 
The identification of all possible component performance combinations does not 
generate an accurate list of all the possible system states in phase j. Some of the state 
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combinations would have resulted in failure in a previous phase and must also be 
eliminated from the structural importance model. The remaining states are all possible 
phase j system states. 
The structural importance for component A through each of the phases in the example 
given in Figure 8.1 will be determined to illustrate these points. The critical state of 
component A in phase 1 is not affected by component behaviour in previous phases 
and so can be obtained in the same way as for a single-phase system. However, since 
components which do not contribute to phase 1 failure will be required later in the 
mission, it is necessary to include the behaviour of all Ne - 1 components used in the 
mission. The critical states for phase 1 are summarised in Table 8.3. 
Other Component States Critical State For A 
---(.,Bl,Cl,Dl ) Yes 
(.,BpCpDl) Yes 
(., Bl , Cl' Dl ) No 
(., Bl , Cl' Dl ) No 
(.,Bl,Cl, Dl ) No 
(.,BpCpDl) No 
(.,BpCl,Dl) No 
(.,Bl,Cl,Dl ) No 
Table 8.3 Critical States for Component A in Phase 1 
There is a possibility of 8 system states in phase 1. We can identify that 2 of the 
possible system states are critical for component A, and so the structural importance 
for component A in this first phase is given by equation (8.3) 
/sT=2=.!. 
Al 8 4 (8.3) 
As expected, the structural importance for component A in the first phase is found to 
be identical to that obtained using conventional single system analysis. 
To evaluate the importance of component A in the second phase, we must include the 
performance of all other components through the first phase. The list of possible 
225 
system states in phase 2 is generated by the combination of the behaviour of 
components B, C, and D through both phases 1 and 2 in the same way as presented for 
component B in Table 8.2. The importance of component A in phase 2 is summarised 
in Table 8.4. Component behaviour combinations that cause failure in phase 1 cannot 
contribute to the importance of component A in phase 2 and are identified in column 
2. From all possible phase 2 system states, those that are critical for component A are 
listed in column 3. 
Other Component. Fails in Critical State Other Component Fails in 
Critical State 
States Phase 1 for Component States Phase I 
for Component 
A A 
-
---(.,BI2 , C12 , D)2) No No (.,BI2 ,CI'DI ) Yes -
-(., B)2, Cl' D2 ) Yes -
---(., BI , C)2' D)2) Yes - (.,B)2,C2 ,DI ) No Yes 
-
--(., B2 , C12 , D)2) No No (.,B)2,C2 ,D2 ) No Yes 
- -(., B)2, Cl' D12 ) Yes -
- -(., B)2, C2 , D)2) No No (.,BI ,Cl ,DI ) Yes -
--(., B)2' C12 , DI ) No Yes (.,BI' CI'D2 ) Yes -
--(.,B)2,CI2 ,D2 ) No Yes (.,BI ,C2 ,DI ) Yes -
(.,BI'C2 ,D2 ) Yes -
-(.,BI' CI'DI2 ) Yes - (.,B2 ,Cl ,DI ) Yes -
-(., BI , C2 , D)2) Yes - (.,B2 ,CI'D2 ) Yes -
-(., B2 , Cl' D)2) Yes - (.,B2 ,C2 ,DI ) No No 
-(., B2 , C2 , D)2) No No (.,B2 ,C2 ,D2 ) No No 
-(., BI , C12 , DI ) Yes -
-(., BI , C12 , D2 ) Yes -
(., B2 , C12 , DI ) No No 
-(., B2 , C12 , D2 ) No No 
Table 8.4 Critical States for Component A in Phase 2 
There are 27 possible component performance combinations through phases 1 and 2. 
However, since the failure of components B or C in phase 1 would cause system 
failure, there are 15 component performance combinations that terminate the mission 
during phase 1 and are impossible phase 2 states (column 2). The remaining 12 states 
are all possible phase 2 states, and 4 of those are identified as critical states for 
component A (column 3). The structural importance of component A in phase 2 is 
given by equation (8.4), 
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I ST =~=.!. 
A2 12 3 (8.4) 
The structural importance for component A using this method is found to be greater 
than that obtained without accounting for the phased nature of the mission in equation 
(8.1). Treating the second phase as a separate system results in an optimistic 
assessment of structural importance for component A. 
To evaluate the importance of component A in the final phase, we must again include 
the performance of all other components through the first and second phases. The list 
of possible system states in phase 3 is generated by the combination of components B, 
C, and D behaviour through phases 1, 2 and 3. The importance of component A in 
phase 3 is summarised in Table 8.5. Component behaviour combinations that cause 
failure in phases 1 or 2 cannot contribute to the importance of component A in phase 3 
and are identified in columns 2 and 3. From all possible phase 3 system states, those 
that are critical for component A are listed in column 4. 
There are 64 possible component performance combinations through phases 1, 2 and 
3. However, certain combinations would have caused system failure during phases 1 
or 2. The failure of components B or C in phase 1 would cause system failure and so 
28 component behaviour combinations are eliminated from the possible phase 2 states 
(column 2). Phase 2 failure will occur if components B and D, or A and D, both fail 
either prior to or during phase 2, eliminating a further 6 component behaviour 
combinations from the possible phase 3 states (column 3). The remaining 30 
component performance combinations are all possible phase 3 states, and 20 of those 
are identified as critical states for component A (column 4). The structural importance 
of component A in phase 3 is given by equation (8.5), 
I ST = 20 = 2 
A) 30 3 (8.5) 
The structural importance for component A using this method is again found to be 
greater than that obtained using conventional structural analysis on single systems in 
equation (8.1). Treating the final phase as a separate system for analysis again results 
in a optimistic assessment of structural importance for component A. 
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Fails in Fails in 
Critical Fails in Fails in 
Critical 
Other Component State for Other Component State for 
States Phase Phase Component States Phase 
. Phase Component 
1 2 A 1 2 A 
---
-
(.,B\23' C\23, Dm) No No No (BI23,C2,D2') No No Yes 
-(BI23,C2,D3') No No Yes 
--
-(.,Bl, C123 , D\23) Yes - - (BI23,C3,Dl') No No Yes 
-- -(.,B2, C\23, D\23) No No No (BI23,C3,D2') No No Yes 
-- -(.,B3, C123 , D\23) No No No (BI23,C3,D3') No No Yes 
- -(.,B\23,Cp D\23) Yes - -
- -(.,BI23 ,C2,D\23) No No Yes (.,Bl,Cl,Dl) Yes - -
- -(.,BI23 , C3, D\23) No No Yes (.,Bp Cp D2) Yes - -
--(.,B\23, C\23, Dl) No No No (.,Bp Cl,D3 ) Yes - -
--( ., Bm , C\23, D2 ) No No No (.,Bl,C2,Dl) Yes - -
--(.,B\23' C\23, D3) No No No (.,Bp C2,D2) Yes - -
(.,Bl,C2,D3) Yes - -
-(.,Bl, Cl' D\23) Yes - - (.,Bp C3,Dl) Yes - -
-(.,Bp C2,D\23) Yes - - (.,Bl,C3,D2) Yes - -
-(.,Bp C3,D\23) Yes - - (.,Bp C3,D3) Yes - -
-(.,B2, Cl ,D\23) Yes - - (.,B2,Cl,Dl) Yes - -
-(.,B2,C2,D\23) No No Yes (.,B2,Cp D2) Yes - -
-(.,B2,C3,D\23) No No Yes (.,B2,Cl,D3) Yes - -
-(.,B3 ,Cl ,D\23) Yes - - (.,B2,C2,Dl) No Yes -
-(.,B3,C2,D\23) No No Yes (.,B2,C2,D2) No Yes -
-(.,B3, C3, D\23) No No Yes (.,B2,C2,D3) No No Yes 
-(.,Bl, C123 , Dl) Yes - - (.,B2,C3,Dl) No Yes -
-(.,Bl,CI23,D2) Yes - - (.,B2,C3,D2) No Yes -
-(.,Bl,CI23,D3) Yes - - (.,B2,C3,D3) No No Yes 
-(.,B2, C123 , Dl) No Yes - (.,B3,Cl,Dl) Yes - -
-(.,B2, C123 , D2) No Yes - (.,B3,Cp D2) Yes - -
-(.,B2, C123 , D3) No No No (.,B3,Cl,D3) Yes - -
-(.,B3, C123 , Dl) No No No (.,~,C2'~) No No Yes 
-(.,B3,CI23,D2) No No No (.,~, C2, D2) No No Yes 
-(.,B3, C123 , D3) No No No (.,B3,C2,D3) No No Yes 
-(.Bm , Cl' Dl,) Yes - - (.,B3,C3,Dl) No No Yes 
-(Bm ,Cl,D2,) . Yes - - (.,B3,C3,D2) No No Yes 
-
(BI23,Cl,D3') Yes - - (.,B3,C3,D2) No No Yes 
(BI23,C2,Dl') No No Yes 
Table 8.5 Critical States for Component A in Phase 3 
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8.3 Probabilistic Measures of Importance 
Probabilistic importance measures for components in non-repairable phased mission 
systems can be developed by appropriate extensions to the definitions presented for 
single phase systems in Section 2.2.3.5.2, and are discussed in the following sections. 
8.3.1 Phase CriticaIity Function 
The phase criticality function for a component c in a phase j is defined as the 
probability that the system is in a critical state for component c in phase j, and is 
denoted byG
c 
(q(t)). Since the mission is non-repairable, for the system to be in a 
J 
critical state for component c in a phase, certain criteria must be met: 
• All phases prior to phase j must have been completed successfully. 
• Component c is in the working state at the start ofphasej, i.e. has not failed in 
a previous phase. 
The phase criticality function for component c may also be defined as the sum of the 
probabilities of occurrence ofthe critical states for component c in phase j. 
The phase criticality function for component A in each phase for the example given in 
Figure 8.1 will be illustrated. Since the critical states for component A in each of the 
three phases (Tables 8.3, 8.4 and 8.5) has already been identified it is possible to 
calculate the probability of occurrence of the critical states to achieve phase criticality 
functions for component A. The critical states for component A in each of the three 
phases with associated probability is summarised in Table 8.6. 
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..... 
Critical State Probability Critical State Probability 
Phase 1: Phase 3 Cont. 
---
-(.,BpCpDl) (1- q BI )(1- q Cl )(1- q DI ) (.,B3, C3 ,Dl23 ) qB3qC3 (1- qn..J 
--
-(.,BpCpDl) (1- q BI )(1 - q Cl )q DI (Bl23 ,C2,Dp) (1- q Bm )qc2 q DI 
-(BI23,C2,D2') (1- qBm )qc2 qD2 
-
Phase 2: (BI23,C2,D3') (1- qBm )qc2 qD3 
-- -(.,BI2,CI2,Dl) (1- q BI2 )(1- q CI2 )q DI (BI23,C3,Dp) (1- q Bm )q C3 q DI 
--
-
(.,BI2,CI2,D2) (1- q BI2 )(1- q CI2 )q D2 (BI23,C3,D2') (1- q Bm )q C3 q D2 
-
-(.,BI2 ,C2,Dl) (1- q BI2 )q C2 q DI (Bl23 ,C3,D3,) (1- q Bm )q C3 q D3 
-(.,BI2 ,C2,D2) (1- q BI2 )q C2 q D2 (.,B2,C2,D3) qB2qC2qD3 
(.,B2,C3,D3) qB2qC3qD3 
Phase 3: (.,B3,C2,Dl) qB3qC2qDI 
- -(.,Bl23 , C2,Dl23 ) (1- q Bm )qc2 (1- qn..23) (.,B3, C2, D2) qB3qC2qD2 
- -(.,BI23 , C3,Dl23 ) (1- q Bm )q C3 (1- q Dm ) (.,B3,C2,D3) qB3qC2q~ 
-(.,B2,C2,Dl23 ) q B2 q C2 (1 - q Dm ) (.,B3,C3,Dl) qB3qC3qDI 
-(.,B2,C3,Dl23 ) q B2 q C3 (1- q Dm ) (.,B3,C3,D2) qB3qC3qD2 
-(.,B3, C2,Dl23 ) q B3 q C2 (1 - q Dm ) (.,B3,C3,D2) qB3qC3qD3 
Table 8.6 Probability of Critical States for Component A 
The resulting expressions to represent the sum of the probabilities that the system has 
not failed in a previous phase and is in a critical state for component A in phases 1, 2 
and 3 are given by equations (8.6), (8.7) and (8.8) respectively. 
GAl (q(t))=Q(criticalfor A in phase 1) 
= (1- q BI )(1- q Cl )(1- q DI ) + (1 - q BI )(1- q Cl )q DI 
= (1 - q BI )(1- q Cl ) 
G
A2 
(q(t))=Q(no failure in phase1 & critical for A in phase 2) 
(8.6) 
= (1- qBI2 )(1- qC12 )qn.. + (1- qBI2 )(1- qC12 )qD2 + (1- qB12 )qc2qn.. + (1- qBI2 )qC2qD2 
= (1- qBI)qDI2 (1- qcl ) (8.7) 
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GA3 (q(t» =Q(no failure in phases 1 and 2 & critical for A in phase 3) 
= (l-qB.2I1c; (l-qLl)+(I-qB.2I1q (l-qLl) 
+q~ qc; (l-qLl)+q~ %.1 (1-qLl)+q~ qc; (1-qLl)+q~ qq (l-qLl) 
+(I-qB.23)qc; qLl +(I-qB.2I1c; q~ +(I-qB.2I1c; q~ +(1-qB.23)qq qLl +(1-qB.2I1q q~ +(1-qB.211c, q~ 
+~~~+~~~+~~~+~~~+~~~+~~~+~~~+~~~ 
= (1-qBt)qc;3 -qBzQCz3QDt2 (8.8) 
The process of identifying the critical states and calculating the sum of the 
probabilities of occurrence of each state becomes more complex as the number of 
phases and components increases. Alternative methods of calculating the criticality 
function are implemented for single phase missions whereby the expression for the 
probability of the system being in a critical state for a component can be obtained 
directly from the system failure probability equation (equations (2.20) and (2.22». 
Similar methods are developed to obtain an expression for the probability that the 
system is in a critical state for a component in any phase of a multi-phased mission 
using the phase failure probability equation, and are presented in the following 
sections. 
8.3.1.1 Phase Criticality Function using the Phase Failure Function 
It is not possible to calculate the failure probability of a phase as the probability that 
one or more minimal cut sets occur during the phase duration as this does not take into 
account the successful outcome of all previous phases. Similarly as presented in 
Chapter 4, it is not possible to multiply the probability of success or failure of 
individual phases as this assumes that phases are independent and that all components 
are in the working state at the start of each phase. 
A method to overcome these problems and obtain the phase failure probability was 
presented in Chapter 4, where the performance of a system is ~onsidered not only for 
the duration of the phase in question, but also for all preceding phases. A component 
that by being in the failed state in a phase would put the system in a critical state for 
another component could have failed at any point up to that time. By considering the 
component failing in each phase as a separate event, component failure in a particular 
phase fault tree is replaced by an OR combination of the events for the component 
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failing in that and all preceding phases. The component failure in phase j is expressed 
as the event that the component could have failed during any phase up to and 
including phase j. 
System failure in phase j is then represented by the AND of the success of phases 1 • .j-
1 and the failure during phase j (Figure. 8.2). 
Success in 
Previous 
Phases 
Failure 
Durtng Phase 
} 
Failure in Failure In 
Phase 1 Phasej-1 
Failure 
Conditions 
Met Durtng 
Phase} 
Phase} 1ault tree with 
each basic event 
replaced with an OR 
combination of 
component failure in 
any previous phase 
from 1..} 
Figure 8.2 Generalised Phase Failure Fault Tree 
All phase failures may then be combined using an OR gate to represent causes of 
overall mission failure as any phase failure will mean the mission does not complete 
successfully. 
For the 3-phased mission in Figure 8.1, the phase failure fault trees and unavailability 
quantifications are given in Figures 8.3, 8.4, and 8.5 and equations (8.9), (8.10), and 
(8.11) respectively. 
(8.9) 
A1 B1 Cl 
Figure 8.3 Phase 1 Failure 
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l-,-----r-' 
Q2 =q~ (l-q~)(l-qC)q~2 +(l-q",)qBz (l-qC)q~2 -q~qBz (l-qC)q~2 
(8.10) 
Figure 8.4 Phase 2 Failure 
Figure 8.5 
T3 = Al BI Cl (DJ2 + AJ2 BJ2)A123 CJ23 
= A23 BIC23 DI2 +A3BJ2C23 
Q3 = q~l (l-q~ )qC2l (l-q~) +q~ (l-q~)qC23 -qAl (l-q~)qCzl (l-q~) 
(8.11) 
Phase 3 Failure 
233 
Once the prime implicant sets and probability of phase failure have been obtained it is 
possible to directly calculate the probability that the system is in a critical state for all 
components in the phase in a similar way as for a single phase system presented in 
Section 2.2.3.5.2. The phase failure probability equations (8.9), (8.10), and (8.11) are 
used. 
An expression to obtain the probability that the system is in a critical state for a 
component c in phase j is derived using equation (2.20) and is given in equation 
(8.12). 
(8.12) 
where Qj(lc} ,q(t)) is the unavailability ofphasej with component c failing in phasej 
Q/OC} ,q(t)) is the unavailability ofphasej with component c working in phasej 
This is the probability that the system fails in phase j with component c failing in 
phase j minus the probability that the system fails in phase j with component c 
working throughout phase j, i.e. the system fails in phase j due to component c failing 
in phasej. 
To obtain the phase criticality function for a component c in phase j, the event that 
component c failed at any point from the start of phase i to the end of phase j, qc' in 
I} 
the phase failure probability equation must be expanded into two separate terms. The 
only interest is the term that represents the failure of component c in phase j, q c. , and 
J 
so the expression is expanded as shown in equation (8.13). 
(8.13) 
This is necessary since if the system is in a critical state for component c in phase j it 
implies that component c cannot have failed in a previous phase. When obtaining the 
probability that the system fails in phase j with component c failing in phase j minus 
the probability that the system fails in phase j with component c working throughout 
phase j, the terms including q c become irrelevant. 
I}-I 
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This method may be applied to the example in Figure 8.1. The evaluation of the phase 
criticality function for component A in phases 1, 2 and 3 is given by equations (8.14), 
(8.15), and (8.16). 
Phase 1 
Phase 2 
Q(1A2 ,q(t)) = (1- qB, )(1- qc, )qD12 + (1- qA, )qB2 (1- qc, )q~2 - qB2 (1- qc, )q~2 
Q(O A2 ,q(t)) = (1- qA, )qB2 (1- qc, )q~2 
GA2 (q(t)) = Q(1A2 ,q(t)) - Q(O A2,q(t)) = (1- qB)(1- qc, )q~2 + (1- qA)qB2 (1- qC)qD'2 
- qB2 (1- qc, )qD'2 - (1- qA,)q B2 (1- qc, )qD'2 
= (1- q B'2 )(1- qc, )q DI2 (8.15) 
Phase 3 
Expand all qA. ~ qA +qA 
, .. 3 , .. 2 3 
Q3 = (qA, +qA, )(l-qs. )qC
n 
(l-qv.,)+qA, (l-qs.,)qCz, -qA, (l-qs.,)qCz, (l-qv.) 
=qA, (l-qs. )qc" (l-qv.,) +qA, (l-qs. )qCz, (l-qv.,) +qA, (l-qs.,)qc" -qA, (l-qs.,)qCz, (l-qv.,) 
glA"q(t))=qA, (1-q~)qc,3 (1-qL\)+(1-q~)qCz3 (1-qL\)+(1-q~2)qCz3 -(1-q~2)qCz3 (l-qL\) 
go A, ,q(t)) = qA, (l-q~ )qCz3 (1-qL\2) 
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G~ (fit) )=gl ~ ,fit) )-go ~ ,fit) )=q~ (l-qIlt )q~3 (l-qn.) + (l-qIlt )q~3 (l-qn.2) +(1-qIlt2)q~3 
-(1-qBt2)q~3 (l-qn.) -q~ (l-qIlt )q~J1-qn.) 
(8.16) 
It can be seen that equations (8.14), (8.15) and (8.16) are identical to those calculated 
by the sum of the occurrences of the critical states (equations (8.6), (8.7) and (8.8». 
The same methods can also be applied to components B, C and D for the mission. 
8.3.1.2 Phase Criticality Function using the Derivative of the Phase Failure 
Function 
The probability of failure in phase j, Qj' is linear in the probability that component c 
fails in phase j, qc' The phase criticality function of component c in phase 
j 
j, Gc. (q(t» , can be derived from equation (2.22) and is given in equation (8.17). 
J 
(8.17) 
This method will again be dem<?nstrated by application to the example in Figure 8.1 
using the expansion technique to separate terms given in equation (8.13). Birnbaum's 
measure of importance for component A in phases 1, 2 and 3 is derived and given in 
equations (8.18), (8.19) and (8.20). 
Phase 1 
(8.18) 
Phase 2 
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Phase 3 
Expand all qA. ~ qA. +qA 
1 •• 3 1 .. 2 3 
Q3 = (qAz +qA,)(l-qn, )qCn (l-qDt)+qA, (1-qn,2)q~ -qA, (l-qn,)q~ (l-qDt) 
=qA, (l-qn, )qCn (l-qDt) +qA, (l-qn, )qCn (l-qDt)+qA, (l-qa,)qC:3 -qA, (l-qa,)qCn (l-qDt) 
(8.20) 
The results obtained by this direct partial differentiation of the phase failure 
probability equation (equations (8.18), (8.19) and (8.20)) are identical to those found 
by calculating the sum of the occurrences of the critical states in equations (8.6), (8.7) 
and (8.8). The critical states with associated probabilities for components B, C, and D 
are identified, and the phase criticality function is calculated as both a sum of the 
probability of occurrence of the critical states and using equation (8.17), given in 
Appendix B. 
8.3.2 Mission CriticaIity Function 
It is possible to combine the results of each phase criticality function to achieve an 
overall mission criticality function with ranking for all components. Since each phase 
may have different time duration, taking an average of all the phase criticality 
functions for each component would not give an accurate representation of the 
importance of a component to the entire mission. The period oftime for which a phase 
is in operation must be accounted for when calculating the mission criticality function 
since a component with higher importance in a shorter phase could be just as 
significant as the same component with lower importance in a longer phase. 
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The mission criticality function for a component is defined as the probability that the 
system is in a critical state for component c in a multi-phased mission, and is denoted 
by G
CMlSS 
(q(t)). This can be represented by equation (8.21). 
m 
G - '" P(System is critical for component c in phase j I in phase j) * P(In 
CMlSS L..J 
j=' 
phasej) (8.21) 
where P(System is critical for component c in phasej I in phasej) = Gc (q(t)) 
J 
The mission criticality function for component A in the example given in Figure 8.1 
can be found by equation (8.22). 
(GA (q(t)) *t,)+ (GA (q(t)) * (t2 -t,))+(GA (q(t))*(t3 -t2)) G (q(t)) = 1 2 ~ 1 (8.22) 
AMISS t 
3 
It is possible to rank the components in order of importance by the criticality function 
for both each individual phase and the entire mission. To demonstrate this, numerical 
values are assigned to the component failure probabilities in phases 1, 2, and 3 in 
Figure 8.1, given in equations (8.23). 
Mission Data 
Phase 1 = 2 hours 
Phase 2 = 10 hours 
Phase 3 = 5 hours 
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Component Data 
AA = 0.01 Ih 
AB= 0.02 Ih 
A.c= 0.03 Ih 
AD= 0.04 Ih 
Component Failure Probabilities 
Phase 1 Phase 2 Phase 3 
qA = 0.020 
I 
qA =0.093 
2 
qA
3 
=0.043 
qB =0.039 qB =0.174 qB =0.075 
I 2 3 (8.23) 
qC
1 
=0.058 qC
2 
=0.244 qC
3 
=0.097 
qD
1 
=0.077 qD
2 
=0.304 qD = 0.112 
3 
The criticality function with ranking for components A, B, C and D in phases 1, 2 and 
3 and for the entire mission are summarised in Table 8.7. 
Phase 1 Phase 2 Phase 3 Mission Mission Component Criticality Rank Criticality Rank Criticality Rank Criticality Rank Function Function Function Function 
A 0.905262 3 0.2824559 2 0.3050947 1 0.3623857 1 
,~'_ff'~'~~_~_ 
B 0.92316 2 0.3183461 1 0 3 0.2958695 2 
~-"C-- 0.94178 1 0 0.0937942 ----
___ 0
4 2 0.1383842 3 
_0 
0 0 4 0.2295758 3 0 3 0.1350446 4 
Table 8.7 Phase and Mission Criticality Functions 
It can be seen that the component importance values in phase 1 are significantly larger 
than in any other phase. This is due to the series arrangement of the components in the 
first phase compared with parallel and combined parallel and series arrangements in 
the final two phases. Since components A and B are less likely to fail in the first 
phase, the system is more likely to be in a critical state for component C and so it has 
the highest importance ranking. This is followed by component B, and then 
component A. In phase 2, the parallel arrangement means that as component D has the 
highest failure rate, components A and B will have the highest importance. In phase 3, 
components A and C are again arranged in parallel and so since component C has the 
higher failure rate, the system is more likely to be in a critical state for component A. 
Component A has the overall highest importance ranking due to the fact it is the only 
component required in all three phases. Component B has the second highest 
importance ranking since from the two phases of requirement it is always connected in 
a series arrangement with other components. Components C and D have lower values 
of importance since they are required in fewer phases and are generally arranged in 
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parallel with other components. The system is most likely to be in a critical state for 
components A and B. 
If each phase is treated as a separate system, using the critical states given in Table 
8.1, Bimbaum's importance for component A in would be represented by equations 
(8.24). 
Q(critical in phase 1) = (1- q BI )(1- q Cl) 
Q(critical in phase 2) = (1- q B2 )q D2 (8.24) 
Q(critical in phase 3) = qC
3 
Numerically, the criticality function for each of the components when treating each 
phase as a separate system produces the results shown in Table 8.8. 
Component 
A 
B 
------C 
-~----D 
Table 8.8 
Phase 1 Phase 2 Phase 3 Mission Mission Criticality Rank Criticality Rank Criticality Rank Criticality Rank 
Function Function Function Function 
0.905262 3 0.251104 2 0.097 1 0.2827391 1 
0.92316 2 0.275728 1 0 3 0.2708 2 
0.94178 1 0 --4-- 0.043 2 0.1234447 --.r-
0 -4- 0.250818 3 0 3 0.14754 3 
Phase and Mission Criticality Functions Treating Each Phase as a 
Separate System 
It is seen that although the rankings remain consistent to those in Table 8.7 through 
the phases, the values obtained for the criticality function of each component become 
increasingly inaccurate as the phases progress. When treating each phase as a separate 
system, the values of importance are generally smaller through the phases, implying 
that the probability of the system being in a critical state for each component is less 
than it actually would be. This is due to the assumption that all components are in the 
working state at the start of a phase. The overall mission rankings using equations 
(8.24) produce a different result to the proposed method, implying that component D 
is more important than component C. 
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8.3.3 Criticality Measures of Component Importance 
The criticality measure of importance is defined as the proportion of system failures 
caused because the system is in a critical state for component c, and component c has 
failed. For a single phase system, this could be directly obtained using the criticality 
function. The criticality measure of importance for a single phase mission is 
calculated as. the product of the criticality function (Bimbaum's measure of 
importance) and the component failure probability at time t, weighted by the system 
failure probability in equation (2.23). 
The criticality importance measure may be developed further to include the possibility 
of phased mission systems. This is the probability that the system is in a critical state 
for component c in phase j, and component c has failed (weighted by the phase j 
system failure probability). However, if the system is in a critical state for component 
c in phase j, it is possible that component c could fail during phase j or exist in the 
failed state at the start of phase j. Both events would cause phase j failure. 
Two new importance measures are developed, the criticality measure of in-phase 
component importance and the criticality measure of transition component 
importance. The criticality measure of in-phase component importance,lc CR(/-P), is 
J 
defined as the probability that the system is in a critical state for component c in phase 
j, and component c has failed during phase j. The criticality measure of transition 
component importance, leeR(Tr) , is defined as the probability that the system is in a 
J 
critical state for component c in phase j, and component c has failed prior to phase j. 
Both are weighted by the phase j system failure probability. 
The total criticality measure of phase component importance,lc CR, is then derived as 
J 
the sum of the contribution of in-phase and transition criticality importances, given in 
equation (8.25). 
I CR = I CR(I-p) + I CR(Tr) 
CJ CJ CJ (8.25) 
The criticality measure of in-phase component importance is obtained using the same 
approach as for a single phase mission, by multiplying the probability that the system 
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is in a critical state for component c in phase j with the probability that component c 
fails in phasej. This is given in algebraic form in equation (8.26). 
I CR(l-p) = GC} (q(t))qC) (t) 
c) Qj(q(t)) (8.26) 
Where the probability that component c fails in phasej, q c = rl) Ic (t) dt 
) J1)_1 
The phase j failure probability, Qj (q(t)) , is derived by considering the method of 
combining previous phase successes with phase j failure (Figure 8.2). 
This measure is best demonstrated by considering the example given in Figure 8.1. 
The criticalitymeasure of in-phase importance for component A in phase 3 is given in 
equation (8.27). 
((I-qo, )qc" - qB, qc"q~,)qA, ((1- qo,) - qB, q~,)q A, I CR(/-p) 
A, qA" (1- qo, )qc" (1-q~,) + qA, (1- qB")qc,, -qA, (l-qB")qc,, (I-q~,) qA" (1- qo, )(1-q~,) +qA, (l-qB" )q~, 
(8.27) 
This method has evaluated the probability that the system is in a critical state for 
component A in phase 3, and component 3 fails during phase 3 (weighted by the 
phase 3 system failure probability). 
To account for the event that component A exists in the failed state at the start of 
phase 3, the criticality measure of transition component importance is required. The 
method given in equation (8.26) can be adjusted to represent the probability that the 
system is in a critical state for component c in phase j, and component c fails in any 
phase up to but not including phase j. This is summarised in equation (8.28). 
I CR(Tr) = GCl (q(t))qcIl_I (t) 
c) Qj(q(t)) (8.28) 
This may be evaluated for component A in phase 3 in equation (8.29). 
lA CR = ((1-qOt)qc2, -qB2qC2,q~)qA,.2 = ((1-qOt)-qB2q~)qAI2 
, qA23 (1- qOt )qc2, (1- q~2) + qA, (1- qOt2)qC23q~2 qA23 (1- qOt )(1- q~2) + qA, (1- qOt2)q~2 
(8.29) 
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It can be seen that the method presented in equation (8.28) is wrong since if 
component A fails in phase 1, phase 1 failure will occur and the mission will not 
transfer to phase 2. It is only possible for component A to be failed at the start of 
phase 3 due to failure in phase 2, q A2 ' However, the combination of this event (q A2 ) 
with the second term ofBirnbaum's measure of phase importance for component A in 
phase 3 (QB,QC'3 Qv.,), represents the occurrence of a phase 2 implicant set, A.z.B1C1D12 • 
This would cause phase 2 failure and so since phase 3 would not be reached 
successfully it is also an incorrect method of obtaining the criticality measure of 
transition importance. 
A new method is presented to derive the correct criticality measure of transition 
importance for a component c in phase j. The probability that the system is in a critical 
state at the start of phase j for the failure of component c in any phase k up to but not 
including phase j, and the component has failed in phase k is required. This is 
represented algebraically in equation (8.30). 
(8.30) 
This method may be applied to derive the criticality measure of transition importance 
for component A in phase 3 of example 8.1 and is given in equation (8.31). 
lA CR(Tr) = ((1-qB,)qC,,(1-qv.,,))·qA, = ((l-qB,)qC,,(l-qv.,,))·qA, 
, Q3(q) qA" (l-qB)qC" (l-qv.,,)+qA, (l-qB")qC,, -qA, (l-qB,,)qCn (l-qD,,) 
(8.31) 
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The total criticality measure of phase importance for component c in phase j is found 
by the sum of the contribution of the in-phase and transition criticality importances. 
This is derived in equation (8.32). 
I CR = I CR(I-p) + I CR(Tr) 
Cl cl cl 
(8.32) 
The total criticality measure of phase importance for component A in phase 3 of 
example 8.1 is given in equation (8.33). 
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I CR = ((1- qn, )qc" (1- q~»). qA, + ((1- qn, )qc" (1- q~,) + (1- qn" )qc" - (1- qn,,)qc,, (1- q~,)). qA, 
A, . . Q3 (q(t)) 
lA CR = ((1-qB)qC" (1-QD,,))·qA,, + ((1-QB")QC,, -(1-qB,)QC,,(1-QD,))'QA, =1 
, qA" (1- qB, )qc" (1- qD,,) + qA, (1- qB" )qc" - qA, (1- qB" )qc" (1- QD,,) 
(8.33) 
For phase 3 failure to occur, component A must either exist in the failed state at the 
start of phase 3 or fail during phase 3 (with component C failed) due to the parallel 
arrangement between components A and C. The result of unity in equation (8.33) is 
consistent with this and shows that for phase 3 failure to occur, component A must be 
in the failed state. 
The criticality measures of importance for components A, B, C and D in the three 
phases of Figure 8.1 are derived using the methods presented and are given in 
equations (8.34), (8.35), and (8.36) respectively. 
Phase 1 
Criticality Measure of Component Phase Importance 
O·qD, --------------~----------=O 
(8.34) 
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Phase 2 
Failure Probability 
Criticality Measure of Component Importance 
[ CI(T-I 
... 
(~}q.., 
Q,(q) 
(
iQ,(q»).q 
[ CR = [ CI(I-p) EX[... ... 
...... Q,(q) 
(~}q~ 
Q,(q) 
( iQiq»).q 
((l-qo,,)(I-qq)qL\,h... (l-qo,,)q ... 
q ... (l-qo,)(l-qq)ql\, +(l-q..,)qB, (l-qG)ql\, -q ... qB, (l-qq)ql\, q ... (l-q~,)+(I-q..,)qB, 
o·q~ o 
((l-q..,)(l-qc,)qDt, -q..,(l-qC,)qL\,hB, (l-qA,,)qB, [ CR _[ C/(l-p) EX[B, B, 
B, - B, Qiq) q.., (l-qB,)(l-qq)ql\, +(l-qA,)qB, (l-qc,)ql\, -q..,qB, (l-qq)ql\, q.., (l-qo,,) + (l-qA,)qB, 
(~(q»).q [ CR _ I C/(l-p) _ Oqc, C, 
C, - C, - Qiq) o 
(
iQ2(q»).q 
[C/(l-p) EX[v, V, (qA,(I-qB,)(l-qc;)+(I-qA,)qB,(I-qc;)-q..,qB,(I-qc,»)-qv, 
v, Q2(q) q..,(I-qB,)(l-qc)ql\, +(I-qA,)qB,(I-qc;)ql\, -qA,qB,(I-qC,)ql\, 
( CQ,(q»).q +(CQ,(q»).q 
[ CR = [ CI(1)) + [ CI/V-p) = OqD, D, OqD, D, 
D, D, D, Q,(q) 
(qA, (I-qo, )(l-qc; )+(I-q.., )qB, (I-qC)-q..,qB, (I-qc»)·(ql\ +qo,) 1 
q.., (I-qB, )(l-qc, )ql\, + (I-q.., )qB, (I-qc, )ql\, -q..,qB, (I-qc; )ql\, 
(8.35) 
246 
Phase 3 
Failure Probability 
Criticality Measure of Component Importance 
I CR(I-p) 
A, 
(~}q~ +( ~ }q~ 
Q,(q) 
Qlq) 
({l-qn,)qc" (l-qD,,) + (l-qBIl)qC" -{l-qBIl)qc" (l-qD,,»)' qA, 
qA" {l-qB.)qC" (l-qD,,) + qA, (l-qB)qc" -qA, {l-qB.)qC" (l-qD,,) 
(~}qB,+(~}q~ 
Q,(q) 
I eR 
'" 
(~}qB,+(~}q",+(~}q", 
Q3(q) 
(q.." (l-q .. ){l-qo,,)+q.., (l-q.,,}-q.., (l-q.")(l-q,,,,)). qc, 
q.." (l-q .. )qc" (l-qo,,)+q.., (l-q .. ,)qc" -q.., (1- q .. ,)qc" (l-qo,,) 
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(8.36) 
As for the mission criticality function (equation (8.21)), it is possible to obtain a 
measure of the criticality of each component in the entire mission. This is defined as 
the probability that the system is in a critical state for component c during any phase j 
of a multi-phased mission, and component c has failed (weighted by the mission 
failure probability). Since the probability of component c failure in phase j accounts 
for the duration of phase j, the period of time for which the phase is in operation for is 
not included. The criticality measure of mission component importance is obtained by 
the sum of each individual phase j criticality importance given that phase j has been 
reached successfully and is derived in equation (8.37). 
ICMISS eR - i: P(System is critical for component c in phase j, and component c has 
j=) 
failed I in phase j) (weighted by the mission failure probability) 
(8.37) 
Using the mission data given in equations (8.23) it is possible to obtain the criticality 
measure of phase and mission importance for each component in Figure 8.1. The 
results of this are summarised in Table 8.9. 
Criticality Criticality Criticality Criticality Mission Component Phase 1 Rank Phase 2 Rank Phase 3 Rank Mission Rank Importance Importance Importance Importance 
A 0.1604459 3 0.3003188 3 1 1 0.3287084 4 
B 0.3190554 2 0.6332829 2 0 2 0.3934449 1 
C 0.484063 1 0 4 1 1 0.3728316 3 
0 0 4 1 1 0 2 0.3765393 2 
Phase 1 Phase 2 Phase 3 Mission 
Unavailabilit}' 0.1128432 0.0874684 0.0319838 0.2322954 
Table 8.9 Criticality Measure of Component Phase and Mission Importance 
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The criticality measure of importance can be used to analyse which of the components 
are most likely to be in the failed state when the system is failed. In phase 1, 
component C has the highest importance ranking since it is the most likely to fail and 
contribute to phase failure, followed by component B, and component D has the 
lowest. For phase 2 failure to occur, component D must fail, and so if the system fails 
in this phase it is definite that component D is in the failed state. The series 
arrangement between components A and B results in an equal system contribution 
however since component B has a higher failure rate, it is more likely to be in the 
failed state when phase 2 failure occurs. In phase 3, components A and C are arranged 
in parallel, and both must be in the failed state for phase 3 failure to occur. 
From the components with the highest value of mission criticality function, A and B, 
it is component B that is most likely to be in the failed state when the system fails. 
Component A is the least likely to be in the failed state when the system fails. 
If the results are again compared to those obtained by treating each phase as a separate 
system, it is possible to see the inaccuracies when disregarding the performance of 
components through all previous phases, shown in Table 8.10. 
Criticality Criticality Criticality Criticality Mission Component Phase 1 Rank Phase 2 Rank Phase 3 Rank Mission Rank Importance Importance Importance Importance 
A 0.1604459 3 0.3062699 3 1 1 0.2360976 4 
B 0.3190554 2 0.6292132 2 0 2 0.4345371 1 
C 0.484063 1 0 4 1 1 0.3042189 3 
D 0 4 1 1 0 2 0.3945334 2 
Phase 1 Phase 2 Phase 3 Mission 
Unavailability 0.1128432 0.0762487 0.004171 0.1932629 
Table 8.10 Criticality Measure of Component Phase and Mission Importance 
when Treating each Phase as a Separate System 
Comparisons between treating each phase as a separate system with the combination 
of previous phase success with current phase failure shows that the component 
criticality importance rankings through the phases are identical and the importance 
values in this simple example are very similar. 
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However, the phase unavailability is seen to become increasingly more inaccurate as 
the phases progress. This is due to the fact that no account is taken of previous phase 
outcome, and the assumption that all components are in the working state at the start 
of each phase. Therefore the importance values for components that do not contribute 
to all implicant sets of a phase will also become more inaccurate as the phases 
progress. 
In this simple example, the greatest inconsistency is seen when considering the overall 
mission values. This is accounted for by considering the increasing inaccuracies in the 
values of phase and mission unavailability when treating each phase as a separate 
system. 
8.3.4 Measures of Component Importance 
For phase failure to arise, it is possible that one or more phase prime implicant sets 
could have occurred. The failure of a component can contribute to the failure of a 
system without being critical. Component c will contribute to the failure of a phase j 
by the occurrence of a prime implicant set containing the failure of c. 
The occurrence of a prime implicant set in phase j could arise at the time of transition 
due to a component failure in a previous phase. An example of this is the prime 
implicant set in the third phase of Figure 8.1, A23 Bl C23 Dl2 • This phase 3 prime 
implicant set is representative of components A and C failing in either of phases 2 or 
3, and so if the components failed in the second phase it will cause phase 3 failure at 
the time of transition. The prime implicant sets that contain the event of a component 
failure must be considered regardless of which phase(s) the failure could have 
occurred in. 
For phased mission analysis, an extension of the Fussell-Vesely measure of 
importance is defined, the Measure of Phase Component Importance. This is the 
probability of the union of the occurrence of phase j prime implicant sets, E k , 
f 
containing the failure of component c (in any phase) given that phase j failure has 
occurred, and is weighted by the phase failure probability in equation (8.38). 
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I FV = P(Ukjlcekj C kj ) 
Cj Qj(q(t)) (8.38) 
This measure may be applied to the example in Figure 8.1. The prime implicant sets 
ofthe mission are given in Figure 8.6. 
Phase 1 
Phase 2 
Phase 3 
Reference Implicant Set 
A23 Bl C23 D\2 
A3Bl2C23 
Figure 8.6 Mission Implicant Sets 
The measure of phase importance for each ofthe components in phases 1, 2, and 3 are 
given in equations (8.39), (8.40) and (8.41) respectively. 
Phase 1 
I IT A, 
Phase 2 
qA, I IT 
B, 
lA FV = q A, (1- qB, )(1- qc,)qv" 
, q A, (1- qB,)(I- qc, )qv" + (1- q A,)q B, (1- qc,)qv" - q A, qB, (1- qc,)qv" 
I B FV = (1- qA,)qB, (l-qc,)qv" 
, q A, (1- q B,)(I- qc,)q 0" + (1- q A, )qB, (1- qc,)q 0" - q A, q B, (1- qc,)q 0" 
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qB, 
(8.39) 
qA, (1- qB,,)+ (l-qA, )qB, 
ID, FV = qA, (1- qB)(I- qC)qv" + (1-q At )qB, (1- qC)qv" - qA,qB, (1- qC,)qv" = 1 
qA, (1- qB)(1- qC)qv" + (1-qA, )qB, (1- qC,)qv" -qA,qB, (1-qC,)qv" 
Phase 3 
lA FV = qA,,(I- qB,)qC13 (1- qv,,) +qA, (1- qBI1 )qc13 - qA, (1- qBI1 )qc13 (1- qv.) = 1 
J qA
13 
(1- qB,)qC
13 
(1- qv,,) +qA, (1- qB
I1 
)qc
13 
- qA, (1- qB
I1 )qc13 (1-qv,,) 
IB,FV =0 
I FV_O 
D, -
(8.40) 
(8.41) 
As for the criticality measure of mission component importance (equation (8.37», it is 
possible to obtain a measure of mission importance for each component. This is 
defined as the sum of the probabilities of the union of the occurrence of prime 
implicant sets 8 k containing the failure of component c (in any phase) given that J 
phase j failure has occurred, and is weighted by the mission unavailability. This 
measure may be obtained by the sum of each individual phase j component 
importance given that phase j has been reached successfully, and is shown in equation 
(8.42). 
I CMISS FV - I P(Union of the 8 k implicant sets containing failure of c (in any phase) I 
j;l J 
phase} failure has occurred) (weighted by the mission failure probability) 
(8.42) 
Using the mission data given in equations (8.23) it is possible to obtain the measure of 
phase and mission importance for each component in Figure 8.1. The results of this 
are summarised in Table 8.11. 
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Component Phase 1 Rank Phase 2 Rank Phase 3 Rank Mission Mission Importance Importance Importance Importance Rank 
A 0.177237 3 0.3438838 3 1 1 0.3618667 4 
B 0.3456122 2 0.6561162 2 0 2 0.4313471 1 
C 0.5139874 1 0 4 1 1 0.3873681 2 
0 0 4 1 1 0 2 0.3765393 3 
Phase 1 Phase 2 Phase 3 Mission 
Unavailability 0.1128432 0.0874684 0.0319838 0.2322954 
Table 8.11 Measure of Component Phase and Mission Importance 
This measure of importance ranks the contribution each component failure makes to 
system failure. In phase 1, component C has the highest value of importance followed 
by component B and component D has the lowest. Since the components are linked in 
series, from the three first order cut sets, {Cl will contribute most highly to phase 
failure as component C has a greater failure rate than components A and B. In phase 
2, component D is present in both prime implicant sets of the phase and so for phase 2 
failure to occur, component D must have failed. In phase 3, components A and C 
contribute to both prime implicant sets, and so they are of equal importance to the 
success of the phase. For the overall mission, component B has the highest ranking 
followed by component C. 
The phase importance rankings are seen to be identical to those obtained using the 
criticality measure of importance and so produce the same conclusions. The mission 
importance rankings are different in that component C is now more important to the 
overall mission than component D. 
It is possible to compare the component phase and mission importance values to those 
obtained by treating each phase as a separate system. The results are given in Table 
8.12. 
253 
Component Phase 1 Rank Phase 2 Rank Phase 3 Rank Mission Mission Importance Importance Importance Importance Rank 
A 0.177237 3 0.3707868 3 1 1 0.2713557 4 
B 0.3456122 2 0.6937301 2 0 2 0.4754973 2 
C 0.5139874 1 0 4 1 1 0.3216913 3 
0 0 4 1 1 0 2 0.3945334 1 
Phase 1 Phase 2 Phase 3 Mission 
Unavailability 0.1128432 0.0762487 0.004171 0.1932629 
Table 8.12 Measure of Component Phase and Mission Importance when Treating 
each Phase as a Separate System 
Component failures that contribute to all implicant sets in a phase result in the same 
phase importance value of unity as the presented method. Component failures that 
contribute to only some of the implicant sets in a phase produce a different importance 
value for all phases after the first phase when treating each phase as a separate system. 
By considering each phase separately, the phase importance values are generally 
higher which implies that components make a higher contribution to phase failure 
than is true. This is due to the assumption made that all components are in the working 
state at the start of a phase. 
The mission importance rankings are different when treating each phase as a separate 
system as component D is considered to be the most important rather than component 
B. This is due to the increasing inaccuracy in the phase unavailability calculation as 
the phases progress. 
8.3.5 Measures of Prime Implicant Set Importance 
A measure exists to rank the importance of each cut set in a single phase mission. This 
Fussell-Vesely measure of minimal cut set importance defines the probability of 
occurrence of each minimal cut set given that the system has failed (equation (2.27». 
This measure may be extended for application to phased mission systems. A measure 
of phase prime implicant set importance is defined as the probability of occurrence of 
prime implicant set 8 k given that phase j has failed (weighted by the phase j system J 
failure probability), and is expressed in equation (8.43). 
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(S.43) 
The measure of phase prime implicant set importance may be applied to the example 
in Figure S.l, and the importance for the prime implicant sets in each of the 3 phases 
(Figure S.6) are given in equations (S.44), (S.45) and (S.46) respectively. 
Phase 1 
(S.44) 
Phase 2 
I., FV = qA, (1-qB, )(I-q(:)q~, qA, (l-qB,) 
qA, (1-qB, )(l-qc; )qL\, +(I-qA, )qB, (1-qc; )q~, -qA,qa, (l-qc; )q~, qA, (l-qB,,)+(1-qA, )qB, -qA,qB, 
12 FV = (l-qA,)qa, (l-qc)qL\, (l-qA,)qB, 
, qA, (l-qB)(l-qC)qL\, + (l-qA,)qB, (l-qc)q~, -qA,qB, (l-qc)qD., qA, (l-qB
Il
)+(I-qA, )qB, -qA,qB, 
(S.45) 
Phase 3 
I. FY = qA" (1- qB,)qC" (1- qD,,) qA" (1- qB,)(1- qD,,) 
, qA" (1- qB, )qc" (1- qD,,) + qA, (1- qB")qC,, - q A, (1- qB" )qc" (1- qD,,) qA" (1- qB, )(1- qD,,) + qA, (1- qB" )qD" 
12 FV = qA, (1-qB,,)qc,, qA, (1-qo,,) 
, q." (1-qB, )qc" (1- q~,)+ qA, (1-qB")qc,, -qA, (1-qB")qc,, (1- q~,) qA" (1-qB, )(1-q~,)+ qA, (1- qB,,)q~, 
(S.46) 
The event of mission failure is represented by the OR combination of the system 
failure during each of the phases. It is possible to obtain a measure of prime implicant 
set importance for the contribution of prime implicant sets to the failure of the entire 
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mISSIon. This is defined as the probability of occurrence of prime implicant set 
E k. given that phase} has failed (weighted by the mission failure probability), and is 
} 
given in equation (8.47). 
lE FV =P(Occurrence of prime implicant set Ek I phase} fails) (weighted 
kM/SS J 
by the mission failure probability) 
QMISS (q(t» 
(8.47) 
Using the mission data given in equations (8.23) it is possible to obtain the measures 
of prime implicant set importance for each of the prime implicant sets in Figure 8.6. 
The results ofthis are summarised in Table 8.13. 
Phase 1 Phase 2 Phase 3 Mission 
Prime Prime Prime Prime Mission Cut Set Implicant Rank Implicant Rank Implicant Rank Implicant Rank Set Set Set Set 
Importance Importance Importance Importance 
11 0.177237 3 - - - - 0.0860973 6 
21 0.3456122 2 - - - - 0.1678896 3 
31 0.5139874 1 - - - - 0.249682 2 
12 - - 0.3438838 2 - - 0.1380834 4 
22 - - 0.6561162 1 - - 0.2634575 1 
13 
- - -
- 0.8625351 1 0.118759 5 
23 
- - - -
0.3608004 2 0.0496772 7 
Table 8.13 Measure of Prime Implicant Set Importance 
In this example, the prime implicant sets with the highest importance to the mission 
are in the first two phases of the mission. 
If each phase is treated as a separate system, the phase minimal cut sets would be as 
given in Figure 8.7. 
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Reference Minimal Cut Sets 
Phase 1 It Al 
21 RI 
31 Cl 
Phase 2 12 ~D2 
22 R2D2 
Phase 3 13 A3C3 
Figure 8.7 Mission Cut Sets when Treating each Phase as a Separate System 
The Fusse11-Vesely measures of cut set importance would be found as given in Table 
8.14. 
Fussell- Fussell- Fussell- Fussell-
Vesely Vesely Vesely Vesely Mission Cut Set Rank Rank Rank Mission Cut Phase 1 Phase 2 Phase 3 Set Rank Cut Set Cut Set Cut Set Importance Importance Importance Importance 
11 0.177237 3 - - - - 0.103486 5 
21 0.3456122 2 - - - - 0.2017976 3 
31 0.5139874 1 - - - - 0.3001093 1 
12 
- -
0.3707868 2 - - 0.1462878 4 
22 - - 0.6937301 1 - - 0.2736997 2 
13 
- - - -
1 1 0.021582 6 
Table 8.14 Fusse11-Vesely Measure of Cut Set Importance when Treating each 
Phase as a Separate System 
Considering each phase as a separate system results in different importance values and 
rankings for the mission minimal cut sets. Treating the prime implicant sets as 
minimal cut sets does not take into account the requirement for previous phase 
successes. The difference in minimal cut set importance is due to the assumption that 
all components are working at the start of a phase. 
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8.4 Summary 
The analysis of importance is a very useful tool in the design and optimisation stages 
of a system. Since many systems comprise of multiple phases, it is useful to be able to 
implement importance measures during these initial stages. 
The importance measures presented for single phase systems (Section 2.2.3.5.2) have 
been successfully developed to allow the assessment of component importance in non-
repairable multi-phased missions. Probabilistic measures can easily be obtained using 
combinatorial methods, and are weighted according to either the phase or mission 
failure probability as appropriate. Further measures for initiating and enabling events 
and repairable systems are presented in the following chapter. 
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Chapter 9 Importance Measures for Initiating and Enabling Events 
in Phased Missions 
9.1 Introduction 
The importance measures described in the previous chapter assumed that the order of 
component failures in a minimal cut set is irrelevant. In some cases the top event of a 
fault tree may only be caused by a certain sequence of basic event occurrences. 
Probabilistic measures of importance are presented in Section 9.2 to deal with the 
interval reliability of a system where the order of component failures is significant. 
Markov models are implemented for the solution to repairable multi-phased missions. 
The model state probabilities can be used to calculate the importance of components 
rather than using combinatorial approaches. Methods to assess the probabilistic 
importance of repairable components using Markov models are presented in Section 
9.3. 
9.2 Probabilistic Measures for Initiating and Enabling Events 
The inclusion of sequential failure relationships in phased mission analysis allows us 
to extend the current initiator and enabler importance measures to derive further 
measures for multi-phased systems. Probabilistic measures of importance are 
presented to deal with the interval reliability of a multi-phased mission where the 
order of component failures is important. It is assumed that a mission is taking place, 
and all such measures are weighted according to the expected number of phase j 
failures, Wj(t.;-l, tj}. 
The example in Figure 8.1 has been modified to include representation of sequential 
failure relationships. This will be used to demonstrate the sequential importance 
measures developed for phased mission analysis and is given in Figure 9.1. 
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to t, 
I Phase 1 I 
A B C 
(I) (I) (I) 
Phase 2 
A B 
(I) (I.) 
Phase 3 
A C 
(E) (I) 
t3 
Figure 9.1 3-Phased Mission with Sequential Failure Relationships 
9.2.1 Expected Number of Phase Failures 
The unconditional phase failure intensity for single phased missions can be derived 
using the criticality function as presented in Section 2.2.3.5.3, given in equation (9.1). 
NI 
wsrs= L G;(q(t»). w; 
;=1 
I initiator 
(9.1) 
i initiator 
where Nj is the number of initiating events 
This is the sum of the probabilities that the system is in a critical state for initiating 
event i, and initiating event i occurs. 
In a multi-phased mission, phase j failure can occur due to either the occurrence of an 
initiating i event during phase j or the existence of initiating event i at the start of 
phase j (if i is non-phase specific). The system can therefore be in a phase j critical 
state for the event of component i failure in any phase k up to and including phase j. 
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The unconditional failure intensity for a phase j, Wj , is defined as the sum of the 
probabilities that the system is in a phase j critical state for component i failure in any 
phase k up to and including phase j, and the frequency that event i occurs during phase 
k. This is expressed in equation (9.2). 
phasej 
initiating event 
phase} (9.2) 
initiating event 
where Ni is the number of initiating events in phase j 
J 
. Wik is the is the frequency that initiating event i occurs during phase k 
The unconditional failure intensity of an initiating event i in phase k, W i
k 
' is obtained 
from the component i failure probability in phase k, qi
k
' using equation (9.3). 
h -'J..../. I -'J...·/k were q. = e ,.- - e ' 
'k 
(9.3) 
The expected number of failures for a single phase system can be obtained by the 
integral of the unconditional system failure intensity over the mission duration [0, t} 
(Section 2.2.3.5.3, equation (2. 30}}. We require a similar method to obtain the 
expected number of system failures during each phase j of a multi-phased mission. 
Phase j failure may occur due to the existence of non-sequential and non-phase 
specific sequential minimal cut sets at the start of the phase, or due to the occurrence 
of any minimal cut sets during the phase. The expected number of phase failures may 
be separated into two discrete terms, the expected number ofphase transition failures, 
and the expected number of in-phase failures. The total expected number of phase 
failures is obtained as the sum of the two terms. 
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The expected number of phase j transition failures, J~t (t j_I)' is obtained by the 
integral of the occurrence of non-sequential and non-phase specific phase j minimal 
cut sets prior to the start of phase j which do not cause failure in a previous phase. We 
require the expected number of phase j failures due to the occurrence of any non-
phase j specific initiating event i in any phase k up to but not including phase j. This is 
the integral of the phase j unconditional failure intensity due to initiating events that 
occurred prior to phase j over the interval [tk-l, tk), and is represented algebraically in 
equation (9.4). 
i=1 
non - phase J (9.4) 
specific initiating event 
The expected number of in-phase j failures, Wj I-p (t j_I' t j) , is obtained by the integral 
of the occurrence of all phase j minimal cut sets during phase j. We require the 
expected number of system failures due to all initiating events i in phase j. This is 
represented algebraically in equation (9.5). 
Nij 
njI-P (t j _l , t) = L 
i=l 
i phase J (9.5) 
initiating event 
The total expected number of phase j failures is obtained by the contribution of both 
the expected number of phase j transition failures and the expected number of in-
phase j failures. This combines equations (9.4) and (9.5), and is summarised in 
equation (9.6). 
iphaseJ (9.6) 
initialingevent 
The inclusion of sequential failure relationships in the example in Figure 9.1 means 
that the top event and thus the phase failure probability equations (8.9) - (8.11) need to 
be adjusted. Since phase failure will only occur if all enabling events occur before the 
initiating event in a sequential cut set, any component failure combinations which do 
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not represent the required sequential relationship of the cut set must be eliminated 
from the phase failure probability equation. 
In phase 1 there are no sequential cut sets and so the phase 1 failure probability 
remains as given in equation (8.9). In phase 2, there are two prime implicant sets, 
A2 BI Cl D12 and Al B2 Cl D12 • However since both represent the event that D occurs 
before A or B, the phase 2 failure probability remains as given in equation (8.10). 
In phase 3 there are two prime implicant sets, A23BIC23D12 and A3B12C23 . With the 
inclusion of sequential failure relationships, for phase 3 failure to occur, event A must 
occur prior to event C. The prime implicant sets must be altered to represent this, and 
become: 
*No longer a prime implicant set 
There are now three prime implicant sets, A2 BIC23 D12 , A3BIC3D12 , and A3B12C3· 
The probability of phase 3 failure becomes as given in equation (9.7). 
(9.7) 
The expected number of system failures in each phase of the example in Figure 9.1 
can be obtained in the following way: 
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Phase 1 
For the first phase of the mission, no previous component performance is considered. 
The expected number of phase 1 failures due to each phase 1 initiating event is 
obtained using equation (9.5), and is given in equation (9.8). 
;=1 
i phase t 
initiating event 
(9.8) 
Phase 2 
The second phase of the mission consists of enabling event (D), phase-specific 
initiating event (B), and non-phase specific initiating event (A). Phase 2 transition 
failure can only be caused by initiating event A if it occurs prior to phase 2 with 
component D failed. The expected number of phase transition failures is obtained 
using equation (9.4) and is given in equation (9.9). 
(9.9) 
Failure in phase 2 can be caused by initiating events A or B if either occurs during 
phase 2 with component D failed. The expected number of in-phase system failures is 
obtained using equation (9.5), and is given in equation (9.10). 
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2 W/-P (tp t2 ) = I 
;=1 
i phase 2 
initiating event 
(9.10) 
The total expected number of phase 2 failures is obtained by the sum of the 
contributions of both the expected number of phase 2 transition failures (equation 
(9.9)) and the expected number of in-phase 2 failures (equation (9.10)), and is 
summarised in equation (9.11). 
(9.11) 
Alternatively the total number of phase 2 failures could be obtained directly using 
equation (9.6). 
Phase 3 
The third phase of the mission consists of enabling event A in a sequential failure 
configuration with non-phase specific initiating event C. Phase 3 failure can be caused 
by initiating event C either at the phase transition if it occurs prior to phase 3 with 
component A failed, or during phase 3 if it occurs in phase 3 with component A 
failed. 
The expected number of transition system failures is obtained using equation (9.4), 
and is given in equation (9.12). 
265 
(9.12) 
The expected number of in-phase system failures is obtained using equation (9.5) and 
is given in equation (9.13). 
W/-P(t t)= rtl(iQ3(Q)].w dt 
3 2' 3 JI ~ Cl 
1 lA[ CJ 
The total expected number of phase 3 failures is obtained by sum of the contributions 
of both the expected number of phase 3 transition failures (equation (9.12», and the 
expected number of in-phase 3 failures (equation (9.13», and is summarised in 
equation (9.14). 
~ (t2,t3 ) = ~Tr (t2) + ~/-P (t2,t3 ) 
= r (qA
1 
(1-q~)(1-q~2»)· wc2dt+ f:(qA23 (l-q~)(l-q~)+q~ (l-qB12 )qDt2)· wcldt 
(9.14) 
Alternatively the total number of phase 3 failures could be obtained directly using 
equation (9.6). 
9.2.2 Measures of Initiator Importance 
Barlow and Proschan presented a time-dependent approach in analysing the 
importance of initiating events in a single phase system (Section 2.2.3.5.3). If only 
one component can fail in a small transition of time dt, then system failure must have 
occurred due to the failure of that component. The Barlow-Proschan measure of 
importance defined a method to calculate the probability that initiating event i causes 
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system failure over the interval [O,t). This was given in terms ofthe criticality function 
and weighted according to the expected number of failures, W(O,t), in equation (2.31). 
The Barlow-Proschan measure of importance is extended to give two new importance 
measures for phased mission analysis. The first is the measure of in-phase initiator 
importance, 1;0 BP(I-P). This is the probability that initiating event i causes system 
J 
failure during phase j [~_/, ~). The second is the measure of phase transition initiator 
importance, 1/ BP(Tr) , and is the probability that initiating event i causes system failure 
J 
at the transition into phase j due to failure in a previous phase. The total measure of 
phase initiator importance, I; BP , is the sum of the contribution of in-phase and phase 
J 
transition initiator importances. 
A phase j specific initiating event can only cause system failure if it occurs during 
phase j. All other initiating events can cause system failure by occurring prior to or 
during phase j. The phase j failure probability, Qj' includes contribution of all 
possible component failure combinations with account for sequential failures. The 
measure of in-phase j importance for initiating event i, I;J BP(I-p) , can be derived from 
equation (2.31) and is given in equation (9.15). 
(9.15) 
The measure of phase j transition importance for initiating event i, I;J BP(Tr) , is the 
probability that initiating event i causes system failure at ~-J due to failure of the 
initiating event in any phase k up to but not including phase j. This is derived and 
given in equation (9.16). 
(9.16) 
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The total measure of phase initiator importance is found by the sum of the 
contribution of in-phase and phase transition initiator importances (equations (9.15) 
and (9.16» in equation (9.17). 
(9.17) 
The measures of phase initiator importance may be applied to the initiating events of 
the example in Figure 9.1 in the following way: 
Phase 1 
The measure of phase initiator importance due to each phase 1 initiating event is given 
in equations (9.18). 
f:'( ~:q)}.dt r I Bl{l-p) o (1-q~)(l-qCj)w4dt 
= 4 TP;(O,t,) f' o (1-q~ )(l-qCj )W4 +(1-q4 )(l-qCj )w~ +(1-q4 )(l-q~ )wCj dt 
c[ ~~q)}.dt f' I Bl{l-p) o (1-q4)(l-qCj)w~dt 
~ TP;(O,t,) f' o (1-q~)(l-qCj)W4 +(1-q4)(l-qCj)w~ +(1-q4)(l-q~)wCj dt 
c[ ~~q)}Gdt f' I Bl{l-p) o (1-q4)(l-q~)wCjdt 
= Cj TP;(O,t,) r o (1-q~)(l-qCj)W4 +(1-q4)(l-qCj)w~ +(1-q4)(l-q~)wCj dt 
(9.18) 
Phase 2 
The second phase of the mission consists of two initiating events, phase-specific 
initiating event (B), and non-phase specific initiating event (A). The Barlow-Proschan 
measure of phase initiator importance for events B and A are given in equations (9.19) 
and (9.20) respectively. 
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/ 
BP _/ Bl{l-p) 
B, - B, 
(9.19) 
/ 
BP _/ Bl{l-p) 
A, - A, 
(9.20) 
Phase 3 
The third phase of the mission consists of only one initiating event, non-phase specific 
initiating event C. Phase 3 failure can be caused by initiating event C if it occurs prior 
to or during the phase with component A already failed. The Barlow-Proschan 
measure of phase initiator importance for event C in phase 3 is given in equation 
(9.21). 
J,"fqA (l-qB )(l-qn )),wc dt+ J,']fqA (l-qB )(l-qn )+qA (l-qB )qn ),wc dt 
'1 ~ 1 I L11 1 '1 ~ II I L11 J 11 ..... 12 3 
(9.21) 
It is possible to obtain a measure of the initiator importance of each component in the 
entire mission; This is defined as the probability that initiating event i causes system 
failure during any phase j, [~-1' ~), of a multi-phased mission (weighted by the 
expected number of mission failures). The measure of mission initiator importance is 
obtained by the sum of each individual phase j initiator importance given that phase j 
has been reached successfully in equation (9.22). 
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m 
I
iM1SS 
BP = L P(Initiating event i causes system failure during phase j I in phase j) 
j=l 
(weighted by the expected number of mission failures) 
m 
where WMIss(O,tm) = L Wj(tj_pt) (9.22) 
j=l 
The total measures of phase importance for all initiating events in Figure 9.1 may be 
quantified and ranked using the mission data given in equations (8.23). Since the 
importance measures are time dependent, the equations are solved numerically and the 
Runge-Kutta method is used for solution. The results of this are summarised in Table 
9.1. 
Phase 1 Phase 2 Phase 3 Mission Mission Component Initiator Rank Initiator Rank Initiator Rank Initiator 
Importance Importance Importance Importance Rank 
A 0.166666 3 0.328079 2 0 2 0.1838108 3 
B 0.333332 2 0.671911 1 0 2 0.3719455 2 
C 0.5 1 0 3 1 1 0.4442423 1 
D 0 4 0 3 0 2 0 4 
Expected Number Phase 1 Phase 2 Phase 3 Mission 
of Failures 0.113068 0.0551839 0.0327668 0.2010187 
Table 9.1 Measure of Initiator Phase and Mission hnportance 
The measure of initiator importance ranks the probability that each initiating event i 
causes system failure during phase j. In phase 1, component C has the highest value of 
importance followed by components B and A. In phase 2 there are only 2 initiating 
events, A and B. Component B has a higher failure rate thus has a higher importance 
value during phase 2. Component C failure must be the initiating event to cause phase 
3 failure, and so has an importance value of 1. 
For the overall mission, component C has the highest initiator importance ranking 
followed by component B, and then components A and D. During the first and final 
phases it is most likely that component C causes system failure, and this is reflected in 
the overall mission rankings. 
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It is possible to compare the initiator importance values to those obtained by treating 
each phase as a separate system. The results are given in Table 9.2. 
Phase 1 Phase 2 Phase 3 Mission Mission Component Initiator Rank Initiator Rank Initiator Rank Initiator 
Importance Importance Importance Importance Rank 
A 0.166666 3 0.333337 2 0 2 0.2012932 3 
B 0.333332 2 0.666674 1 0 2 0.4025858 1 
C 0.5 1 0 3 1 1 0.3961247 2 
D 0 4 0 3 0 2 0 4 
Expected Number Phase 1 Phase 2 Phase 3 Mission 
of Failures 0.113068 0.040313 0.0069945 0.1603755 
Table 9.2 Measure of Initiator Phase and Mission Importance when Treating each Phase 
as a Separate System 
Comparisons between treating each phase as a separate system and combining 
previous phase success with current phase failure shows that the initiator importance 
rankings through the phases are identical, and the importance values are very similar 
for this simple example. However, as the phases progress, the expected number of 
failures is increasingly inconsistent. This is due to the fact that no account is taken of 
previous phase outcome and the assumption that all components are in the working 
state at the start of each phase. The inaccuracies in the expected number of phase and 
therefore mission failures are reflected in the mission initiator values which show 
greater inconsistencies. 
9.2.3 Measures of Enabler Importance 
In a sequential failure relationship, system failure will only be caused if the order of 
component failures occurs in the correct sequence. It is possible that the failure of a 
component can permit the failure of another component to cause system failure, but is 
not able to cause system failure alone. The Dunglinson-Lambert measure of enabler 
importance for a single phase system presented a method to approximate the 
probability that enabling event e permits an initiating event i to cause system failure 
over [O,t) in equation (2.33). A new importance measure is presented to give the 
probability that enabling event e permits an initiating event i to cause system failure 
during phase}, [~-J, ~). This is an extension of the Dunglinson-Lambert measure and is 
defined as the measure of phase enabler importance. 
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We require the measure of enabler importance (le DL) for enabling event e in phase j. 
} 
This is the fraction of time that prime implicant sets containing event e have caused 
the top event to occur given that the top event has occurred. This can be expressed as 
two separate measures, the measure of in-phase enabler importance, and the measure 
of phase transition enabler importance. 
The measure of in-phase enabler importance, le} DL(I-P) , is the probability that 
enabling event e permits an initiating event i to cause system failure during phase j. 
This is found by the expected number of phase j failures due to the union of all prime 
implicant sets 8k with contribution of enabling event e and occurrence of initiating } 
event i in phase j, and is weighted by the expected number of phase j failures in 
equation (9.23). 
I DL(I-p) = 
e} 
(9.23) 
where Ek (i ) is the event that phasej prime implicant set 8 k occurs with initiating } } } 
event i in phase j set to true 
The measure 0/ phase transition enabler importance, le DL(Tr) , is the probability that 
} 
enabling event e permits an initiating event i to cause phase j failure at the time of 
transition. This is found by the expected number of phase j failures due to the union of 
all prime implicant sets 8k with contribution of enabling event e and occurrence of } 
initiating event i in any phase I up to but not including phase j, and is weighted by the 
expected number ofphasej failures in equation (9.24). 
(9.24) 
where Ek}(i/) is the event that phasej prime implicant set 8 k} occurs with initiating 
event i in phase I set to true 
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The total measure of phase enabler importance, le DL , is obtained by the contribution 
} 
of both the in-phase and phase transition enabler importances. This is the expected 
number of phase j failures due to the union of all prime implicant sets 8k with } 
contribution of enabling event e and occurrence of initiating event i in any phase I up 
to and including phase j, and is weighted by the expected number of phase j failures 
in equation (9.25). 
~ rl, ~ P(U. Ek (i »)wi dt 
DL DL(I) DL(Ti) L JI1_1 L..J kjlll,eek}} 1 1 I =1 -p +1 r =....:;I=::!..I_....:l.:::=I _______ _ 
e} e} e} W.(t. t .) 
J J-I' J 
(9.25) 
This approximation is demonstrated by application to the enabling events of the 
example in Figure 9.1 as follows: 
Phase 1 
Since the components are arranged in series, all events are initiating and there are no 
enabling events that can allow system failure in this first phase. 
Phase 2 
There are two phase 2 prime implicant sets: 
The phase enabler measure of importance for enabling event D in phase 2, IDz DL, is 
given in equation (9.26). 
Z 1 
'\' rl P(U E)w dt ~ J(O k li Dek k,(il) '1 
1 DL(Tr) _ i=1 ' I' , D -
, W2(tI,t2) 
J;I ({O}. wA1 +{O}.wB)it = 0 
f' ((1-qTJ.., )(1-qc1 )qo,.,)' w A,dt + f' ((1-qA,,)(I-qc, )qo,.,)' wB,dt 
1 1 
For phase 2 failure to occur, enabling event D must have occurred before either of 
initiating events A or B. This is consistent with the result of unity in equation (9.26). 
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Phase 3 
There are four phase 3 prime implicant sets, 
. A2B1C23D12 
- -
A3 B1C3Dl2 
A3 B12C3 
Expand E2J = A2 B1C3 Dl2 
--~~~ - -
E3J = A3 BP3 Dl2 
E4J = A3 Bl2C3 
The measure of phase enabler importance (IAJ DL) for enabling event A in phase 3 is 
given in equation (9.27). 
1'1 i" {O}·wc dt+ qA (l-q.J(I-qn )wc dt o :I '1:Z .... ....,1 1 
i "{qA (l-q. )(l-qn »)'Wc dt+ J,"{qA (l-q. )(l-qn )+qA (l-q. )qn )'Wc dt I, ~:I ..... "12 :I '] ~ 23 .... L")1 ] VJ.2 ...... 2 1 
J,"(qAn (l-qs, )(I-ql\,)wC, +qA, (l-qs,,)ql\, Wc,}tt , 
J,"{qA (l-q. )(l-qn »).Wc dt+ i"{qA (l-q" )(l-qn )+qA (l-q. )qn ).Wc dt tl~2 ..... "12 1 12~21 ~ • .... U 1 V(1 "12 ] 
(9.27) 
Phase 3 failure will only occur if enabling event A occurs before initiating event C. 
This is consistent with the result of unity in equation (9.27). 
It is possible to obtain a measure of enabler importance of each component in the 
entire mission. This is defined as the probability that enabling event e permits an 
initiating event to cause system failure during any phase j, [;-I. ;), of a multi-phased 
mission. The measure of mission enabler importance is obtained by the sum of each 
individual phase j enabler importance given that phase j has been reached 
successfully, and is weighted by the expected number of mission failures in equation 
(9.28). 
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m 
feM/ss DL - L P(Enabling event e permits an initiating event to cause system failure 
}=1 
during phasej I in phasej) (weighted by the expected number of mission 
failures) 
(9.28) 
The total measures of phase importance for all enabling events in Figure 9.1 may be 
quantified using the Runge-Kutta method and ranked using the mission data given in 
equations (8.23). The results of this are summarised in Table 9.3. 
Phase 1 Phase 2 Enabler Phase 3 Mission Component Enabler Rank Importance Rank Enabler Rank Enabler Importance Importance Importance 
Cut Set Cut Set Total {D,S} {D,A} 
A 0 - 0 0 - - 1 1 0.16300374 
S 0 - 0 0 - - 0 - 0 
C 0 
-
0 0 - - 0 - 0 
D 0 - 0.671911 0.328079 1 1 0 - 0.27452123 
Expected Phase 1 Phase 2 Phase 3 Mission Number of 
Failures 0.113068 0.0551839 0.0327668 0.2010187 
Table 9.3 Measure of Enabler Phase and Mission Importance 
The measure of enabler importance ranks the probability that enabling event e permits 
an initiating event to cause system failure during phase j. Since in this example there 
is never more than one enabling event in a phase, comparisons within individual 
phases cannot be made. However, it can be seen that the probability that enabling 
event D allows initiating event B to cause phase 2 failure is much greater than the 
probability that enabling event D allows initiating event A to cause phase 2 failure. 
This is due to the fact that initiating event B has a higher rate of occurrence. 
For the overall mission, Component D has the highest ranking of enabler importance 
followed by component A. During the longest phase 2, it is most likely that 
component D allows an initiating event to cause system failure and this is reflected in 
the overall mission rankings. 
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Mission 
Rank 
2 
-
-
1 
It is possible to compare the enabler importance values to those obtained when 
treating each phase as a separate system. The results are given in Table 9.4. 
Component 
A 
B 
C 
D 
Expected 
Number of 
Failures 
Table 9.4 
Phase 1 Phase 3 Mission 
Enabler Rank Phase 2 Enabler Importance Rank Enabler Rank Enabler 
Importance Importance Importance 
Cut Set Cut Set Total {D,B} {D,A} 
0 - 0 0 - - 1 1 0.04361321 
0 - 0 0 
- -
0 
- 0 
0 - 0 0 - - 0 - 0 
0 - 0.666674 0.333337 1 1 0 - 0.25136634 
Phase 1 Phase 2 Phase 3 Mission 
0.113068 0.040313 0.0069945 0.1603755 
Measure of Enabler Phase and Mission Importance when Treating each 
Phase as a Separate System 
Comparisons between treating each phase as a separate system with the combination 
of previous phase success with current phase failure show that the importance 
rankings through the phases are identical and the values are very similar. However, a 
larger inconsistency is seen in the mission importance values. This is again due to the 
increasing inaccuracy of the expected number of phase failures as the phases progress. 
9.3 Repairable Systems 
The importance measures presented in the previous sections can be applied to 
repairable as well as non-repairable systems. If a Markov model is implemented for 
solution to a repairable multi-phased mission, the model state probabilities can be 
used to calculate the importance of components rather than using the combinatorial 
approaches described previously in this chapter. 
Methods to assess the probabilistic repairable component importance with Markov 
models are presented in the following sections. 
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2 
-
-
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9.3.1 Probabilistic Measures of Importance 
Probabilistic measures of importance for phased mission systems where the order of 
component failures in a minimal cut set is irrelevant (Section 8.3) can be 
demonstrated by example to the second phase of a simple 2-phased mission, given in 
Figure 9.2. The Markov model for the repairable second phase is given in Figure 9.3. 
A B 
A B 
Figure 9.2 Example 2-Phase Mission 
Figure 9.3 Phase 2 Markov model 
The initial state probabilities of this phase 2 Markov model are determined by the 
final Markov system state probabilities at the end of phase 1 using the methods 
presented in Chapter 5. The importance measures can then be calculated using only 
the phase 2 Markov model since the previous phase is accounted for in the initial 
phase system state probability vector. 
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The unavailability of the system at time t in phase j, Qj (t), can be calculated as the 
sum of the probabilities that the system resides in an absorbing phase j failure state at 
time t. This is summarised in equation (9.29). 
Qj(t) = L~(t) 
sail phasej 
failure states 
where t is measured from the start ofthe mission 
(9.29) 
For the example in Figure 9.3, the unavailability at time t in phase 2 would be found 
by the sum of the probabilities that the system resides in an absorbing phase 2 failure 
state (4,6, or 8) at time t in equation (9.30). 
Q2 (t) = ~ (t) + Pr, (t) + Pg (t) (9.30) 
9.3.1.1 Phase Criticality Function 
The phase j criticality function for a component c is the probability that the system is 
in a critical state for component c in phase j at time t. The Markov model states can be 
identified that are critical for component c such that if component c fails, transition to 
an absorbing phase failure state will occur. The criticality function for component c in 
phase j at time t is given in equation (9.31). 
Gc (q(t» = 
J 
s allphasej 
critical states for c 
(9.31) 
This measure may be demonstrated by application to the phase 2 Markov model in 
Figure 9.3. The critical states for components A, B, and C can be identified as: 
Component Critical States 
A 2 
B 2 
C 3,5,7 
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The criticality function for each of the components at time t in phase 2 is calculated in 
equations (9.32). 
GA (q(t» = li(t) 2 
9.3.1.2 Criticality Measure of Phase Component Importance 
The criticality measure of importance for component c in phase j is the probability 
that the system is in a critical state for component c in phase j, and c fails. Using a 
Markov model, this is the sum of the probabilities that the system is a critical phase j 
Markov system state for component c at time t, and component c fails. This is 
obtained using the phase j criticality function for component c at time t and is 
weighted by the phasej unavailability at time t in equation (9.33). 
(9.33) 
The criticality measure of importance for components A, B, and C in the example in 
Figure 9.3 are given in equations (9.34). 
I CR(t) = GA2 (q(t»· qA(t) = P2(t)·qA(t) 
A2 Q2 (t) Q2 (t) 
I CR(t) = GB2 (q(t»· qB(t) =P2(t)·qB(t) 
B2 Q2 (t) Q2 (t) 
I CR(t) = GC2 (q(t»·qc(t) = (~(t)+Ps(t)+P.,(t»)·qc(t) 
C2 Q2 (t) Q2 (t) 
(9.34) 
9.3.1.3 Measure of Phase Component Importance 
The measure of phase component importance is the probability of the union of phase j 
minimal cut set occurrences, ek , containing the failure of component c given that J 
phase j failure has occurred. Using a Markov model, this is the sum of the 
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probabilities that the system resides in an absorbing failure state representative of the 
existence of minimal cut sets Ck at time t in phase j, and is weighted by the phase j } 
failure probability at time t in equation (9.35). 
L~(t) 
s all phase j states 
representing existence of Ct } 
lc} FV (t) = whereceCt } 
Qj(t) (9.35) 
This measure may be demonstrated by application to the example in Figure 9.3. The 
measures of phase importance for components A, B, and C are obtained in equations 
(9.36). 
Component Cut Sets Including States Representing 
Component Existence of Cut Set 
A {A, C} 6,8 
B {B, C} 4,8 
C {A, C},{B, C} 4,6,8 
(9.36) 
9.3.1.4 Measure of Minimal Cut Set Importance 
The measure of phase minimal cut set importance is the probability of the existence of 
minimal cut set Ck given that phasej has failed. For a repairable system represented } 
by a Markov model, this is the sum of the probabilities that the system resides in an 
absorbing failure state due to the occurrence of minimal cut set Ck at time t, and is } 
weighted by the phasej system failure probability at time t in equation (9.37). 
L~(t) 
sail phasej 
states representing 
I FV (t) = _ex_ist_enc_eo_if_Ct },"-
Ct} Qj(t) 
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(9.37) 
The measure of minimal cut set importance for each of the minimal cut sets in the 
phase 2 Markov model in Figure 9.3 is obtained in equations (9.38). 
Phase 2 Minimal Cut Sets: 
12 = {A, C} 
22 = {B, C} 
I FV (t) = P4 (t) + Pg(t) 
22 Q2(t) 
9.3.2 Probabilistic Measures for Initiating and Enabling Events 
(9.38) 
Probabilistic measures of importance for phased mission systems where the order of 
component failures in a minimal cut set is important (Section 9.2) can be 
demonstrated for a repairable system using an extension of the example in Figure 9.2, 
shown in Figure 9.4. The Markov model for the second phase is given in Figure 9.5. 
A B 
A B 
Figure 9.4 Example 2-Phase Mission 
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Figure 9.5 Phase 2 Markov model 
9.3.2.1 Expected Number of Phase Failures 
The rate of phase j failure, Wj (t), is the rate that phase j failure occurs at time t 
between [~-1' ~). Using a Markov model, this may be found by the sum of the 
probabilities that the system is in a critical state for initiating event i at time t, and the 
frequency that event i occurs at time t in equation (9.39). 
w/t) = L Gij (q(t)) . Ai 
i phasej 
initiating event 
where Gi/q(t)) = L~(t) (9.39) 
sail phasej 
critical states for i 
The expected number of phase j failures is the integral of the unconditional phase j 
failure intensity (equation (9.39)) over the time interval [~_], tj), and is given in 
equation (9.40). 
(9.40) 
In the example given in Figure 9.5, the initiating events are the failures of components 
A and B. The expected number of phase 2 failures can be obtained using the critical 
states for initiating events A and B and is given in equation (9.41): 
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Initiating Event Critical States 
A 
B 
2,42 
2,62 
W2 (t p t2 ) = f2 L Gi2 (q(t)) 'A i dt = f(G A2 (q(t)) 'AA + GB2 (q(t)) 'A B )dt 
tl i phase 2 1 
initiating event 
where G A2 (q(t)) = P2 (t) + P42 (t) 
GB2 (q(t)) = P2 (t) + P62 (t) 
9.3.2.2 Measure of Phase Initiator Importance 
The measure of phase initiator importance is the probability that initiating event i 
causes system failure during phase j. Using Markov models, this is the integral of the 
sum of the probabilities that the system is in a critical state for event i at time t, and 
the frequency that i occurs at time t in equation (9.42). 
r
tJ Gi (q(t))· Aidt J. BP =_Jt~J_:....1 _J ___ _ 
IJ W/tj_l't) where GiJ (q(t)) = L~(t) (9.42) sail phasej 
critical stales for i 
The phase initiator importance for initiating events A and B in Figure 9.5 is obtained 
using equation (9.42) as follows: 
where G A2 (q(t)) = P2 (t) + P42 (t) 
(9.43) 
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9.3.2.3 Measure of Phase Enabler Importance 
The measure of phase enabler importance (le DL) for enabling event e in phase j is the 
J 
expected number of failures due to the union of all phasej minimal cut sets ek . with } 
contribution of enabling event e. Using a Markov model, this is the integral of the sum 
of the probabilities that the system is in a critical state for an initiating event i 
contributing to the same minimal cut set as e, multiplied by the rate of occurrence of i. 
This is weighted by the expected number of phase j failures and is given in equation 
(9.44). 
L~(t) Aidt 
sal/phase} 
crilical slales for i 
suchlhalCk, will occur 
I DL = __ ---!:...if_IO_C_CuT_s,_an_d e_E_Ck.:...., ~_ 
e, (9.44) 
In the example shown in Figure 9.5, component C failure is the only enabling event. 
Enabling event C contributes to two sequential minimal cut sets, {C(E), A(I)} and {C(E), 
B(I)}. The critical system states for initiating events A and B such that the failure of 
either event would cause a minimal cut set containing C to occur are: 
Initiating Event Critical States for Occurrence 
of Cut Set Containing C 
A 
B 
The measure of enabler importance for enabling event C in phase 2 is therefore: 
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(9.45) 
9.3.3 Mission Importance Measures for Repairable Systems 
The phase importance measures for a repairable system are obtained using separate 
phase models, and the outcome of the previous phases are accounted for in the initial 
system state probability vector. Since the duration of each phase is accounted for in 
the solution of each Markov model, the mission importance measures can be obtained 
as an average of the individual phase importance measures. 
9.4 Summary 
The importance measures presented for initiating and enabling events in single phase 
systems have been successfully developed to allow the assessment of component 
importance in multi-phased missions where the order of component failure is relevant. 
The probabilistic measures are weighted according to the expected number of phase 
failures. 
For repairable systems, the Markov phase system state probabilities can be used to 
accurately assess the importance of both individual components and minimal cut sets, 
rather than the approximations obtained using combinatorial techniques. 
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Chapter 10 Conclusions and Further Work 
10.1 Summary 
The concept of a phased mission has been introduced as a sequential set of objectives 
that operate over different time intervals. During each phase of the mission, the 
system may alter such that the logic model, system configuration, or system failure 
characteristics may change to accomplish a required objective. 
The unreliability of a phased mission cannot be obtained by the simple multiplication 
of the individual phase unreliabilities due to the fact that the system must occupy a 
state that allows both of the involved phases to function at the phase change times. 
The phases of a mission are statistically dependent. The event of component failure 
can be critical for either the phase in which it occurs, or for a later phase of the 
mission. As such it can be the transition from one phase to another that is the critical 
event leading to mission failure. 
The most common existing techniques for solution to non-repairable phased mission 
systems are fault tree analysis and binary decision diagrams. Due to the potential 
system state explosion problem encountered when employing Markov methods, it is 
useful to be able to implement alternative combinatorial techniques. Many of the 
existing techniques also concentrate on the transformation of a multi-phased mission 
into an equivalent single phased mission. The main disadvantage identified in the 
existing approaches is that due to cut set cancellation between phases, it is not 
possible to accurately calculate the failure probability of individual phases, only the 
mission as a whole. 
A new fault tree method has been proposed to overcome some of the deficiencies of 
other fault tree methods, and enable the probability of failure in each phase to be 
determined in addition to the whole mission unreliability. Phase changes are assumed 
to be instantaneous, and component failure rates are assumed to be constant through 
the mission. The basic events are expanded into a series of sub-events representing the 
separate performance of the component in each phase of the mission. For any phase, 
the method combines the causes of success of previous phases with the causes of 
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failure for the phase being considered to allow both qualitative and quantitative 
analysis of both phase failure and mission failure. A new set of Boolean laws is 
introduced to combine component success and failure events through multiple phases 
so that the expression for each phase failure can be reduced into minimal form. The 
application of these laws allow the prime implicant sets to be obtained for each phase. 
The fault tree structure efficiently represents the non-repairable phase failure logic, 
but is not an ideal form for mathematical analysis. The binary decision diagram 
(BDD) method offers an alternative approach to the fault tree method and reduces the 
complexity of the problem. For larger fault trees it is more efficient to convert to a 
BDD prior to analysis, and this is particularly true of the non-coherent phase failure 
fault trees. The standard BDD technique has been extended to develop a method for 
use in missions of multiple phases, allowing the exact phase and mission unreliability 
to be calculated. 
The current importance measures defined for single phase systems have been 
developed for missions of multiple phases. This allows the importance of a 
component, minimal cut set, or prime implicant set to each individual phase and the 
entire mission to be calculated. 
Markov methods are considered for analysis of phased missions where repair of 
components is possible, and also for situations that prevent the assumption of 
independence between component failure or repair being made. A full Markov model 
is generated by using a single model which works over all phases of the mission, and 
is constructed by the inclusion of all components featured in every stage. The model is 
formed by considering the different requirements for each phase success and mission 
success, and the state transition matrix is used to obtain the probability of the system 
residing in each of the possible system states. By identifying certain types of phases 
and components, it is possible to reduce this full Markov model further. 
The phases of a mission may be characterised in certain ways. If a phase requires the 
relevant system function to work at an instant in time it is defined as discrete. No state 
transitions may occur during a discrete phase, and any component failures that exist 
would have occurred prior to the phase. A continuous phase requires the appropriate 
system configuration to be reliable for the specified phase duration. 
287 
The components in each phase may be non-repairable or repairable. The most 
simplistic repair model assumes that failures are detected instantly and upon repair a 
component is considered to be as good as new. However if a component is not 
monitored continuously, this assumption cannot be made. A maintenance policy is 
considered where components can be subject to scheduled inspection. In this case the 
failure of a component will occur unrevealed and remain in this state until it is 
revealed at the next scheduled inspection point, when it can be restored to good as 
new condition. 
The concept of sequential failure relationships has been introduced to missions of 
multiple phases. Component failures can be identified as initiating or enabling events. 
The occurrence of an initiating event can directly cause phase failure, where as the 
occurrence of an enabling event can permit the failure of another component to cause 
phase failure, but is not able to cause system failure alone. The function of a 
component is subject to change through the mission duration. 
Modified Markov methods have been presented to account for the possible types of 
phase, component, and maintenance policy, and the conclusions from this work are 
discussed in the following section. 
10.2 Conclusions 
The aim of this research was to consider analytical techniques for the efficient 
representation and solution of phased mission systems. The following conclusions are 
made: 
10.2.1 Non-Repairable Missions 
• The proposed fault tree technique for combining the causes of success of previous 
phases with the causes of failure for the phase being considered allows the phase 
failure probability to be determined in addition to the mission failure probability. 
This method is seen to be more suitable for the solution of systems which operate 
over a small number of phases. As the number of phases increases, this fault tree 
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technique is susceptible to a large state explosion which leads to extra 
computational time and effort being required. 
• Since each phase is obtained as a combination of current phase failure with 
previous phase successes, the basic events can represent either component failure 
or success in different phases. The top event of phase or mission failure can also 
contain multiple events belonging to the same component. A new set of Boolean 
laws is introduced which allows the expression for each phase failure to be 
reduced into minimal form, and the prime implicant sets to be obtained. 
• The BDD approach is found to provide an efficient and accurate alternative to the 
fault tree technique. With an optimal ordering scheme, the combination of phase 
failure with previous phase successes can be very simple as the events of 
components failing through sequential phases are considered only once. The 
quantification of the binary decision diagram approach leads to an exact answer 
rather than the approximation calculated by the fault tree method. 
• Once the phase or mission failure probability is calculated using either fault tree 
analysis or BDDs, the frequency of phase and mission failure can be easily 
obtained using the mission frequency. 
• Standard deterministic and probabilistic importance measures for single phase 
systems have been successfully developed to allow the assessment of component 
importance in multi-phased missions. For non-repairable systems, the probabilistic 
measures can easily be obtained using combinatorial methods, and are weighted 
according to either the phase failure probability or expected number of phase 
failures as appropriate. 
10.2.2 Repairable Missions 
• The full Markov model generated by using a single model which works over all 
phases of the mission and constructed by the inclusion of all components featured 
in every stage can get very large and in some cases become too large to generate 
and solve. this full Markov model may be reduced in the following situations: 
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• Discrete and Continuous Phases. It is only the continuous phases where the 
reliability calculations necessitate the use of Markov methods. Components 
that only feature in discrete phases are segregated from those which contribute 
to the failure of continuous phases. Discrete phases can be solved using fault 
tree analysis and continuous phases can be solved using Markov models. Only 
components contributing to each phase failure are included in the model. The 
full set of states for the total mission are reduced to evaluate initial conditions 
for each phase, and expanded out again at the end of a phase to enable 
calculation of successful entry to the immediately succeeding phase. 
• Non-Repairable and Repairable Phases. A non-repairable phase can be 
solved using standard fault tree techniques, and a repairable phase can be 
solved by application of a minimal Markov model. The expansion of the state 
probabilities at the end of each phase allows the unavailability or availability 
of all components to be calculated for transition to the next phase, and thus any 
sequence of repairable and non-repairable phases can be modelled. 
• Scheduled Inspection. A scheduled inspection routine is introduced for 
components that are not monitored continuously. The Markov model states for 
each phase of the mission can be expanded to represent the possibility of both 
unrevealed and revealed component failures. 
• Initiating and Enabling Events. The consideration of sequential failure 
relationships in phased mission Markov analysis is susceptible to state 
explosion problems, and so a minimal model is defined at each transition 
point. Initiating events that can only cause system failure by occurring in a 
particular phase are defined as phase specific. All components that do not 
contribute to any further phases of the mission may be removed completely 
from the transition model at each phase boundary. All remaining components 
that do not contribute to any non-phase specific sequential minimal cut sets in 
later phases are expressed in non-sequential form, and all components that do 
contribute to a later non-phase specific sequential minimal cut set must remain 
in sequential form. The model can then be expanded to represent phase 
specific failure relationships within each phase. If components do not 
contribute to non-phase specific sequential minimal cut sets in later phases, it 
is possible to remove them from the model during phases in which they are not 
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required, and also apply fault tree techniques where they are input to static 
gates in non-repairable phases. 
• If a system is too complex to use deterministic analysis, or if the failure or repair 
distributions of a component do not have a constant failure or repair rate, 
simulation may be necessary. Simulation techniques typically offer the greatest 
generality in representation, but are also often the most expensive in computational 
requirements. 
• The importance measures for non-repairable multi-phased missions have been 
extended to include the possibility of repair. Where systems are repairable, the 
Markov system state probabilities can be used to assess the importance of both 
individual components and minimal cut sets. 
10.3 Further Work 
The scope of this research leads to the possibility of further areas of investigation. 
Potential directions are discussed in the following sections. 
10.3.1 Optimum BDD Ordering Schemes 
The effect of basic event ordering schemes in single phase system BDDs has been 
subject to much research. Since the BDD approach can also be applied to non-
repairable multi-phased missions, it would be useful to be able to obtain an optimal 
event ordering scheme to result in the most accurate and efficient phased mission 
BDD. 
10.3.2 Dependency 
The assumption that components are independent is not always practicable. In some 
situations it is possible that the failure of a component may depend on the state of 
another component, in which case this assumption no longer holds. The current 
research into dependencies within single phase systems could be extended for 
application to multi-phased missions. 
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10.3.3 Varying Failure Rates 
The methods presented for solution to phased mission systems assume that the failure 
and repair rates of a component remain constant throughout the mission duration. It is 
possible that the requirements of a phase may cause an increase or decrease in the 
failure or repair rate of a component. Modifications of the current method can be 
made to allow for the possible change in failure or repair rate of a component between 
phases. 
10.3.4 Phase Sequences 
The research in this thesis has assumed that the phases in a mission occur in a set 
order. In reality, this may not be true. Depending on the outcome of a phase, the 
immediately succeeding phase may be different. An extension of the current methods 
could allow for any combination of phase patterns depending on the outcome of each 
phase. 
10.3.5 Variable Phase Durations 
The proposed methods for phased mission analysis assume that each phase is of a 
fixed time duration. In some cases it is possible that the interval over which a phase 
operates can be variable, for example if a phase transition will only occur due to the 
system reaching a particular state. It would be useful to extend the current techniques 
to allow for the possibility of variable phase durations. 
10.3.6 Delayed Phase Transitions 
The assumption that the transition between phases is instantaneous cannot always be 
made. It is possible that a delayed time period between phase boundaries can occur, 
for example due to the replacement of components. The current method could be 
modified to include the situations where phase transitions are not instantaneous. 
10.3.7 Phase Consequences 
The research in this thesis does not consider the consequence of each phase failure. In 
reality components would be more important in phases where failure has catastrophic 
consequences. Extensions could be made to this work to consider the consequence of 
each phase failure. 
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Appendix A Unconditional Phase Failure Intensity Example 
Phase 1 
The phase 1 prime implicant sets are: El = {AI} 
E2 = {BI } 
The phase 1 failure intensity can be expressed in equation (A. 1 ), 
WI dt = wI (I) dt - WI (2) dt (A. 1) 
The first term on the right hand side of equation (A. 1) represents the contribution from 
the occurrence of at least one prime implicant set in phase 1, and can be expressed in 
equation (A.2). 
W/ = P(EI) + P(E 2 ) - P(EI (JE2) 
= P(EI) + P(E 2 ) since there are no common events (A.2) 
Each term of equation (A.2) may be obtained as follows to give W11 in equation (A.3). 
P( El) = P(Prime implicant set El occurs during phase 1) x AMISS 
P(E 2 ) =P(Prime implicant set E2 occurs during phase 1) x AMISS 
P( E2 ) = A MISS S:· IB (t)dt = A MISS (1- e -AB I. ) 
(A.3) 
The second term of equation (A. 1 ) represents the contribution of prime implicant sets 
occurring while other prime implicant sets already exist in phase 1 (i.e. the system has 
already failed). This can be expressed in equation (A.4). 
(A.4) 
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The first tenn of equation (AA) represents the probability that prime implicant set El 
occurs in phase 1 while any other prime implicant sets already exists. This is 
expanded in equation (A.S). 
since a prime implicant cannot exist and occur (A.S) 
The probability that prime implicant set El occurs while prime implicant set E2 
already exists is the probability that component A fails in phase 1 when component B 
is already failed. This can be represented diagrammatically in Figure A.1. 
Bfails 
1 A fails 
1 Ir )1 
0 u u+du I, 
Figure A.1 Component B Fails Followed by Component A in Phase 1 
The situation demonstrated in Figure A.1 can be represented algebraically and is 
derived in equation (A.6). 
P(sl'u2) = AMISS r fB(U{ r fA (t)dt) du 
= AMISS f;1 fB (u)( [- e-AAI ]~ )du 
- A rll I' (u)(_e-AAII +e-AAU )du 
- MISS Jo J B 
= AMISS rABe-ABU(-e-AAII +e-AAU )du 
- A rll - A e -AAII-ABU + A e -(AA+AB)U du 
- MISS Jo B B 
297 
Similarly, the second term of equation (A.4) may be expanded as, 
This is the probability that prime implicant set Et exists when prime implicant set E2 
occurs, and is calculated in equation (A. 7). 
The third term of equation (A.4) becomes zero since the prime implicant sets contain 
no common events and so cannot both occur at the same instant of time, 
The second term of equation (A.I) is then obtained as the sum of equations (A.6) and 
(A.7) in equation (A.8). 
(A.8) 
The phase I unconditional failure intensity is calculated using equations (A.3) and 
(A.8) in equation (A.9). 
(A.9) 
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Phase 2 
The prime implicant sets for phase 2 are: 
f:l = {A2BJ 
f:2 = {A2 B.G.}. 
f:3= {A2 B.C2 }· 
Using equation (4.23), the unconditional failure intensity of phase I can be found by 
equation (A. I 0). 
I 2 
W2 =W2 -W2 (A.IO) 
The first terrn on the right hand side of equation (A. I 0) represents the contribution 
from the occurrence of at least one prime implicant set in phase 2, and can be 
expressed as, 
It is not possible for prime implicant sets f:2 and f:3 to both occur since component C 
cannot fail in both phases I and 2. The occurrence of at least one prime implicant set 
becomes as given in equation (A. I I). 
(A. I I) 
The first term on the right hand side of equation (A.4) represents the probability of 
occurrence of minimal cut set f: 1 • For f:1 to occur, components A and B must both fail 
in phase 2 in any order. The two possible failure orderings are represented 
diagrammatically in Figure A.2. 
B fails A fails 
1 A fails 
)1 
1 B fails 
II( II( )1 
u u+du ~ 11 u u+du 12 
Figure A.2 Failure Orderings for Occurrence of Prime Implicant Set f: I 
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The probability of occurrence of minimal cut set El is expressed as the sum of the 
probabilities of either A failing followed by B in phase 2, or B failing followed by A 
in phase 2. This is derived and given in equation (A.12). 
(A. 12) 
The probability of occurrence of prime implicant set E2 is the probability that 
component B works through phase 1, component C fails in phase 1, and then 
component A fails during phase 2. This is derived algebraically and is given in 
equation (A. 13). 
(A. 13) 
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E3 will occur if component B works through phase 1, and components A and C both 
fail in phase 2 in any order. Since only dynamic failure relationships are considered in 
phase 2, the probability that component B works through phase 1 is treated separately. 
The probability of occurrence of prime implicant set E3 is expressed in equation 
(A.I4). 
(A. 14) 
Using the derivation method presented in equation (A. 12), the probability of 
occurrence of prime implicant set E3 is derived and expressed in equation (A. IS). 
P(E3) = ')..,MISS
e 
-ABt• (e -(AA+ACltl + e -(AA+ACltl - e -AAt2-ACtl - e -ACt2-AAt1 ) 
P(E3) = ')..,MISs(e-Astl-(AA+Aclt2 +e-(AA+As+Acltl _e-AAtl-(AB+Acltl _e-Act2-(AA+ABltl ) (A. IS) 
Minimal cut set El and prime implicant set E2 can both occur at the same instant of 
time if C fails in phase 1, B fails in phase 2, and A fails after B in phase 2. Component 
A must be the last to fail since the failure of A in phase 2 is the only common event 
between the two sets. If the event of component C failure in phase 1 is treated 
separately, the probability of occurrence of El AND E2 can be expressed in equation 
(A. 16). 
(A.I6) 
The probability that component B fails followed by component A in phase 2 can be 
derived using equation (A.I2), and the probability of occurrence of El AND E2 is 
calculated in equation (A.I7). 
(A. 17) 
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Minimal cut set E, and prime implicant set E3 can both occur at the same instant of 
time if C and B fail in phase 2, and A fails last in phase 2. Component A must be the 
last to fail in phase 2 since component A failure in phase 2 is the only common event 
between the sets. There are two possible failure orderings, CT-+B2~A2 or 
B2~C2~A2, given in Figure A.3. 
Bfails Cfails 
I( Cfails 1 A fails )1 I( Bfails 1 A fails y )II( )1 
t, uu+du t. 
" 
uu+du t. 
Figure A.3 Failure Orderings for Occurrence of Prime Implicant Sets E, and E3 
The probability of occurrence of E, AND E3 can be derived and is given in equation 
(A.I8). 
= L:2 ~-.lcl' _ e-.lcu)ABe-Aau ( e-AAU - e-AAI2 )du 
= J 12 (A e-.lcI,-(AA+Aalu _ A e-(AA+Aa+.lc)U - A e-.lc I,-AA I2-AaU + A e-AA'2 -(Aa+Ac)u)du 
I, B B B B 
=[ AB e-Ac,,-(AA+ABlu + AB e-(AA+AB+Aclu +e-Ac,,-AA'z-ABu AB e-AAlz-(AB+AclU]IZ 
~+~ ~+~+~ ~+~ I, 
AB e-Ac,,-(AA+ABl', + AB e-(AA+AB+Ac)I, + e-Acl,-(AA +AB It, AB e-(AA+AB+Aclt, 
AA+AB AA+AB+AC AB+Ac 
+ AB e-(AA+AB+Acl', 
AA +AB 
AB e-(AA+AB+Acl', _e-(AB+Acl,,-AAlz + AB e-(AB+Acl,,-AAlz 
~+~+~ ~+~ 
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Therefore, 
The contribution from the occurrence of at least one prime implicant set in phase 2 
can be expressed using equations (A.12), (A.13), (A.15), (A.17) and (A.18) and is 
given in equation (A. 19). 
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AB +Ac ]} 
AA +AB +Ac 
(A. 19) 
The second term of equation (A. 1 0) represents the contribution of prime implicant sets 
occurring while other prime implicant sets already exist in phase 2 (i.e. the system has 
already failed). This can be expressed in equation (A.20). 
2 - - - - - - -
W2 = P(E.,A) + P(E 2 ,A) + P(EJ,A) - P(E.,E 2 ,A) - P(Et ,EJ,A) - P(E 2 ,EJ,A) + P(E.,E2 ,EJ,A) 
(A.20) 
Each term of equation (A.20) can be further expanded. The first term on the right hand 
side of equation (A.20) is the probability that minimal cut set El occurs while any 
other minimal cut sets or prime implicant sets exist. This is expanded as, 
Since it is not possible for a minimal cut set to both occur and exist, and also prime 
implicant sets E2 and E3 cannot both exist together, many of the terms are eliminated. 
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The probability that minimal cut set El occurs while any other prime implicant set 
exists becomes as given in equation (A.2I). 
(A.2I) 
The probability that prime implicant set E2 exists requires C to fail in phase 1, B to 
work through phase 1, and finally A to fail in phase 2. Since A is already failed in 
phase 2, for minimal cut set El to occur, B must then fail in phase 2. The probability 
that minimal cut set El occurs while prime implicant set E2 exists is the probability 
that C fails in phase 1, A fails in phase 2, and B fails last in phase 2. This is 
represented algebraically in equation (A.22). 
(A.22) 
Using the derivation in equation (A.I2), equation (A.22) can be calculated and is 
given in equation (A.23). 
(A.23) 
The probability that minimal cut set El occurs while prime implicant set E3 exists is 
the probability that C fails in phase 2, A fails in phase 2, and B fails last in phase 2. 
Components A and C can fail in any order, but component B must fail last for 
minimal cut set El to occur. This is represented in equation (A.24). 
P(EI'U3)=AMISs{f( (fc(t')dt'YA(U{ r fB(t)dtYu + f((fA(t')dt'Yc(u{ r fB(t)dt)dU} 
(A.24) 
Using the derivations in equation (A.I8), this may be obtained in equation (A.25). 
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(A.2S) 
Prime implicant set E2 can not occur while any other minimal cut sets or prime 
implicant sets exist. The existence of any other prime implicant sets would require 
component A to be failed in phase 2. Since the last component of E2 to fail is 
component A in phase 2, it is not possible for E2 to be the last prime implicant set to 
occur, 
P( E2, A) = P( E2, u1) + P(E2' u2) + P(E2 ,u3 ) - P(E2 ,u1' u2) - P(E2 ,u1 ,u3 ) - P( E2 'U2 ,u3 ) + P( E2 ,u1 'U2 ,u3 ) 
P(E2,A) =0 since prime implicant set E2 cant be the last to occur 
The probability that prime implicant set E3 occurs while any other minimal cut sets or 
prime implicant sets exist is expanded as, 
Since it is not possible for a prime implicant set to both occur and exist, and prime 
implicant set E3 cannot occur if E2 already exists since component C is already failed 
in phase 1, many of the terms are eliminated. The probability that prime implicant set 
E3 occurs while any other prime implicant set exists becomes as given in equation 
(A.26). 
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(A.26) 
The probability that minimal cut set El exists requires A and B to both fail in phase 2. 
Since A is already failed in phase 2 and component B must have worked through 
phase I, for prime implicant set E3 to occur, C must fail last in phase 2. The 
probability that prime implicant set E3 occurs while minimal cut set El exists is the 
probability that A and B fail in phase 2 in any order, and C fails last in phase 2. This is 
represented algebraically in equation (A.27). 
P(E3 ,UI ) = AM1SS{ C( (fit')dt')fB(U{ r fc(t)dt)du+ C( ffB (t')dt') fA (u{ r fdt)dt)dU} 
(A.27) 
Using the derivations in equation (A.I8), this may be obtained in equation (A.28). 
(A.28) 
It is not possible for minimal cut set El and prime implicant set E2 to both occur while 
any other minimal cut sets or prime implicant sets exist and so, 
P(&..,~,A) =P(&",~,14)+ P(&..,E2'~)+P(&.., ~,ll:l) 
-P(&",~,14,~)-P(&",~,14,ll:l)-P(&",~,~,ll:l)+P(&",~,14,~,ll:l)=o 
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Similarly, it is not possible for minimal cut set f>l and prime implicant set f>3 to both 
occur while any other minimal cut sets or prime implicant sets exist, 
Also, it is not possible for prime implicant sets f>2 and f>3 to both occur at the same 
time and so, 
p(lj, 62, 63, A) = p(lj, 62, 63, 14)+ p(lj, 62, 63,~)+ p(lj, 62, 63,~) 
- p(lj, 62, 63, 14'~) - p(lj, 62, 63, 14, ~)-p(lj, 62, 63,~, ~)+ p(lj, 62, 63, 14,~,~) = 0 
The contribution of prime implicant sets occurring while other prime implicant sets 
already exist in phase 2 can be expressed using equations (A.23), (A.25), and (A.28), 
and is given in equation (A.29). 
2 - - -
W 2 = P(f> p u2 ) + P(f> p u3 ) + P(E3 ,U1) 
(A.29) 
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The unconditional failure intensity of phase 2 as defined in equation (A. 1 0) can be 
obtained using equations (A. 19) and (A.29) and is given in equation (A.30). 
(A.30) 
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AppendixB Criticality Function Example 
B.t Critical States 
In tabular form, the arbitrary components X, Y, and Z are assigned for each component as 
given in Table B.I. 
X Y Z 
ComponentB A C D 
Component C A B D 
ComponentD A B C 
Table B.t Component Representation 
The critical states for components B, C, and D are shown for phase 1,2, and 3 in Tables B.2, 
B.3, and B.4 respectively 
Other Component Critical State Probability States B C D 
(.,X1,J-;,Zt) (1-qx. )(I-q1\ )(I-qz.) Yes Yes No 
(.,XPJ-;,Zl) (1- qx. )(1- q1\ )qz. Yes Yes No 
(.,XpJ-;,Zt) (1- qx. )q1\ (1-qz.) No No No 
("XI'J-;,Zt) (I-qx)q1\qz. No No No 
(.,XpJ-;,Zt) q XI (1- q 1\ )(1- q z\ ) No No No 
(.,XpJ-; ,Zt) qXI (I-q1\)qz. No No No 
(.,XI'J-;,Zt) q X. q 1\ (1- q z) No No No 
("XI'J-;,Zt) qx.q1\qz. No No No 
Table B.2 Critical States in Phase 1 
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Other 
Component Probability Phase Critical Phase Critical Phase Critical 
States 1 Fail forB 1 Fail forC 1 Fail forD 
(.,Xt2 'Y;2,Zt2) (l-qx12 )(1- q>;2 )(1- qZ12) No No No No No No 
("Xl 'Y;2 ,Zt2) qX1 (1- qr..2 )(1- qZ(2) Yes - Yes - Yes -
(.,X2'Y;2,Zt2) qX2 (1- qYl2 )(1- qZ(2) No No No No No Yes 
("Xt2 ,.¥;,ZI2) (1- qX(2 )qY1 (1- qZ(2) Yes - Yes - Yes -
(.,Xt2 'Y2,Zt2) (1- qX(2 )qY2 (1- qZ(2) No No No No No Yes 
("XI2 '.¥;2,Zt) (1- qX12 )(1- qY(2 )qz( No Yes No No Yes -
("X12 '.¥;2,Z2) (1- qX12 )(1- qY(2 )qZ2 No Yes No No No No 
("XP.¥;,ZI2) qx(qy( (1- qZ(2) Yes - Yes - Yes -
(.,XPy;,Zt2) qx( qY2 (1- qZI2) Yes - Yes - Yes -
(.,X2,.¥; ,Zt2) qx2qy( (1-qz() Yes - Yes - Yes -
("X2,y;,Zt2) qX2 qY2 (1- qZ(2) No No No No No Yes 
("Xp .¥;2,Zt) qx( (1- qY12 )qz( Yes - Yes - Yes -
("Xp .¥;2,Z2) qx( (1- qr..)qZ2 Yes - Yes - Yes -
("X2'.¥;2,Zt) qX2 (1- q>;2 )qz( No No No No Yes -
("X2'.¥;2,Z2) qX2 (1- qr..2 )qZ2 No No No No No Yes 
(.,Xt2,y;,Zt) (1- qX12 )qy( qz( Yes - Yes - Yes -
("XI2,y;,Z2) (1- qX12 )qy( qZ2 Yes - Yes - Yes -
(.,Xt2 ,Y2,Zt) (1- qX12 )qY2 qz( No Yes No No Yes -
("XI2,y;,Z2) (1- qX12 )qY2 qZ2 No Yes No No No Yes 
(.,xpy;,Zt) Qx(Qy(Qz( Yes - Yes - Yes -
(.,XPy;,Z2) Qx(Qy( QZ2 Yes - Yes - Yes -
("XpY2,ZI) Qx(Qy2QZI Yes - Yes - Yes -
("XpY2,Z2) Qx(Qy2QZ2 Yes - Yes - Yes -
("X2,y;,Zt) Qx2Qy(Qz( Yes - Yes - Yes -
("X2,y;,Z2) QX2Q>; QZ2 Yes - Yes - Yes -
("X2,y;,Zt) QX2Qy2QZ( No No No No Yes -
("X2,y;,Z2) QX2Qy2QZ2 No No No No No Yes 
TableB.3 Critical States in Phase 2 
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- -
Other Component Phase Phase Critical Phase Phase 
States Probability I Fail 2 Fail 
forB I Fail 2 Fail 
Critical Phase Phase Critical 
forC I Fail 2 Fail forD 
(.,XI23 ,1';23,ZI23) (1-lJXj2)(l-q>;)(l-qZt2l) No No No No No No No No No 
(.,Xp 1';23,ZI23) qX1 (1- qY12l )(1- qZ12l) Yes - - Yes - Yes 
(.,X2, 1';23' Z\23) qX2 (1- qY12l )(1- qZ12l) No No No No No Yes No No No 
(.,X3,1';23,ZI23) qXl (1- qY12l )(1- qZ12l) No No No No No Yes No No No 
(.,XI23' 1';, Z123) (1- qX12l )qY1 (1- qZ12l) Yes - - Yes - Yes 
(.,XI23 , y;,ZI23) (1- qXI2l )qY2 (1- qZ12l) No No No No No No No No No 
(.,XI23,y;,ZI23) (1- qX12l )qYl (1- qZ12l) No No No No No No No No No 
(.,X123 , 1';23' Zl) (1- qX12l )(1- qY12l )qzl No No No No No No No No No 
(.,XI23 , 1';23' Z2) (1- qX12l )(1- qY12l )qZ2 No No No No No No No No No 
(.,X123 , 1';23' Z3) (1- qX12l )(1- qY12l )qZl No No No No No No No No No 
(.,Xl,1';,Z123) qX1 q1( (1- qZ12l) Yes - - Yes - Yes 
(.,Xl,y;,ZI23) qX1 qY2 (1- qZ12l) Yes - - Yes - Yes 
(.,XPy;,ZI23) qX1 qYl (1- qZ12l) Yes - - Yes - Yes 
(.,X2,1'; ,ZI23) qX2 q1( (1- qZl2l) Yes - - Yes - Yes 
(.,X2,y;,ZI23) qX2 qY2 (1- qZ12l) No No No No No Yes No No No 
(.,X2' ~,ZI23) qX2 qYl (1- qZ12l) No No No No No Yes No No No 
(.,X3,1';,Z\23) Qxl Q1( (1- QZ12l) Yes - - Yes - Yes 
(.,X3,y;,ZI23) QXl Qy2(1- QZ12l) No No No No No Yes No No No 
(.,X3' ~, Z123) QXl QYl (1- QZ12l) No No No No No Yes No No No 
(.,X1,1';23,ZI) qX1 (1-qy12l )QZI Yes - - Yes - Yes 
(.,Xp 1';23,Z2) qX1 (1- q1(21 )QZ2 Yes - - Yes - Yes 
(.,Xp 1';23,Z3) qX1 (1- q1(21 )QZl Yes - - Yes - Yes 
(.,X2,1';23,ZI) QX2 (1-Q1()Qzl No Yes - No Yes Yes 
(.,X2,1';23,Z2) QX2 (1- QY12l )QZ2 No Yes - No Yes No No No 
(.,X2,1';23,Z3) QX2 (1-Q1()QZl No No No No No Yes No No No 
(.,X3,1';23,ZI) QXl (l-Q1()Qzl No No No No No Yes Yes 
(.,X3,1';23,Z2) QXl (1- QY12l )QZ2 No No No No No Yes No No No 
(.'X3' 1';23' Z3) QXl (1- QYI2l )QZl No No No No No Yes No No No 
(X123'1';,Zp) (1- QXI2l )QY1 QZI Yes - - Yes - Yes 
(XI23 , 1'; ,Z2') (1- QX12l )Q1( QZ2 Yes - - Yes - Yes 
(X123 ,1';,Z3') (1- Q X12l )QY1 QZl Yes - - Yes - Yes 
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Other Component Phase Phase Critical Phase Phase Critical Phase Phase Critical 
States Probability 1 Fail 
2 Fail forB I Fail 2 Fail forC I Fail 2 Fail forD 
(X123 , ~ , ZI ,) (1-qx.)qy2qz. No No No No Yes - Yes - -
(X123 'Y2,Z2') (1- qX123 )qY2 qZ2 No No No No Yes - No No No 
(XI23,~,Z3') (1- qX123 )qY2 qZl No No No No No No No No No 
(XI23'~'Zp) (1-qx.)qylqz. No No No No No No Yes - -
(XI23,~,Z2') (1-qx123 )qylqZ2 No No No No No No No No No 
(XI23,~,Z3') (1-qx.)qylqZl No No No No No No No No No 
(.,XPy;,ZI) qx.qy.qz. Yes - - Yes - - Yes - -
(.,XPy;,Z2) qX8r.qZ2 Yes - - Yes - - Yes - -
(.,XPy;,Z3) qX.qr. qZ3 Yes - - Yes - - Yes - -
("XP~,ZI) qx.qy2qz. Yes - - Yes - - Yes - -
("Xp Y2,Z2) qx.qy2qZ2 Yes - - Yes - - Yes - -
("XP~,Z3) qx.qy2qZ3 Yes - - Yes - - Yes - -
("XP~,ZI) qx.qylqz. Yes - - Yes - - Yes - -
("XP~,Z2) qx.qylqZ2 Yes - - Yes - - Yes - -
(.,XPl';,Z3) qx.qylqZl Yes - - Yes - - Yes - -
("X2,y;,ZI) qx2qr. qZ• Yes - - Yes - - Yes - -
("X2,y;,Z2) qX2qr. qZ2 Yes - - Yes - - Yes - -
("X2,y;,Z3) qX2 qr. qZ3 Yes - - Yes - - Yes - -
(.,X2, Y2, ZI) qX2qy2qZ. No Yes - No Yes - Yes - -
("X2,~,Z2) qX2qy2qZ2 No Yes - No Yes - No No No 
("X2'~' Z3) qxZqYZqZl No No No No No Yes No No No 
(.,X2,l';,Zl) qX2qylqZ. No Yes - No Yes - Yes - -
(.,X2,l';,Z2) qX2qylqZ2 No Yes - No Yes - No No No 
(.,X2,l';,Z3) qX2qylqZl No No No No No Yes No No No 
("X3,y;,ZI) qxlqy.qz. Yes - - Yes - - Yes - -
("X3,y;,Z2) qxlqy.qzz Yes - - Yes - - Yes - -
("X3,y;,Z3) qxlqy.qZl Yes - - Yes - - Yes - -
("X3,~,ZI) qXlqy2qZ. No No No No Yes - Yes - -
("X3,Y2,Z2) qXlqy2qZZ No No No No Yes - No No No 
("X3,Y2,Z3) qxlqYZqZl No No No No No Yes No No No 
("X3,l';,ZI) qXlqylqZ. No No No No No Yes Yes - -
("X3,l';,ZJ qXlqylqZZ No No No No No Yes No No No 
("X3,l';,Z3) qXlqylqZl No No No No No Yes No No No 
Table B.4 Critical States in Phase 3 
313 
B.2 Phase Criticality Function 
The criticality function for components B, C, and D calculated by the sum 'of the 
probabilities of occurrence of the critical states and also by differentiation of the phase 
unavailability are given in Table B.5. 
Sum of Probability of Occurrence 
ComponentB 
Q(critical in phase 1) 
= (1- qA. )(1-qc, )(I-qv,) + (1- qA. )(1- qc, )qv, 
= (1- qA. )(1- qc,) 
Q(no failure in phase1 & critical in phase 2) 
= (1- qA" )(1- qc" )qv, + (1- qAt, )(1- qc" )qv, + (l-qAt,)qc, qv, + (1- qAt,)qc, qv, 
= (1- qA,)(1-qC" )(qv, + qD)+ (l-qA.)qc, (qD, +qD) 
= (1- qA" )(1-qc" )qD" + (1-qA" )qc,qv" 
= (1-qA" )qv" (1- qc" + qc,) 
= (1-qA,,)qD,, (1-qc, -qc, +qc,) 
= (1- qA
Il 
)qv" (1- qc,) 
Q(no failure in phases 1 and 2 & critical in phase 3)=0 
Component C 
Q(critical in phase 1) 
= (1- q A, )(1- q B, )(1- qv, ) + (1- q A, )(1- q B, )q V, 
= (1- q A, )(1- q B, ) 
Q(no failure in phase1 & critical in phase 2)=0 
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Partial Differential 
8QI 
--I-q -q +q q a - A, c, A, c, 
qB, 
= (1 - qA )(1 - q c ) 
I I 
8Q2 = (1- q )(1 - q)q - q (1 - q )q 8 A, c, D
" 
A, c, D" 
qB, 
= (1-qC,)qD,,(1-qA, -qA) 
=(1-qc, )qv" (1-qA,,) 
8QI 
8q =1-qA, -qB, +qA,qB, 
c, 
= (1- q A, )(1- q B,) 
Sum of Probability of Occurrence 
Q(no failure in phases 1 and 2 & critical in phase 3) 
= q A, (1- q B123 )(1- q ~" ) + q A, (1- q B123 )(1- q ~23 ) 
+ qA,qB, (1- q~23) + qA, qB, (1- q~23) + qA, qB, (1- qD123 ) + qA, qB, (1- q~23) 
+ q A, (1- q B123 )q D, + q A, (1 - q B123 )q ~ + q A, (1- q ~23 )q D, + q A, (1- q B123 )q D, 
+ q A, q B, qV, + q A2 q B, qV, + q A, q B, qV, + q A, q B, qv.. + q A, q B, q D2 + q A, q B, q D, 
= (qA, + qA, )(1- qB123 )(1- qD123 ) 
+ (qA,qB, +qA,qB, +qA,qB, +qA,qB,)(l-qD123 ) 
+qA,(l-qB123 )qD, +qA,(1-qB123 )(qD\ +qD, +qD,) 
+qA,(qB, +qB,)qD, +qA,qB,qD, +qA,qB,(qD\ +qD2 +qD,) 
= qA23 (1- qBI2l )(1- qD123 ) + qA23 qB2, (1- qv..23) + qA, (1- qBI2l )qD, + qA, (1- qB123 )qv..23 
+qA,qB2J qD, +QA,QB2 QV, +QA,qn,Qv..23 
= qA" (l-q~" +qB" )(I-q~,,)+qA, (l-q~" +qB,,)qo, +qA, (l-q~" +qB,)q~" +qA,qB,qo, 
= qA" (l-q~ )(l-q~,,) + qA, (l-qB)qo, +qA, (l-q~,)q~" +qA,qB,qo, 
= qA" (l-q~ )(I-q~,,)+ qA, (l-q~ )qo, +qA, (l-q~,)q~, +qA, (l-q~, +qB, )qo, 
= qA" (l-q~ )(I-q~,,)+qA, (l-q~)qo, +qA, (l-q~,)q~, +qA, (l-q~ )qo, 
= qA" (l-q~ )(I-q~,,) + (qA, +qA,)(I-q~ )qD, +qA, (l-qB12 )qo, 
= qA
D 
(I-q~ )(I-q~,,) + qA" (I-q~ )qo, +qA, (I-q~, )qo, 
= qA" (I-q~ )(I-q~" +qD, )+qA, (I-q~,)qo, 
= qA" (l-qs.)(I-q~,)+qA, (l-q~, )qo, 
ComponentD 
Q(critical in phase 1) =0 
Q(no failure in phase1 & critical in phase 2) 
=~(l-lhJ,)q-qq,)+(1~2~(l-qq)~~(l-qq)~{l-lhJ)1C2 +(1~,~QC2 ~~QC2 
~ (l-lhJ -cm, ~)q-qc;)+(I~,~ (l-qc; ~ +qc;)~ (1-lhJ -qBz ~)qc; 
=~ {l-lhJ )q-qc;,)+(1~,~ (l-qq)~ (1-lhJ)qc; 
=~ (l-lhJ)q-Qc; -qc; +qC2)+(I~,~ (I-Qq) 
=q.., (I-ql\)(l-qc;) + (l-qA,,)qs, (I-qc,) 
Q(no failure in phases 1 and 2 & critical in phase 3)=0 
ferential Partial Dif 
aQ3 a =qA" (l-q~ )(I-q~, 
qc, 
) +qA, (l-q~,) 
=qA" (l-q~)(l-q~, ) + q A, (l- q ~,)q~, 
)+qA, (l-q~,)q~, =qA" (l-q~)(l-q~, 
aQ2 =0 
aqo. 
~-il:JE! =fJA. (1-ql\,)~-qc;)+(l-qA, JIB, (l-qc;) 
=qA, (l-ql\ )~-lk)-qA, qB, (I -qc; )+(I-qA, JIB, (I-qc;) 
JIB,(I-qc;) =qA, (l-ql\ )~-qc; )+(I-qA" 
aQ2 =0 
aqD, 
Table B.S Criticality Function for Components B, C, and D 
315 

